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EAST TIMOR, LAND OF HOPE

2nd SEMINAR ON EAST TIMOR
OF
THE OPORTO UNIVERSITY

With a Historical introduction on

EAST TIMOR, INVASION AND GENOCIDE WHEN DECOLONISATION WAS STARTING



Rectory of the University of Porto
September 1990

"EAST TIMOR, LAND OF HOPE"

2nd SEMINAR ON EAST TIMOR

of

THE OPORTO UNIVERSITY

[April 28 - May 1, 1990]

With a historical introduction on

EAST TIMOR, INVASION AND GENOCIDE WHEN DECOLONISATION WAS STARTING

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Rectory
University of Oporto

September 1990

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This 2nd Seminar on East Timor was possible by the commitment made by the University's Rector, Professor Alberto Amaral, when the booklet on the 1st. Seminar on East Timor [10 - 17 September 1989] was published.

To the Chancellor, and all the Rectory staff, to the Public Relations Secretariat and its Planning Division and to the Executive of the Engineering Faculty of the Oporto University where many of sessions took place, we want to express our thankfulness, by all support and incentives received.

Without the support of lobby groups such as "Peace and Justice for East Timor" and the "Oporto Committee for the Rights of the Maubere People" this Seminar would not have been possible. To these and all other organizations that took part in the seminar we want to show our appreciation.

From the very first start we had full support from the East Timor National Convergency, and from both parties that belong to it, Fretilin and UDT, and its leaders in Portugal Abílio Araújo and Paulo Pires. We had also the support of various East Timorese individuals, and namely José Ramos Horta whose international contacts were of invaluable importance.

'O GRITO' [Group for the Resistance and Intervention on East Timor], with the support of stage director, Miguel Loureiro provided our Seminar with a very important cultural participation, giving to both, participants and the public in general, an image of traditions, music, dance and songs, games, as well as the suffering and fighting of the East Timorese people. To "O GRITO" and the sound and light engineer, Eduardo Brandão, and his assistants, Pedro Branco and Abílio Vinhas, very special thanks for their dedication and hard work.

The Oporto Municipal Council sponsored and gave a very relevant support to the two shows by the group "O GRITO." To the Council's President, Dr. Fernando Gomes, the alderman for Cultural Affairs, Dr. Manuela Melo, the Director of Casa do Infante', Dr. Manuel Real, and all council staff who took part in those shows our special thanks.

We are indebted to Foundation 'Engineer António de Almeida', who also sponsored these shows and to the Embassy of the United States of America and to all that somehow helped us setting up this Seminar.

The contents, projection and relevance of this Seminar are due to the much higher number and importance of participants, who exceeded all initial projections.

It is important to mention the official participation of an important delegation of the "Ad-Hoc Committee for East Timor" of the Portuguese Parliament, led by its convenor, the Honourable MP António de Sousa Lara, and relevant political personalities as the State Councillor and ex-President of the Portuguese Republic [1976-1981, 1981-1986], General Ramalho Eanes, the Member of the European Parliament, Honourable MP José Barros Moura, the ex-Governor of East Timor, Brigadier Lemos Pires, Monsignor Bishop Fernando Soares of the Anglican Lusitanian Church, of university lecturers and students, journalists, legal experts, politicians and academics. Also a special mention to the important East Timorese delegation, comprising people of the most diverse opinionated fields whose participation was invaluable.

We also should stress the importance of having the presence of foreign representatives, such as the Most Reverend Paul Moore, Jr., Bishop of New York [Ret.] of the Anglican Episcopal Church of the USA, the Indonesian ('Tapol') [political refugee] Liem Soei Liong, the Australian expert Sasha Stepan of Monash University and British writer Professor John Taylor.

A special mention to Engineer João Meireles and to Conceição Alves for their efficiency and extreme dedication in performing the one thousand and one difficult tasks needed to make this Seminar possible.

Our thanks also to the journalist José Chrys Chrystrello for the translations from the original Portuguese, and Teresa Guedes de Oliveira, José Paulo Oliveira and Valdemar Morgado for the care put in the revision of the English version of the text.

Finally our very special word of appreciation to Miss Aida Costa for her permanent availability and very special care dedicated to the word processing and typesetting of this booklet.

To all our heartfelt thankfulness.

The co-ordinator of the 2nd Seminar on East Timor of the Oporto University

A. Barbedo de Magalhães
(Full Professor)

Introductory Note on the Synthetical Format adopted for the 2nd Seminar on East Timor

Originally we had anticipated the participation of 35 people for this 2nd Seminar on East Timor, but the interest revealed in this Seminar meant that the real number of participants exceeded even the most optimistic forecasts.

The fifty presentations and written speeches and ancillary documentation distributed to the participants exceed five hundred pages, and the transcription of the debates between the 150 participants equals that amount.

The cost of publishing such a huge documentation in full would mak impossible its distribution.

Taking into consideration suggestions from various participants in this Seminar, namely the Honourable MP Sousa Lara of the Social Democratic Party, President of the "Ad-Hoc Committee for East Timor" of the Portuguese Parliament, and the Rector of the Oporto University, we have decided to publish a shortened version.

We have shortened presentations and debates and even, omitted some of them. We have left out the opening speeches, not because they were of less importance but because they relate more to the moment and to the organization of this Seminar.

Since this booklet aims in Portuguese, French and English to readers that in some cases are totally alien to the problems of East Timor, we have included some introductory and supplementary notes regarding East Timor and some of the Seminar's presentations.

The co-ordinator of the Seminar is responsible for all introductory texts and the synthetical summary of presentations and debates. All transcripts and quotes are presented italic, and whenever possible their author is quoted.

What you will read here is a synopsis of the Seminar, instead of a full transcription, complemented with information that the participants are well aware of, but can be usefull for the public in general.

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PART ONE

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

EAST TIMOR: INVASION AND GENOCIDE WHEN DECOLONISATION WAS STARTING

1 - EAST TIMOR: SLIGHTLY LARGER THAN KUWAIT ALSO VERY RICH IN OIL

Timor is located at the far eastern end of the Sunda Archipelago, roughly 600 kms. off Darwin [the nearest Australian airport] and about 2,200 kms. from Jakarta [Indonesia's capital in the island of Java].

The East Timor territory comprises not only the eastern side of the island but as well the enclave of Oé-cussi, the Ataúro Island and the Jaco Islet, totalling around 19,000 sq. kms. [Kuwait has 17,818 sq. kms.]

In the Timor Sea between Australia and East Timor there are oil reserves considered to be between the twenty biggest in the world.

In early 1975 the population of the territory was deemed to be around 700, 000 [half of Kuwait's population].

The western part of the island belonging to Indonesia has around 11, 000 sq. kms.


KALIMANTAN
(Borneo)
SULAWESI
(Calebes)
(IRIAN JAYA)
PAPUA OCIDENTAL
WEST IRIAN
I N D O N E S I A
JAKARTA
JAVA
ARU
TIMOR LESTE
EAST TIMOR
Darwin
AUSTRÁLIA

2 - A NON-AUTONOMOUS TERRITORY UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION, CULTURALLY TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM INDONESIA

During the pre-colonial period, the Javanese empires whose fortunes were high between the X and the XV centuries never had any cultural influence over East Timor.

The island was also unaffected by the religious influences that marked most of the Indonesian population from Java to the outer islands. During the first centuries of the Christian era those peoples were influenced by Hindu polytheist currents in the wake of immigrant waves from India.

A few centuries later, namely during the VIII century, it was Buddhism to make its mark. It was by then that the biggest Buddhist temple in the world was built at Borobodur. It is by the XV century and after that Muslim ideals permeated and became a reality.

To this day, Indonesia is the most populous predominantly Islamic country in the world, with around 88 per cent of its 180 million inhabitants officially professing the Islamic cult.

When the Portuguese merchants and missionaries arrived in East Timor by the beginning of the XVI century [around 1515], in shark contrast with the rest of Indonesia, its population was animist and knew no written words.

Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism or even Islamism had penetrated the people of Timor, totally untouched by the dominant cultural influences of Indonesia, although the existing trade with China, Malacca and with other regions now belonging to Indonesia.

By then the island was already divided in two confederations of kingdoms: - one under the aegis of the Sombay kingdom, or confederation of Servian, on the western part of the island [corresponding to what is now West Timor] - the other under the supremacy of the Behale kingdom, or confederation of Belos, in East Timor.

The latter was already using by then a common lingua franca, Tétum.

The division of Timor in two halves has historical reasons dating back to pre-colonial times.

During the third quarter of the XVI century, the Portuguese established themselves on a permanent basis on the island, through Dominican friars who exercise a progressive cultural and religious influence whilst the Portuguese domination expands itself.

In 1970, a third of the Timorese was Catholic and only 0,04 per cent of the population [only 234 people] were Muslim. Two thirds of the population remained faithful to traditional animist beliefs.

In 1651 the Dutch defeat the Portuguese and occupy Kupang on the far western part of the island, before they start penetrating on the western side of the island. This shows how ancient the colonial division of the island is.

In 1859 a Treaty is celebrated between the Portuguese and the Netherlands settling the border areas between the Portuguese East Timor and the Dutch West Timor.

In 1945 the then Dutch East Indies became the Republic of Indonesia of which West Timor is part of.

Between 1945 and June 1974 the Indonesian Government abiding by International Laws states at the United Nations and outside that it has no territorial claims over East Timor.

Back in 1960 East Timor was considered a non-autonomous territory under Portuguese administration, according to Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

Between 1962 and until 1973 the United Nations General Assembly approved various Resolutions supporting the right to self-determination of East Timor as well as other Portuguese colonies.


INDONESIA
OMBAI STRAIT
WETAR STRAIT
TIMOR SEA
Ataúro
DILI
V. de Liquiça
MANATUTO
V. DE MANATUTO
V. SALAZAR
V.N. DE MALACA
LAUTEM
Jaco
V.C. CARMONA
SURO
S. DOMINGOS
FRONTEIRA
V.A. MONTEIRO
OCUSSI
9709'
7695'
6285'
5720'
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124°
125°
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9°
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EAST TIMOR
Road
Limit of the shires
0
20
40
60
Miles
Km
MAP NO. 1391 REV. 1 (S) UNITED NATIONS

3 - THE APRIL REVOLUTION OPENED THE DOORS TO SELF DETERMINATION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES AND TO THE CREATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST TIMOR.

Democracy in Portugal and self-determination and independence for its ex-colonies came simultaneously with the April 25, 1974 Revolution that toppled the undemocratic regime of Salazar and Caetano.

The liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies of Africa were fighting a consuming war thanks to the intransigence of the Salazar regime in Lisbon always unperturbed by the winds of change, namely in the three larger colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

Meanwhile in East Timor the nationalist feeling was being nurtured in the shadows looking for ways to express itself politically.

Because of the socio-economic underdevelopment and the laggard education system until the 50's, there was a very incipient elite barely capable to channel nationalist feelings.

Underdevelopment does not mean lack of culture, nationalist feelings and self-identity. Quite the contrary, as Portugal was oblivious of Timor, since there was no effective economical colonisation in terms of population, agriculture or even exploitation, the Timorese social stratification was left intact, with its kingdoms, its kinglets [liurais, régulos and chiefs of souks] and its noblemen [datos].

Although slightly influenced by the Portuguese presence and four and a half centuries of missionary presence [Roman Catholic], traditions, cults and in general, the cultures of the various peoples of East Timor were left to their devices.

We also should bear in mind the differences between the Portuguese presence and the Dutch colonial rule of the Indonesian archipelago already heavily influenced by Islam, to understand the colossal differences between East Timor and Indonesia.

The rebellions against the Portuguese colonial domination and its immediate repression and subjugation by the Portuguese administration, only helped the flourishing of national identity, reinforcing the psycho-social identity of the Timorese people.

Starting in the early 60's a massive investment drive was made by the Portuguese Republic at the educational level first, followed by a slower build-up of the socio-economic infrastructures of the colony changing albeit slightly its image.

This also promoted, even if indirectly, the emergence of an elite able to organize the nationalistic feelings and will of the East Timorese.

These started expressing themselves during the colonial regime, namely in articles on the local newspaper published by the Seminary, altogether with incipient and camouflaged forms of civil disobedience.

During May 1974 benefiting from the political freedom granted by the April Revolution two political parties were formed with substantial popular support:

- UDT (Timorese Democratic Union) was formed on 11 May 1974, started by defending a form of federation with Portugal, later evolving into a desire for independence.

- ASDT (Social Democrat Timorese Association) was formed on May, 20 to evolve a few months later into FRETILIN [Revolutionary Front For An Independent East Timor] and always proclaimed the need for total independence.

Under the aegis of Indonesia a new party was formed on May, 27, APODETI [Popular and Democratic Timorese Association] defending integration into Indonesia under a special autonomous statute. This party never had more than 2 or 3 per cent of popular support.

During 1975 other political parties are formed, all of them lacking popular support, such as KOTA and the Labour Party.

4 - SEPTEMBER 1974 INDONESIA GETS THE NOD FROM AUSTRALIA TO INCORPORATE EAST TIMOR, AND STARTS DESTABILIZING THE TERRITORY TO ANNEX IT.

Adam Malik, then Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Minister states publicly on the 17th of June 1974 that *"East Timor has a right to get independence and Indonesia has no territorial claims over any territory, as stated in its Constitution, and will try to have good working relationship with an independent East Timor."*

Notwithstanding this statement from the Foreign Minister, five days earlier an Indonesian MP, John Naro was defending the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, and a month later General Ali Murtopo and General Benny Murdani had completed a plan for incorporation of the territory, to be achieved when possible, and by forceful means if needed [1].

The daily "Berita Yudha" on its August, 28, 1974 edition editorializes that *"The right to self-determination cannot be separated from the general global strategy"*.

The idea of trying to integrate East Timor with Indonesia was not new. By the end of 1972 or 1973, the Special Action Group of the Indonesian Secret Service [BAKIM/OPSUS] gravely worried about the advances of communism and the American retreat from Vietnam, was voicing its opposition to a possible independence of East Timor.

The Portuguese censors still in operation on the 14th of February, 1974, interdict the publishing of an article by a French journalist who had visited East Timor because *"it is not favourable to us and says Indonesia has not ceased to try to occupy East Timor"* [13/p 106].

General Suharto who fearing international reactions hesitated on accepting the integrationist proposals from some of his generals and advisers, met on the 6th of September 1974, at Wonosobo in the Java Island with the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam who offered Australian support for the Indonesian policy of integrating East Timor.

A few days later, the Australian, Portuguese and international media were reporting on its headlines *"the Australian support for integration,"* and that *"The Australian Government considers this option for Timor to be important for stability in the region."*

Although the official communiqué added that *"Australian support for the integration of East Timor in Indonesia"* depended on *"a referendum by its inhabitants approved by the international community"* [2], later, Australia would forget such proviso and would recognize the annexation without the people of East Timor being able to vote for that in accordance with the international community.

The strategic interests and preoccupation with regional stability combined with the panic created by the advances of communism in Vietnam [Saigon fell on the 30th of April, 1975], the desire of good relations with Indonesia, together with an interest in Timor Sea oil reserves, might have dictated the Australian Government decision *"in total agreement with President Suharto on the issue."*

The USA support and the Australian agreement might have been fundamental for President Suharto to go ahead with the annexation.

It was well known by then, that the sea of Timor, between Australia and Indonesia was very rich in oil. In 1971/1972, both Indonesia and Australia signed an agreement defining their maritime borders, which obviously excluded the gap between Portuguese Timor and Australia.

During 1974/1975 negotiations were under way between Australia and Portugal to define the borders of such a rich area, although Australia was not very happy with the progress of those, well short of its expectations. Its ambassador in Jakarta reiterated in a cable dated 17/8/75:

> *"I wonder whether the department has ascertained the interest of the minister or the Department of Minerals and Energy in the Timor situation. It would seem to me that this Department might well have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia by closing the present gap than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor."*

As expressed on their meeting of 6-8 September 1974, the support given by the Australian Government meant that after such a meeting a decision was taken: East Timor had to be integrated with Indonesia, irrespective of the will of its people.

Curiously both that decision and its public knowledge precede the transformation of ASDT [Social Democrat Timorese Party] into FRETILIN [Revolutionary Front For An Independent East Timor] which only occurred a few days later, on the 11th of September, 1974. It also precedes the left turn in Portuguese politics that took place by the demise of President Spínola on the 28th of September 1974 and the 11th March 1975 movement.

It is obvious that the radicalization of East Timor political parties and the left turn in Portuguese politics (during the transitional period of the implantation of democracy in Portugal) served the best the interests of Indonesia to justify itself in the eyes of the world for the annexation of East Timor.

On the other hand, international evolution, especially in Indo-China has created a favourable climate to an Indonesian intervention.

Therefore, multiple factors were present in 1975 to make acceptable, and even supportable to a great part of the international community the invasion and annexation of East Timor.

The Indonesian Government had just to take advantage of such a favourable context to accomplish what was already before an aspiration of some of their top military leaders.

Summing up then, we have four basic reasons to make the ground for the invasion:

i) Panic in the western world and in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) confronted by the advance of communism in Vietnam and the subsequent north American retreat, of which the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975 is a symbol;

ii) Geostrategical reasons linked with the importance of Indonesia to the USA, Australia and the western world in general;

iii) Economic interests (mainly Australian) in the enormously rich oil basin of the Timor Sea;

iv) Internal needs of the military regime of Indonesia, and its 'hawks' to consolidate the fragile national unity of the archipelago [with autonomous movements demonstrating in other islands] through an exemplary lesson of forcefulness obtained by an invasion followed by the immediate suffocation of any East Timor reaction.

Unfortunately the successive and ephemeral Portuguese Governments that followed the unstable period after the April Revolution did not oppose firmly, as they should, the Indonesian ambitions.

Unable to know about the cultural, economic and political realities of East Timor they only defended the right to self-determination according to which, it should be the people of the territory the one to choose its own destiny, without any objections to the Indonesian integration if such was the freely expressed will of the people of East Timor.

Placing an overwhelming trust that the Indonesians, as they often boasted, would also abide by this principle, those Portuguese governments committed a far more tragic evaluation mistake than anyone could predict at the time.

Indonesia put forward its plan for the annexation, counting on the support of Australia, the compliance of the western world in general and the USA in particular, the understanding of the USSR (the PKI, Indonesia's Communist Party smashed by Suharto in 1965/1966 was pro-Beijing) and without a strong opposition from Lisbon.

The first step to it was the destabilizing of the territory, and to operate it General Suharto gives the go ahead in October 1974 to 'Operasi Komodo' led by Generals Benny Murdani and Yoga Sugama, and Colonel Sugiyanto. Such operation included the recruitment of East Timorese agents, fake propaganda by Radio Kupang and Radio Atambua on the Indonesian half of Timor and spreading through the official newsagency ANTARA of false and alarmist reports on the situation in East Timor.

This operation would also focus on the softening of East Timorese political leaders with all sorts of promises and offers (later converted in pressure) as well as the radicalization of local political parties through agents infiltrated from Indonesia.

A second phase of this 'Operasi Komodo' to start in early 1975 would include a military preparation of the invasion when it was fully clear the almost absolute rejection by the East Timorese of any integration project with Indonesia.

General Benny Murdani was the major architect of the preparation of the invasion of East Timor. On February 18, 1975 a simulated invasion was held at Lampung on the southern tip of Sumatra Island, allowing the preparation of the troops and set the stage for the operation that would occur late that same year in East Timor. According to Australian analysts the exercise was a total flop and helped delay the invasion of East Timor.

5 - PORTUGAL STARTS DECOLONISING EAST TIMOR IN 1974/1975 BUT INDONESIA IMPEDES A HAPPY ENDING TO THE AFFAIR

Lieutenant-colonel Mário Lemos Pires was nominated by the Portuguese Government on November, 14, 1974 as new Governor of Portuguese Timor, and when he arrived he started a systematic decolonisation process in anticipation of a future medium term self-determination.

Supporting a proposal from FRETILIN, well accepted by UDT of having a coalition of the two major political parties, he presided over what was supposed to become after January 20 1975 a drive for independence between five to ten years away.

This political posture and other measures designed to install moderation and serenity in the territory were seen as unwelcome by the Indonesian authorities who harshly criticised them. The constant provocation of Radio Kupang and Radio Atambua, the Indonesian broad casting stations in West Timor, was heightened during this period.

Misinformation and gossip regarding an imminent invasion of East Timor became a constant, and led an Australia broadcaster to announce on February 24, 1975 that Indonesia was preparing an attack of amphibious and air borne troops to Dili (the capital of East Timor) and to Baucau (the second most important city) within a few weeks.

As if to confirm such an intent, the Indonesian Consul in Dili Tomodok sent his family back to Indonesia. Simultaneously an Indonesian paper controlled by President's Suharto adviser on Security Matters General Ali Murtopo, "The New Standard", was publishing articles stating that East Timor could not become independent because of a lack of natural resources and because an independent East Timor would be pried open to communist influences thus affecting the regional stability.

In early March 1975, the Indonesian Command for Security Matters advised that West [Indonesian] Timor was off bounds for all Indonesian and international journalists. This coincided with hard needed improvements on roads to the border with East Timor and with other preparations of the invasion of the Portuguese colony. [4]

Portugal was in the meanwhile following onwards its decolonisation policy.

A document prepared in Lisbon during May 1975 is presented to the three major political parties of East Timor regarding the self-determination of the territory.

On May 27, 1975 UDT unilaterally cuts its link with the coalition established on January 20, with FRETILIN. This occurs immediately after the return to Dili of two of the major UDT leaders, Francisco Lopes da Cruz [President] and César Mouzinho [Vice President] who had held talks in Jakarta in the previous week with high ranking Indonesian officials.

At the end of June 1975, formal negociations take place in Macau, between representatives of the Portuguese Government and Timorese political parties. FRETILIN, however, has refused to attend this summit meeting alleging, among other reasons, the participation of an indonesian-backed integrationist party.

In spite of this, an agreement has been reached at the Macau summit, between the Portuguese Government, UDT and APODETI, of which has resulted the promulgation, on July 11 1975 of Law 7/75 where it was stated the election in the following month of October, of a People's Assembly of Timor to define its future political statute, and allowing for a transational period of about three years.

The breach of the coalition between UDT and FRETILIN caused by the first one due to Indonesian influence, FRETILIN's intransigence and their refusal to attend the summit meeting of Macau, some violence on the part of some of their militants inside East-Timor, provocations and violence by Indonesian agents, all were contributing to an effective destabilization on the territory.

But apart from these difficulties and problems, the Portuguese administration was able to keep moving towards decolonisation in areas such as local administration and education.

About this latter issue, it was more a problem of adapting the programmes, curricula and teaching methodologies to the realities and needs of East Timor. The Salesian Mission School of Fatumaca was an inspiring source.

The development of arts and crafts as well as agriculture teachings was accompanied by the introduction of health education and health support to the schools. Simultaneously school programmes were changed to include History, Geography, Legends and Traditions of East Timor as part of a major restructuring.

Schools were beeing equipped with arts and crafts workshops. Land was made available for horticultural projects and teachers were to be retrained commencing the 11th of August 1975.

A pilot project had started a week earlier at the Salesian Mission School of Fatumaca [near Baucau] to prepare rural foremen able to conduct agricultural teaching on all thirteen schools of secondary education.

The Administrative Review conducted by the Government intended to replace the colonial administration by another, that could become more representative of the local population whose will would be freely expressed in elections.

It all started in December 1974, with a special request from the population of the far eastern coast to the new Governor. After some months of consultation with political parties, it gave way to new legislation and to an electoral process that was started at Lautém [Far Eastern Coast]. Journalists, some diplomats and other independent international observers considered the electoral process as democratic. A high level of voting participation, including women, and the orderly manner of this first electoral process impressed and even surprised those observers.

By August 10, 1975 the Portuguese Governor officially swore in the first Regional Municipal Administrative Council of Lautém. The elections at the local level comprising villages, 'sucos' [groups of villages] and at the town level gave well balanced results between UDT and FRETILIN candidates, with a sole APODETI [pro-integration political party] being elected for the Council.

Such a regional election did not please the Indonesian generals, who stated they were not inclined to accept similar elections in the remaining twelve municipal districts. Knowing that those elections were freely conducted in a democratic way, the Indonesians were worried about the very poor popular support to the integrationist movement, thus deciding to stop such process at any price.

A few weeks earlier in July 1975, even the Indonesian President Suharto had publicly stated that *"East Timor could not become independent because that was economically infeasible."*

Moreover, the President considered that it was not feasible the continuation of links with Portugal, so that the only real alternative was integration with Indonesia. Such statements were vented immediately after his return from a trip to the USA, Canada, Japan, Iran and Yugoslavia.

UDT leaders leave to Jakarta on July, 25 where they had an important meeting on August 2 with general Ali Murtopo and his associates, trying to clarify the Indonesian position.

They returned to Dili on August, 6, and based upon promises, lies and threats by Jakarta they were able to convince other UDT leaders to launch four days later a coup d'etat against the Portuguese administration.

They took by force the airport, the local broadcaster and some other major key points, demanding the immediate imprisonment of FRETILIN leaders and an immediate transition of all powers to UDT.

With this coup late in the evening of August 10, Indonesia was finally able to achieve the first step of its *"Operasi Komodo"*: destabilizing the situation in East Timor.

The restructuring of education, the administrative review and other decolonisation and progressive measures were halted. The interest and enthusiasm such measures were causing among teachers and the population in general, would soon make any division and destabilizing attitude impossible.

Probably a month later it would have been too late for Indonesia to create a civil war in the territory. Unfortunately for the East Timorese, some of its leaders believed they would attain independence if they obeyed the instructions of Indonesia, so when they later realized how they had been tricked and unconsciously how disastrous their attitude had been, it was too late.

6 - WHILST PORTUGAL GOES THROUGH POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND INDONESIA KEEPS PORTUGUESE MILITARY AS HOSTAGES, A SHORT CIVIL WAR ENDS AFTER ONE MONTH AND FRETILIN TAKES CONTROL OF THE WHOLE TERRITORY.

The summer of 1975 will be remembered in Portugal by the political instability, and because the new democratic regime was not yet consolidated, the country even faced civil war.

The situation in the African ex-colonies, especially in Angola, was very difficult and complex. It certainly was not easy to make such a tardy decolonisation, after fourteen years of colonial war and when so many countries in line with their interests, were supporting and arming diverse groups of freedom fighters.

The successive governments in Lisbon during 1975 had very little internal and international operational control, and their preoccupations were more concentrated on internal Portuguese problems and on Angola where independence was finally declared on November 11, 1975, than on the East Timor situation, away in the Far East.

The only non-Timorese operational military force that Portugal had in East Timor was made of seventy parachutists who were thus neutral in the conflict. Such a force was too small to keep a whole territory under military control.

The global political context, the difficult situation that Portugal faced in that long hot summer of 1975 and the enormous distance between Portugal and East Timor [16.000 kms.] made it impossible to send in reinforcements.

As administering power, Portugal was left with the option of trying a negotiated solution through the United Nations.

Three days after the UDT coup d'etat, the Lisbon government sends a special official mission led by Major António Soares. Arriving at Jakarta Major Soares is not allowed to go on to East Timor by the Indonesian authorities and forced to return to Portugal.

In the field, the Portuguese Governor Lemos Pires tries to dialogue with local Timorese leaders. When an agreement seemed possible and UDT and FRETILIN leaders broadcast Peace appeals, on the Indonesian side Atambua Radio is calling up on violence and dialogue is broken.

FRETILIN sided timorese military forces, impatient with the government's impotence and in order to put an end to imprisonments and deaths by UDT forces, sublevate on the night of August 19, 1975 and take up control of the majority of military units. Portuguese army officers are detained for a few hours and liberated in the morning the following day, by the Officer's Mess. That day, the 20th of August, marks the beginning of the civil war.

Attempts to obtain a negotiated solution, however, do continue. On August 22, a second mission, this time led by the Portuguese Inter-territorial Coordination Minister goes to New York for talks with U.N. Secretary-General, after which he left for Indonesia and Australia. It is considered the formation of a Good Offices Committee and of a multi-national Peace-keeping Force, this one including Portuguese, Australian, Indonesian and Malay troops. Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Minister refuses and counter-proposes the immediate sending of a solely Indonesian Force. Portugal rejects this as an attempt by Indonesia to obtain the backing of the Admnistering Power for a military occupation of the territory.

In the meantime, and following instructions from the Indonesian leaders, UDT forces imprison 23 Portuguese Officers who are delivered to Indonesian authorities as hostages.

Fifteen days after UDT's take over, when cross fire was reaching Dili's harbour zone where the few European Portuguese military forces were concentrating, a radio broadcast informed that Indonesia was sending a navy ship to collect and *"take to a safe place"* the Portuguese Governor and his staff. That ship was destroyer *"Mon Icidi"*.

Trying to avoid becoming hostage to any of the warring factions and also in order to obtain safety conditions that permitted negotiations to take place between a Ministerial Mission, coming from Lisbon, and Timorese parties, Governor Lemos Pires decides to with draw with his team on August 26, 1975, to Ataúro island, also part of Portuguese Timor, and about 30 Kilometres away across Dili bay. In this way he was also escaping a trap set by the Indonesians who, offering their protection, were desiring that the Portuguese Governor himself would solicit military intervention by the neighbour country. But this, as other similar attemps by the Indonesian leaders to the Portuguese, were always completely rejected.

As a result of the coup against the Portuguese administration and the approach to Indonesian policies by some of UDT leaders, this party quickly lost a great part of the popular support they envoyed. Quite contrarily, FRETILIN became the only truly pro-independence movement and has gained a much larger support. Under these conditions, their miliatry and numerical advantage has become such that UDT has no way other than to withdraw to the border between Portuguese Timor and Indonesia, where they ask for protection. A little more than a month after its start, the civil war ends on September 24, with UDT forces and refugees numbering 2.500 crossing the border with Indonesia. Prior to that, UDT leaders are forced, by their Indonesian "protectors", to sign a document where they request the integration with Indonesia.

Other UDT leaders who were out of the territory, when informed on what had happened, reject the request, as being signed under duresse, as Indonesian prisoners. They were in fact prisoners: cought between FRETILIN forces and Indonesia, with dialogue channels cut, they had no other choice except signing a request they themselves completely rejected.

Later, some of these UDT leaders have publicly denounced Indonesian activities and one of their most responsible leaders even gave, at the U.N. Decolonisation Committee, his personal testimony on the false promises and threats to which he and his colleagues were subject by the Indonesians so as to have that request of integration of East-Timor with Indonesia signed.

By the end of September, FRETILIN controlled the situation in the whole eastern side of the island. They insisted with other countries, especially those in the region, to send in observers to watch what was going on in the territory. Pretexting that such visits could be seen as interferring with the role of Portugal as Administering Power, such requests were ignored, excepting some aid organisations and foreign journalist. These can see how efective FRETILIN's control of the territory was, the large popular support they enjoyed and the relative efficiency of the transitional administration led by the Front.

The International Red Cross (IRC), invited to operate on the territory, was doing a good job helping in the health and relief fields since the end of August. Its Mission Head, André Pasquier, who had been allowed to move freely, visited all civil war areas and was able to estimate casualties around 1500 people. The imprisonment situation was also controlled by IRC, once FRETILIN authorized visits to all detention locations.

The Portuguese Administration symbolically remained in the meantime in Ataúro Island.

As to UDT and the 23 Portuguese military hostages, they were in the hands of Indonesia.

APODETI had such a little support that their role in the civil war had been almost null. In political terms, however, its was one more good trump to be played by Indonesia.

Several times Portugal and FRETILIN try to dialogue to solve the problem. Indonesian authorities make known that any negotiation without party leaders who had sought refuge in their territory will be unacceptable - but at the same time such leaders are prevented to take part in any such negotiation...

Not succeeding in obtaining any backing from the Administering Power to cover military occupation, the Indonesians are going to try to convince world-wide public opinion that Timorese refugees are recovering ground themselves, just with support from some Indonesian volunteers.

To keep up with this fiction, they do not hesitate to murder five Australian television journalists, on October 16, to avoid that their filmings of Indonesian attacks to East Timor would throw down such a mystification.

Between November 1 and 3, the Portuguese and Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministers meet in Rome. Both agree that the decolonisation of Timor is Portugal's responsability, and that negotiations between Portugal and all Timorese parties should be initiated. Arriving in Lisbon, Portugal's Foreign Affairs Minister, Major Melo Antunes, declares that the Indonesian Minister has guaranteed that his country would not intervene by military means nor would even pressure the people of Timor.

Subsquent to that, Portugal suggests the Timorese parties that talks take place between November 15 and 20. All agree but UDT and APODETI - controlled by Indonesia - disagree with the date and the location, Darwin, which had in the meantime been proposed. Once more dialogue is not made viable by Indonesian authorities.

On November 28, 1975, FRETILIN, who were tired of trying the way of dialogue, unilaterally declares independence, which neither Portugal nor the United Nations do recognize.

7 - ON DECEMBER 7 1975, INDONESIA INVADES EAST TIMOR, WHICH THE U.N. IMMEDIATELY CONDEMN, REQUESTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES

By the end of November1975, Indonesia had achieved the following results for its integrationist policy:

a) In spite of not having had any opposition to campaigning for integration, they had not obtained a minimum of popular support that could justify integration by free choice of the population. Cultural differences were very clear, as a result of more than four centuries of evolution in opposing directions.

b) Having stopped the decolonisation process, led by the Adminstering Power through dialogue with the Timorese parties and according to international law, Indonesia was however unable to get support both from Portugal and the local Government, for its military occupation of the territory, in spite of several attempts made for that.

c) Having created instability in Portuguese Timor through the most dishonest means of captivation, provocation, pressing and threat, even that instability had ceased by the end of September 1975. FRETILIN had effective control on the territory and on the Administration and was enjoying a large popular support. East Timor, still under the Portuguese flag, was open not only to the International Red Cross but also to international journalists, diplomate, christian aid organisations, or whoever wanted to visit it.

d) Only in the international arena did Indonesia manage to get some goos results.

Using a well orchestrated campaign, on which investment was strong, Indonesia created an international image of violence and communist terror in Timor that was well received in that year of the fall of Saigon.

By murdering the Australian journalists who were in Timor, the Indonesian Government assured that its propaganda would not be disclaimed by the Media.

The interests of most states and Christian Churches made them regard with understanding, even sympathy, the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Regional stability was supposed to benefit from that.

Finally, in spite of the contribution of the November 25 political-military movement towards a clarification of Portuguese political affairs, a few more months would still be needed before the full settlement of a democratic state in Portugal, and some years more to recover stability and increase Portuguese diplomatic intervention capacity at international arenas.

Attacks on the border had permitted Indonesia to move in just a few kilometres. FRETILIN, very poorly armed, lacking heavy artillery, navy and air force, resisted with a lot of courage and tenacity the advancements of its neighbour's forces, accompanied by Timorese refugees they mobilized and commanded.

With such poor results for its *"Operasi Komodo"*, Indonesia decides to invade in force, fearing that the real situation would become internationally known.

At 2 o'clock in the morning, Sunday, december 7, 1975, the invasion began with a massive attack on Dili, involving naval and air forces (including the lauching of many parachutists) and the disembarkation of numerous batallions.

The operation, under general Benny Murdany, involved about ten thousand soldiers and was the biggest Indonesian military action since the end of their war of independence.

Thirty kilometres away, at the Ataúro Island, the very small Portuguese garrison could see the indonesian navy ships bombing the surroundings of Dili, the aircraft launching a large number of parachutists and the smoke of the city fire. Shortly after, it would withdraw for Darwin, impotent before such numerous forces.

There was no declaration of war and, on the following day, rejecting portuguese accusations, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister publicly affirmed that the attackers were only Timorese forces from MAC (Anti-Communist Movement) and Indonesian volunteers, trying to create a climate of peace for an orderly decolonisation. It must be remembered that MAC was made up of UDT plus three other Timorese small parties whose leaders had taken refuge in Indonesia: APODETI, KOTA and the Labour Party.

The day before the invasion USA President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had left Jakarta, after a visit during which they would have assured General Suharto that the supply of armament would not be affected by the military action that, soon afterwards, was going to take place. In fact, the following year American arms supplies to Indonesian would duplicate.

Facing such a powerful support to Indonesia, the Portuguese impotence was both military and political.

The same day of the invasion the Portuguese Government cut off its diplomatic relations with Indonesian and requested an urgent meeting of UN security Council so that this could take position on this *"act of aggression"* by the Republic of Indonesia against the territory of Portuguese Timor.

On the December 12, **The United Nations General Assembly approves a resolution** according to which, *"having heard the statements of the representatives of Portugal, as the administering Power, concerning developments in Portuguese Timor",*

(...) "deplores the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor", (...) "Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to (...) withdraw without delay its armed forces from the Territory in order to enable the people of the Territory freely to exercice their right to self-determination and independence"*, recommends that the Security Council *"take urgent action to protect the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and the inalienable right of its people to self-determination", (...).

On December 22, 1975, the **UN Security Council approves, unanimously**, a resolution in which:

> ***(...) "1. Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),***
>
> ***"2. Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory,***
>
> ***"3. Calls upon the Government of Portugal as administering Power to co-operate fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East Timor to exercice freely their right to self-determination", (...)***

In the meantime, on December 10, Indonesia throws a second attack, this time on Baucau, the territory's second city, where the biggest airport of the island is located.

Between ten and fitteen thousand troops disembark on the Christmas Day of 1975 in Dili, Liquiça and Maubara, disrespecting all UN resolutions. By April 1976 there were thirty five thousand indonesian troops in East Timor.

The enclave of Oe-Cussi was conquered on December 19 and the Ataúro Island was occupied on December 29 1975.

The interior of the territory was much more difficult to control and until today was never totally occupied.

In Dili and in other towns and villages invaded and occupied, the attitude of the Indonesian troops was the most inimaginably barbaric and inhumane. Indiscriminate murders, including women and children (and even some of the rare supporters of integration), robberies, looting, rape and torture, all was done on and on by the occupying forces in such a savage way.

Having been evacuated from Timor on the eve of the invasion - thanks to an Australian advice - all foreigners were safe, but the Australian journalist Roger East, who preferred to stay behind to witness the invasion, was captured by the indonesian military and murdered on the Dili harbour, together with hundreds of other people. The indonesians paid no attention to his Australian nationality.

Indonesia did not want witnesses for its crimes and, therefore, even the International Red Cross was not allowed, for more than three years to have any representative on the territory. Only Radio-Maubere, of FRETILIN, and later letters and reports from some catholic missionaries, permitted to know a little of the extent of the tragedy, that the Indonesian propaganda had completely distorted.

8 - THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE FARCE OF WHAT INDONESIA CALLED SELF-DETERMINATION

Shortly after the invasion, Indonesia took to Dili the leaders of the parties who had signed - under conditions of no other choice - the request of integration of East Timor with Indonesia. By December 18, the Indonesian Foreign Affairs minister announces the Formation of a "Provisional Government".

Although this "Provisional Government" had stated that there was no need for any popular referendum, such was the desire of the Timorese people to integrate Indonesia, on May 31, 1976, the creation of a "Popular Representative Assembly" is announced, formed on a non-elected basis, by "consensus and consent", that is, by people appointed by the occupants. On its first meeting, it unanimously approves a petition to President Suharto to accept the integration of East Timor with the Republic of Indonesia. A few days later, a delegation made up by all the members of the "Popular Representative Assembly" and the "Provisional Government of East Timor" officially delives the petition to President Suharto. On July 16, the Indonesian Parliament accepted the request and on the following day the President of the Republic of Indonesia promulgates the decree of integration of Portuguese Timor as the 27th Province of Indonesia.

Only after this farce had been played through, did Indonesia release the Portuguese military hostages, retained almost an year under its control.

In the meantime, the Geneva United Nations Mission Director-General, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, visited some areas controlled by the occupying forces, on the week of January 19 through 23, 1976. When he tried to visit other areas and contact with FRETILIN, the "Provisional Government" impeded him alleging lack of transport, unsafety and other reasons. Once in Darwin, Australia, the UN delegate and representatives of the Portuguese Government have tried, communicating with FRETILIN through a radio link using the means of Portuguese corvette João Roby, to establish latitudes on the southern coast of the island of Timor where the UN special representative could disembark and visit areas under control of that movement. Indonesian government members became so alarmed that even threatened to sink the Portuguese corvette. In the end, all locations mentioned on the radio messages were bombed, therefore making it impossible for the UN delegate to complete his mission.

Considering the data that, in spite of all, he was able to gather, Winspeare Guicciardi prepared a report, dated March 12, 1976, based on which and on statements by the representatives of Portugal, Indonesia and people of East Timor, the UN Security Council has approved, on April 22, a second resolution, in which:

> *(...)" Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence (...)".*
> *(...)" Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without further delay all its forces from the Territory (...)".*

This resolution was adopted by 12 votes to none, with two abstentions, these of Japan and the United States of America.

Already after the Indonesian Government had gone through with all the farce it has named *"self-determination"* and even *"independence"* of Portuguese Timor *"by integration with Indonesia"*, the United Nations General Assembly discussed the question on numerous occasions.

In this way, on December 1, 1976, a resolution was approved with a large majority, in which:

(...) " 1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the People of East Timor to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve that right,"

Reaffirms previous resolutions of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council,

(...) " 4. Strongly deplores the persistent refusal of the Government of Indonesia to comply with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX) and Security Council Resolution 384 (1975) and 389 (1976)".

" 5. Rejects the claim that East Timor has been integrated into Indonesia, inasmuch as the people of the Territory have not been able to exercice freely their right to self-determination and independence, "(...).

Until 1982, the UN General Assembly approved every year resolutions marking the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence.

Its resolution of 1982 *"requests the Secretary General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem, ..."* (resolution 37/30, dated 23 November 1982).

Portugal strongly committed itself on this resolution, being a co-sponsor of it (what had not been the case with previous resolutions), and having actively campaigned, at the United Nations and at state capital cities, in defence of the rights of the Timorese people. Indonesia opposed to that, voted against and said not to accept the mandate therefore given to the Secretary-General.

Indonesia initially refused to take part (what would expose it to being accused of lack of collaboration with the United Nations towards a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the question), but conversations did start in 1984, under the aegis of the Secretary-General, between Portugal and Indonesia, at the level of the Permanent Representatives by the United Nations, in New York.

After a first phase of intense contacts with some progress on the humanitarian area (repatriating Portuguese civil servants and family reunion), it became apparent however that due to the continued refusal of Indonesia in accepting a genuine act of self-determination, the positions of Portugal and Indonesia about this essential point were still unremediably apart. The Secretary-General however, carried on his effort to keep the dialogue open. It is in this frame that negotiotions were maintained between the two countries, limited, however, to the definition of terms of reference, modalities and dates of a possible visit by a Portuguese parliamentary delegation to East-Timor, with the purpose to observe, in first hand, the situation prevailing on the territory.

Taking into account the mandate given to the Secretary-General by its resolution 37/30, pending the mediation of which, consequently, he is in charge, the General Assembly has been postponing, since 1982, all debate on this question and therefore the adopation of further resolutions on it. Reports have been presented every year by the Secretary-General, accounting for the initiatives undertaken in the course of the mandate he had been given.

It has not just been the UN that has not recognized the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. Other bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement, the Inter-Parliamentary Union

(UIP), the European Parliament (EP) and the ACP-EEC Parity Assembly (this gathers MP's from countries of Africa, the Caribean and the Pacific and of the Euroepan Economic Community) have taken position in the defence of the right to self-determination of the timorese people.

In this way, in spite of Indonesia being one of the principal Founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, this has defended, on sucessive occasions during several years, the rigths of the people of the territory.

An example of such positions is the Declaration adopted by the Conference of Colombo, and approved on August 19, 1976, in which *"the conference affirms the right of the people of East-Timor to self-determination according to the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council"*. Similar positions would be taken in new Dehli, on April 11, 1976 and in other subsquent meetings.

As to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (UIP), whose members are MP's from all over the world, of the most diverse political currents, various resolutions have been approved such as the one in a meeting in 1981, that *"reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East-Timor to self-determination and independence and calls upon Indonesia to withdraw its forces to allow the exercice of that right"*.

At the end of September 1982, the UIP has approved an appel from Portugal in order that Governments and Parliaments all over the world should recognize and reaffirm the right of the people of East-Timor to self-determination and independence.

Even at the meeting held in Bangkok, Thailand (one of the member states, together with Indonesia, of ASEAN), from october 7 to 12, 1987, the UIP has approved by 791 votes in favour, 122 against and 207 abstentions, a resolution that considers the situation in East-Timor of great concern and invites intervening parties to collaborate in view of finding a solution according to the principle of self-determination.

On October 1, 1987, the **ACP-EEC Parity Assembly**, meeting in Lisbon, **has approved unanimously** a resolution, in which:

> *"1. Condemns the illegal and illegitimate occupation of East-Timor by Indonesia,*
> *"2. Reafirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and indepence,*
> *"3. Invites the interested parties to solve the question of East-Timor in the framework and according to the principles of the United Nations Charter,*
> *"4. Requests their co-presidents to transmit the present resolution to the Council of Ministers ACP-EEC, to the Commission and the Governments of Signatory States of the Lome Convention".*

The ACP-EEC Parity Assembly is a sort of a multi-continental parliament, composed by 132 members: one representative from each one of the 66 EEC-associated states of Africa, the Caribean and the Pacific, and 66 further members of the European Parliament. Its aim is the cooperation between the EEC and those 66 ACP states.

The above mentioned resolution has been put forward by all portuguese MP's and the representatives of the five Portuguese officially-speaking African countries (PALOP).

On its turn, the European Parliamentary, even before Portugal became an EEC member, had approved a resolution on May 23, 1980, that pointed for the hardening of positions taken by EEC member states at the voting of UN resolutions, and proclaimed the need for an urgent international investigation on the effects of the Indonesian occupation over the local population.

However, it has been the work in common of all Portuguese MP's, since Portugal jopined EEC in January 1986, from all represented parties, with no exception, that made possible the approval by the European Parliament, of numerous and important resolutions, examples of which are those on July 10, 1986, on September 15, 1988 and on November 23, 1989.

The resolution of the 10th of July, 1986, approved by a very large majority (162 votes in favour with only 3 against and 4 abstention):

> *"A. Considering that, since December 1975, Indonesia occupies by forec and in disrespect for International Law, the Terrotory of East-Timor;"*
> *(...) "1. Appeals to the Government of Indonesia to cease immediately all hostilities against the inhabitants of East Timor, to put an end to the occupation of this territory and to respect to right of the Maubere people to self-determination".*

In resolution of the 15th of September, 1988, the **European Parliament:**

> *"Considering that the territory of East Timor was invaded and occupied on December 7, 1975, was illegally annexed in July 1976, and has been, since then, under forced occupation by Indonesia; that this situation has caused the genocide of a third of the population, (...)"*
> *(...) " Considering that the cultural identity of the population of East-Timor is being destroyed (...)"*
> *(...) **"1. Condenms the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia and supports the right to self-determination of the people of East Timor;***
> *"2. Defends the right of the people of East Timor to keep, to develop and to affirm their cultural, linguistic and religious identity, resulting from the course of their own History;*
> *"3. Condenms the Indonesian policy of denial to independent foreign visitors the opportunity of freely examining the situation in the territory and of investigating alleged human rights violations; "(...)*
> *"9. Calls upon the Member states of the European Community to take political initiatives that contribute for the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces from East Timor, indispensable conditions to make the fundamental rights of the population be respected and to the exercice of the right to self-determination, including the right to independence; and to support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General with a view to accomplish these objectives;*
> *"10. Requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations that, in his efforts to find a solution for the conflict, not only Portugal and Indonesia be heard, but also the representatives of the people of East Timor, the Nationalist Convergence;*
> *"11. Calls upon the Governments of all Member States of the Community to suspend sales of military equipment to Indonesia until this puts an end to the illegal occupation of East-Timor; "(...)*
> *"15. Draws the attention of all EEC institutions to the present colonial situation in East Timor and to the terms of the present resolution, concerning the relations that develop in the framework EEC-ASEAN; (...)"*

Finally, the resolution of November

> *(...) "1. Reaffirms its demand for the recognition of the right to self-determination and independence of the people of East Timor, to be exercised in accordance with the standards of international law" (...)*
> *"4. Condenms once more the genocide Indonesia is committing in East-Timor" (...)*

N.of T. All quotations of official documents, made in this section 8, excepting those made from UN resolutions, are translated from available portuguese versions.

9 - THE EAST TIMORESE SUFFER A REAL GENOCIDE DURING 15 YEARS OF INDONESIAN OCCUPATION

All the Christian Churches in Indonesia, including the Roman Catholic, have from the beginning supported the annexation of the Portuguese territory of East Timor. On the one hand, they considered Timor's catholic congregation as a welcome reinforcement for the Indonesian Christian minority (about 3% catholic and 6% Protestant). On the other hand they were thus displaying their appreciation and their support to the Government of Indonesia, for not having created an Islamic state in the world's largest and predominantly Muslin Nation, with about 88% of 140 million persons, in 1975, and 180 millions in 1990.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a delegation of Indonesian priests who visited Eastern Timor, four months after the farcial *"self-determination"* and once the occupying forces considered it as the 27th province of the Unitary Republic, wrote in a report of November 1976 that:

> *"80% of the territory is not under direct control of the Indonesian military forces";*
>
> *"The total population of villages and towns occupied by the Indonesian forces amounts to 150.000 people. Taking the total population of East Timor of 650.000 people into consideration it means that 500.000 people is (sic) not under their control..."*
>
> *"The desire for integration is reduced because of robberies, fires, rapes, and when Indonesian troops got to Amara they had 5.000 people saluting them, now there are 1.000 left, the others joined FRETILIN in the mountains".*

The writer noted some comments heard as passing such as:

"If there should be a real referendum people will chose FRETILIN"

The same report mentions that during the first year of indonesian occupation 60.000 people had been killed. *"We found this figure rather high, because it means 10% of the total population of East Timor. But when I asked two fathers in Dili they replied that according to their estimate the figure of peopel killed may reach to 100.000".*(*).

The figure of 60.000 was also mentioned in Jakarta by one of the members of the "Provisonal Government", Lopes da Cruz, already on february, 13, 1976, who mentioned excesses and the death of women and children.

The murdering by the Indonesian army of all foreign media correspondents, present at that time in East Timor, as well as the total blockade of the island, even to the representatives of humanitarian organizations, made it impossible for the world to acknowledge all the extent of the tragedy.

Thus it has been mainly due to the letters and reports written by missionary nuns and priests, that some news could eventually pass through the blockade and reach the outside world.

In a report titled *"A report of this sad captivity"* writen by a missionary and published in *"Magnificat"*, the Jesuit newsletter, he says:

(*) This report was published on the 22nd of November 1976 by Legislative Research Service of the Australian parliamentary Library and is cited by Jill Jolliffe in his book "East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism"

" On November, 23, 1978 at Uadaboro, in the Matebian Range around 500 people were shot by machine gun, including pregnant women, children, adults and old people, when believing the propaganda they came to surrender. The same happened in Taipo with 300 people. Young women, married or single were taken to huts and sexually attacked. If they refused they were disrobed and burn with cigarette butts, after being raped they were shot at. Other married women were tied and bound with their husbands , then raped by the Javanese soldiers before being killed. Men and able youngsters were used in order to capture the guerrilllas; after being used in such a manner they were killed by the Indonesian troops.

"At Uatolári, in Viqueque, all school boys, upward and including the 3rd year of schooling were executed. Occasionally the firing squads operated in the presence of the victims relatives, parents and wives" (...)

"Between 1975 and July 1980 most political prisoners were executed, but this was reduced after the Red Cross was allowed in. When these prisoners are visited by international delegations they are forced to say they are common criminals and not political prisoners. The torture range from hot iron rods, electric chairs, cigarette butts, the denailing by pliers, having the toes under the table legs´and having the tables ladden with heavy weights. All victims are tortured naked and the burns are predominantly done on the sexual areas.

"Only the clergy has been helping these poor people, and that is how they survive. Many priests are courageous enough to intercede in front of the execution troops, while others go to the mountains to help those who live there aspiring for independence.

"All the fertile land around Dili belong to Javanese, and the Timorese are forced to pay to register their lands and since they cannot afford it the Indonesians take them over".

Some Timorese were sent on delegations to the UN or to European countries but they were forced to leave their families behind. Some of them escaped and live in Australia (João Carrascalão of the Central Committee for UDT), or in Portugal (Paulo Pires of the Political Committee of UDT), or in the Netherlands (José Martins, leader of KOTA).

On April, 29, 1979 José Martins wrote a letter to the UN Secretary General where he says:

"On December, 16, 1975 I went to the Security Council as leader of KOTA in a delegation comprised of Guilherme Gonçalves (Apodeti) and Mário Carrascalão (UDT) because our parties were then in a coalition opposing FRETILIN. I was not a free man, since I was forced while imprisoned to sign what the Indonesians wrote. Now I am free. I do not intend to give details on how I escaped the Machiavellian Indonesians.

"My people in East Timor trust me to tell the truth regarding our situation.

"My opinion reflects the feelings and the suffering of all men and women in my country who are still fighting for the self-determination and for the independence of East Timor.

"Most of those that like myself were forced to cross the border into Indonesian Timor are now jailed and understand the perverse nature of the Indonesian Army.

"When we ran away from the FRETILIN forces we became an instrument on the hands of the Indonesians, as soon as we crossed the Indonesian border on September

1975.

"The dismembered presidency of APODETI, UDT, KOTA and the Labour Party soon realized that instead of the sought freedom they all became dependent on the Indonesian Army".

Further down, José Martins states:

"The official statement of integration of East Timor with Indonesia is farcical since it was written on Bali, Indonesia on December, 2, 1975.

"While FRETILIN on November, 28, 1975 was declaring its unilateral declaration of independence at Dili, the capital of East Timor, our "Anti-Communist Movement" [MAC] was declaring the 'integration' more than a 1,000 kms. away in Bali at the luxurious 'Peneda View Hotel' which actually belongs to Colonel Sugianto, assistant of General Ali Moertopo [Murtopo]. It was a magnificent farce without a true mandate from our people".

Arnaldo de Araújo, the first 'East Timor Governor' installed by the Indonesians after the invasion could not avoid writing back in July, 1976 a letter to general Suharto complaining against the plundering and massacres that not even the APODETI and UDT members escaped, although they previously supported integration.

Two members of the 'East Timor Regional Assembly' Leandro Isaak and Sousa Soares by June, 3, 1981 submit this document to President Suharto:

"The Regional Assembly, representative of East Timor keeps on receiving with the utmost pain, written and verbal reports, or complaints from the people regarding torture, assassination and other unthinkable cases".

This document quotes concrete cases of persecution, naming places and people, cases of torture (sexual abuses and rape of women), executions because some people did not collaborate with the particular interests of certain individuals or groups, and charges of black magic (i.e., the traditional practice of local animist cults).

Focusing on the generalized corruption, the same document refers that medicine and food supplied by humanitarian institutions were being pilfered, the sandal cultivation was being destroyed and the coffee monopoly was being controlled by a company belonging to the army, amongst some other abuses.

Because they dared write such a document, those two members of the 'Regional Assembly' were landed on jail, so that they would be silent like the others. It was only through international pressure that they were later released by the Indonesians.

A Catholic missionary reports some massacres occurred during September and October 1981, during military operations involving the siege and subsequent annihilation to end with some resistance pockets still active.

The horrors suffered and witnessed by the East Timorese were so intense that the rebellion against the invaders became even stronger.

The same missionary reports:

"With our eyes we have witnessed the massacre of the people when surrendering: they were all killed, even women and small children; not even the pregnant women escaped: then opened them wide with knives in front of their mothers the newborn were decapitated and after that they finished with the mothers.

"The massacres were more brutal towards the people who followed the Front [FRETILIN]. Their families did not have the mobility to accompany the warriors.

"I also learned that they repeated what they did last year to young children, grabbing them by their feet they threw them in circles until they smashed their heads against the rocks. Another person told me that a person from D. watching the massacre of a mother asked the Indonesians if he could keep the baby. Initially they said yes, but after forming gathering group they killed the child as well as the 'imprudent good samaritan'".

"Another one who had asked to keep the child had to watch them smash the little innocent. Then an Indonesian showing his teeth said: "When you clean the garden, don't you kill all snakes, big and small?"

All this was happening when President Suharto had 'offered' a large amnesty to all those who volunteered to surrender.

One tactic used by the Indonesians was to force the East Timorese civilians, men and boys to advance in front of the Indonesian troops working as a shield to destroy the Maubere Resistance.

Tens of thousand of East Timorese were forced to take part in the Indonesian military actions of siege and annihilation, thus witnessing the macabre spectacle of other East Timorese who fought with the guerrillas in the mountains.

The same report from the missionary priest on events of September and October, 1981 states:

"Notwithstanding their bellicose display they see themselves faced with a lost war. All over the territory the people's rejection is total thanks to all sorts of ordeals they have sustained since the invasion.

"They realize that they have lost all support from the population. On desperation, they try all forms of terror to subjugate the local spirit.

"Some witnesses said that even Indonesian soldiers wept in face of such terror. It may be the case that they remembered their wives and children.

"To understand the moral standards of this army it is worth remembering the words of some officers: "We have done it before in Java, Celebes, Borneo and Irian Jaya and it worked." This means that only terror can subjugate the populations.

"The people who govern are the same of those days. It is evidently clear that such a massacre witnessed by representatives of all East Timor Shires had a terrible dimension.(...)

"The Indonesian army mixed with the people: rows of people and rows of troops circling the pockets of the resistance in the bush. The Front [FRETILIN] is faced with a dilemma: either to destroy the attackers and simultaneously exterminating lots of its own people or to surrender to save its own people.

"This is what yesterday [26] was referred to me by Father D. very impressed by this act of heroic generosity of some FRETILIN commanders. According to his report some FRETILIN leaders tried to inform the population to get separated from the Indonesian army.

"Since that was impossible without any arms, and all would be massacred by the Indonesian troops, the FRETILIN leaders decided to opt for their holocaust and save their people".

After that it was the return to Dili and to their villages, if they still existed, of all the East Timorese forced to serve as human shield:

"In Dili one could not avoid noticing cadaveric, sepulchral civilians returning from the forced marches.

"If someone talks about the brutality used against women and children by the Indonesian army they are threatened of immediate death.

"However the population cannot continue silent and go to tell the Bishop all the horrors and their hallucination, even stating they do not mind even if they die."

The Apostolic Administrator of Dili [to whom the East Timorese call Bishop because he performs the same functions] refuses to be silent and denounces the massacres in letters to the outside world and during the homily after the Procession honouring Our Lady of Fátima on October, 13, 1981.

The same missionary reports further:

"The people are united under the Bishop. The Indonesian army being internationally denounced try to eliminate the Bishop and some priests and start a deliberate campaign of defamation of the Church and the clergy.

"There were about 15,000 people with the Bishop and this is important to be noted here, before they kill the Bishop. It is being said here that they might eliminate him dissimulating a disaster"

After this denunciation of Monsignor Martinho Lopes to the outside world the Indonesian authorities exercised pressure over the Vatican for his substitution and departure from East Timor. Thus, in May 1983, Vatican replaced Mons. Martinho Lopes by Mons. Ximenes Belo.

The missionary ends his report saying:

"The Indonesian military members state they won't pay any attention to the United Nations and as far as the American congressmen although feared they can also be bought.

"The missionary concludes his report on what he saw and was told:

"There are two great truths: they are people [Government] able to execute genocide ... they only fear one thing: a universal public condemnation"

However, universal public condemnation has never, unfortunately, been expressed loudly, for too many years. Such silence constituted, perhaps, the most powerful ally for the Indonesian invaders and certainly permitted the genocide practices by the occupying forces to be carried so far and for so long a period of time. Sadly enough even the Vatican kept mute ...

For that reason, the members of religious congregations of East Timor wrote in distress, in 1981, a document as the result of their collective reflection over this issue:

"... as yet, we do not comprehend the reason why the Indonesian, nor the Roman Churches, have not openly declared their solidarity with the Church, the religious and the East Timorese people. This might indeed be the hardest blow to us all. Considering all the extent of this people's tragedy, through all these long six years, resulting in a number of victims in excess of 200.000, and such an occurrence being known by the whole world, we are appalled to notice the total silence which will seem to allow us all to die abandoned".

In fact when confronted with such a strong and generalized opposition to the integration of East Timor, Indonesia did not hesitate to practice a physical and cultural genocide of the people of the territory.

In 1975, East Timor had approximately 700,000 (1) inhabitants, but in 1980 the Roman Catholic Church could only get a Census of 425,000. Even admitting that the Church Census was not complete, and because between two and three thousand East Timorese, had meanwhile left the territory, the total number of people killed during the invasion and after five years of occupation must be around 200,000 [more than a quarter of the population!]

The Washington Centre of Defence Institute published in May 1983 an estimate that between 100,000 and 250,000 people were killed in the East Timor conflict, making it the second biggest and deadly war. Only Cambodia could exceed that.

The Indonesian bombardments between 1977 and 1979, with napalm and all sorts of arms, trying to destroy everything - people, animals and land - were extremely deadly and created enormous famine between the population.

According to statistics of the *"Provincial Government of Timor"* quoted in a report from an Australian Senate Commission (9) the number of cattle heads in East Timor was drastically cut between 1973 [two years before the invasion] and 1979 [four years after the Indonesian occupation]

	1973 (thousands)	**1979 (thousands)**	**PERCENTILE REDUCTION**
. Buffaloes	**141**	**24**	**83%**
. Horses	**139**	**15**	**89%**
. Swine	**305**	**27**	**91%**
. Sheep/Goat	**318**	**36**	**88%**

Statistics relating to agriculture are harder to establish but according to the letter sent to General Suharto by those two members of the *"Timor Provincial Regional Assembly"* the sandal culture was totally destroyed. And what survived the bombings did not survive the cupidity of the occupiers.

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(1) The Census of 1970 had registered 609.477 in Portuguese Timor. The Bureau of Statistics of the Timor Government mentions 645.155 inhabitants. With all deficiencies expected from those Departmental figures, one might be tempted to put the figures slightly higher. In 1974 an estimate from Roman Catholic Church indicates 688.711 or 700.000 in 1975 since there was a very high birth rate after the 60's. December, 27, 1987, or three years after the invasion, the Indonesian authorities estimate the population around 498.433. [8].

This 'burnt land policy' meant a systematic destruction of East Timor and its life that was performed by the Indonesian occupiers. All this was done, of course with American and other western nations arms. And this was happening while the Indonesian 'puppets' in the United Nations stated that the situation was normal or almost normal. Let us recall what the representative of the 'Provisional Government of East Timor' said to the Security Council in April, 1976:

> *"Life returned to normal in East Timor, apart some small disturbances by FRETILIN gangs in isolated areas".*

How can the Indonesians justify the death of a quarter of the population and of about 90 per cent of all cattle during the first four years of occupation?

The massacres became more local and selective after 1980, as the missionary refers in his September-October 1981 report.

In March 1983 there were some peace negotiations and a truce operated between March and August of that year, but it was short lived, the massacres, torture, assassinations, arbitrary detentions and disappearances become normal again.

A priest who was able to evade the news blockade wrote in March 1984:

> *"The genocide on this authentic concentration camp goes on and on. No village escapes this corralling where the army goes and picks who is going to be murdered or tortured." [10]*

Another priest writes on July, 14, 1984:

> *"Since March 1984, at Hau-Ba, near Bobonaro, many men and young boys were detained and then killed. At the Kota-Boot souk near Hau-Ba all men and male youngsters disappeared. They were taken by the 'tentaras' [army people] and murdered". [10]*

For a complete extermination of the East Timorese, killing them was not enough, so the Indonesians introduced its own Family Planning with forceful inoculations to make women sterile. Although there were some strong protests even by the Church authorities forced contraception and sterilization has continued unabated.

In early 1987 the subcommittee for External Operations of the U.S. Congress shows its preoccupation on a *"programme for birth control in East Timor by the occupying authorities notwithstanding the severe depopulation of the island after the 1975 Indonesian invasion."* [11]

The Timorese frequently complain that when their wives are giving birth the Indonesian doctors invent complicated reasons to extract the uterus or to perform other surgical interventions that actually render their wives sterile. Quite often contraceptive drugs are given as if they were medicine or vaccines. The Indonesian Press denials are only a way of calming down the population against such dishonest methods. Back in January, 1989, even the territory's Governor, Engineer Mário Carrascalão admitted to the monthly magazine 'Matra':

> *"They have recently initiated an inoculation programme aimed at all high schools [SMAI, SMAII, and SMEA, the HSC and Economy courses]. Only the girls were injected and they were told it was an anti-tetanic vaccine. Fairly good, but I asked 'Why only the girls? ' and the answer was 'To make sure that when they get married or have children they will have no diseases.*

> *"I told them that in East Timor contraception is a very delicate matter, and so far we have been discreet, not using all the means available. But now the BKKBN asks the medical authorities to do an injection campaign under the guise of anti-tetanic that is actually a sterilization campaign.*
>
> *"The programme for birth control is a national one for regions where the conditions are normal. Why wasn't I consulted on this subject? I might have been able to suggest other methods"*

To implement fully its genocidal policy, the Indonesian Government gives facilities and promotes the transmigration from Java and other islands to East Timor. Its number now is close to 100,000.

Mixed marriages between Timorese and Indonesian are fairly rare, but the constant policy of rape by Indonesian soldiers of Timorese women has created a fair number of children descending from an Indonesian father.

All methods have been used and considered of good value to achieve the objective of destroying the Timorese as people.

Indonesia invested heavily in roads, hospitals and schools to mask such policy and does not stop gloating internationally about the territory's development. But with these economic injections and the help of the few international agencies still allowed to operate in the territory there are still regions in 1990 were famine prevails. Those areas are of course, off limits to visitors invited by the occupiers.

Whenever there is a break in hostilities the borders become more open and some Timorese are allowed to leave and some foreigners allowed in. Whenever the repression gets going the genocide becomes more intense. This genocide is also a cultural one with the official imposition of the Indonesian language, with the persecution, torture and murder of all those who practice animist religions.

The Islamic drive by the Indonesians has failed abysmally because the Timorese sought refuge on the Catholic Church who protected them best. Recently the Indonesian authorities have forbidden any usage of the lingua franca 'Tétum' even during mass, but this prohibition was not abided. At school the indoctrination is a complete one and they try to destroy anything related to the East Timorese culture.

The Permanent Court of the Peoples met in Lisbon between 19-21 June 1981 and it accepted that the East Timorese were indeed victims of genocide. After reminding us that:

> *"The genocide is a crime against the rights of people with the intent of destroying partially or totally a national ethnical, racial or religious group as such, the Court concluded that:*
>
> *"In the case of East Timor, the court is fully aware of the amplitude of massacres its population was subjected to. The physical massacres combined with the cultural ones reiterates the notion that we face a general genocidal action and the Court considers that the Indonesian authorities should be prosecuted for their crime of aggression."* [7]

On March, 28, 1984 the Portuguese Episcopal Conference states in a Note from its Permanent Council that:

> *"Notwithstanding other problems it is an illusion to think that behind all sad events happening in East Timor there is not a national identity deeply sought and unable to be repressed or annihilated. Timor aspires to its own individual expression and if we impede it we will be witnessing not only a physical genocide but a cultural one, more damaging than the first because it affects equally those who die as well as those who survive, and as well the present and future generations.*

June, 9, 1989, a few months before the visit of His Holiness, the Pope John Paul II to East Timor in another Note from its Permanent Council the Portuguese Catholic Bishops' Conference reiterates this point.

What we are dealing with here is a true genocide. Even with all promises of a total opening of the territory in the last couple of years, the Indonesians never allowed an independent investigation on this very grave question!

10 -THE TIMORESE RESISTANCE HOLDS FIRM AND TENACIOUS NOT WITHSTANDING ENORMOUS SUFFERING AND DIFFICULTIES.

When the Indonesian generals decided to invade and annex East Timor, they thought it would be a quick exercise, just a matter of days to have the territory and its population entirely under their control.

Similar expectations were held by the United Kingdom Ambassador in Jakarta [Sir John Archibald Ford] that reported in a cable to the British Foreign Ministry on July 1975:

> *"Certainly as seen from here it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible; and that if it come to the crunch and there is a row in the United Nations we should keep our heads down and avoid siding against the Indonesian government."* [3] [5]

The opinion of the North-American Ambassador Newson after receiving instructions from his government, more precisely from Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, was similar. This is a quotation then made by the Australian Ambassador after a conversation with him:

> *"His [Newson's] somewhat cynical comment to me was that if Indonesia were to intervene the United States would hope they would do so 'effectively, quickly and do not use our equipment"*. [3]

In fact there was such a big difference in power between the fifth most populous nation on earth and the little, underdeveloped East Timor that it is easy to imagine how they would be subjugated without any reaction. Just because it was an insular territory without any outside support and without neighbouring countries willing to offer 'sanctuary' for the resistance it would make it extremely vulnerable and fragile.

The reality after fifteen years of brutal occupation whereas Indonesians used all means at their disposition, including American military equipment specially designed for guerrilla wars, as well as equipment from the U.K., France, Netherlands and other countries, the resistance still goes on and strong. There are two major reasons behind this surprising resistance drive:

- On the one hand the enormous cultural difference between the Javanese and the Timorese;

- On the other the hand brutal behaviour of the occupying forces that instead of obtaining submission by force and terror provoked the most deep and generalized revolt.

Succinctly we can consider six different phases over the past 15 years of occupation under suffering and resistance. We will describe it afterwards without forgetting that the reality is far more complex and that those phases are intertwined, mixed and related.

PHASE I: DECEMBER 1975 - AUGUST 1977:
A CLASSICAL WAR

Most of the East Timorese population, banking on the previously mentioned cultural differences and on the barbaric, brutal and bestial behaviour of the invading troops during the invasion, decided to hide on the hills instead of falling hostage to the occupiers.

With FRETILIN holding about 85 per cent of the population and the territory it has no alternative but follow a classic war. Its borders are more or less determined, and small skirmishes by both sides, trying to take over the enemy do not leave scope for much change in those boundaries.

Inside those borderlines, FRETILIN using its armed wing FALINTIL to keep out the invader can afford to let people go their way, tending their little farms and small cattle groups, while schools still operate, and a congress of herbal health healers [matandocs] is held to try to research and disseminate information on herbal products to replace the lack of traditional western medicine.

This is the situation in East Timor until 1977, with FRETILIN controlling the vast majority of territory and civilian population.

"Operasi Seroja" the well planned strategy of general Benny Murdani to take over East Timor within days and without any major resistance fell through and it was a major fracas. For more than two years the occupying forces could only claim control of major towns and villages and some means of communication.

PHASE II: SEPTEMBER 1977 EARLY 1981: THE SIEGE AND ANNIHILATION CAMPAIGNS TO DESTROY ALL BASES OF THE RESISTANCE.

The first BRONCO OV-10 planes, especially designed for armed insurgencies were delivered by the United States during September 1976. Soon, thereafter Indonesia started using them over FRETILIN-controlled regions, killing thousands of East Timorese, including women and children.

Later, on April, 4, 1978 Indonesia receives from the United Kingdom eight British Aerospace's Hawk aeroplanes designed for land attacks.

With all this sophisticated equipment supplied by the major arms manufacturers from the western world, Indonesia's Javanese generals will be able to wage, after September, 1977, a new war tactic.

Since FRETILIN dominated most of the territory and population of East Timor, thus lacking mobility, Indonesia starts in September, 1977, successive campaigns of siege and annihilation that will go on for most of 1988.

The Indonesian generals mobilize massive troop contingents and do carpet bombings, using napalm and defoliants on every man, woman, child, animal and crop.

Famine and disease start to spread and the casualties rise daily. FRETILIN in mid-1978 advises the population who has lived under its shelter to surrender.

The powerful and sophisticated military equipment used by Indonesia against an ill-equipped Timorese resistance, still engaged in a classic war, will conduct to the destruction one by one, of all FRETILIN guerrilla bases.

The first President of FRETILIN, Xavier do Amaral, who had meanwhile been dismissed, surrenders to the occupying forces.

The last bastion of guerrilla support at Matabian Mount [on the Central-East Region] fells to the invaders on November, 22, 1978.

Alarico Fernandes, responsible for Communications and Security surrenders on December, 3, taking with him the receiver/transmitter used for Radio Maubere broadcasts.

Later, on 1979 New Year's Eve, the second President of FRETILIN, Nicolau Lobato is killed in action. With all this string of victories, Indonesians think that they finally won the war.

The situation, as far as the resistance is concerned is indeed dramatic:

- 80% of all members of the Supreme Council for the Fighting were dead;
- Of the original 50 members of FRETILIN's Central Committee only three remained;
- 80% of all FALINTIL members were gone;
- More than 90% of all military equipment had been taken by the occupier;
- Links between the few remaining resistance groups were then cut, as well as links with the outside world.

After almost three years of war, Indonesian allows for the first time some foreign journalists to visit East Timor between 7 and 9 September, 1978. They came back in shock with the famine and the high rate of mortality in the 'relocation centres' where the Indonesians put all those who surrendered.

This situation forces Australian Parliamentarians to ask Indonesia to let in East Timor, the International Red Cross, but this will take place only a year later, in October, 1979.

Between 1979 and 1981, Indonesia organizes systematic attacks to try to capture the remainder of the resistance, and simultaneously offers an amnesty to those who are willing to surrender.

Some East Timorese women are convinced to go to the hills and using megaphones try to convince their husbands, still hiding in the bush, to come back and surrender, because the Indonesians were promising that they would be well-treated.

The majority of those who believed such promises, were killed like all the others who died fighting. Many of the women after raped and tortured had the same destiny. The Javanese brutality goes on and bigger.

The occupying forces were in for a bit of a shock, when on Portugal's National Day [10 June 1980] FRETILIN attacks the Television Transmitter in Dili as well as, the Ammunition Store and military barracks in the East Timor capital. It is the sign of a resurgence.

PHASE III: MARCH 1981 - MARCH 1983, CIVILIANS MOBILIZED TO SERVE AS SHIELDS FOR THE INDONESIAN TROOPS AND THE RESISTANCE RESTRUCTURES.

As a reaction to the brutality of the occupying forces and the persistent lack of honouring its promises by the Indonesians, led the Maubere Resistance to resurrect as Phoenix from the ashes. Its position is now more radical under a new motto: "VICTORY OR DEATH."

Between March 1 and 8, 1981, FRETILIN manages to convene a National Congress in East Timor where Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão is elected as the resistance leader. From then on the war tactic is guerrilla fighting.

Since there were still some resistance pockets, the occupiers decide to mobile 40000 East Timorese men, between the ages of 15 and 55. Their purpose, to lead Indonesian troops acting as human shields. [13]

They are then forced to form continuous human chains around the hills where suspected guerrillas are hiding, slowly tightening the siege, always in front of Indonesian troops.

It is then, that thousands of East Timorese are forced to witness the brutal savagery of the Indonesians on the guerrillas, their wives, even the pregnant ones, their children including babies.

This is what the previously mentioned report titled *"A report of this sad captivity"* was referring to. [5]

No matter how horrific these Indonesian campaigns were they did not diminish the East Timorese determination to resist no matter what price they had to pay for it. It is especially after late 1981 that the guerrilla action starts to intensify, both in number and in importance continuing through 1982.

FRETILIN takes control and expels the Indonesian occupiers from five villages during February, 1983. Other combats are meanwhile taking place with more than 2, 500 guerrillas in Ailéu, Same, Suai, Viqueque and Lospalos.

PHASE IV: MARCH - AUGUST 1983
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND CEASEFIRE

Facing the sudden apparent success of the guerrillas, the Indonesians tried to become more keen to accept dialogue. It is under their request that on March, 20, 1983, FRETILIN's commander-in-chief Xanana Gusmão and his Indonesian counterpart in East Timor, Colonel Purwanto met for the first time.

The meeting takes place at Lari-Gutu, an area still controlled by FRETILIN. On the negotiating table one can only see a FRETILIN flag, according to the pictures of the epoch.

Finally three days later a cease fire agreement is signed by both parties, and simultaneously FRETILIN proposes a bold Peace Plan:

"1. Under the aegis of the United Nations' General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), and under mediation from the UN Secretary General direct conversations should be held between the three parties, Portugal, Indonesia and FRETILIN to debate:

i) "The formation of an UN peace keeping force, or a multinational force whose impartiality had to be guaranteed as indispensable to warrant and make feasible:
- *The functioning of a Transitional Administration;*
- *The correct implementation of all decision made throughout the process of dialogue regarding the stationing of the belligerent forces - FALINTIL and Indonesian troops.*

i i) "The organization of a free and democratic consultation of the Maubere People.

i i i) "The setting of a date for a transference of sovereignty.

"2. We reserve the right to accept Australia as an observer during the negotiations.

> *"3. Other observers might be accepted, if proposed under equal terms and numbers by any of the parties referred to on 1 if accepted by all."*

Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, as commander-in-chief of FALINTIL and President of the Revolutionary Resistance Council, clarifies on a statement dated May, 10, 1983:

> *"FRETILIN states the awareness of the Maubere people to be part of the Southeast Asia region. FRETILIN reinforces that it does not want and it will not let Timor be a focus of conflict in the geopolitical region. East Timor will be a non-aligned country willing to follow the path of a peaceful coexistence. Its principles will rule over relations with all countries and will strengthen links of co-operation in the technical, economical and cultural fields with neighbouring nations. The Maubere people knows that it has to respect the interests of its neighbours believing that its own will similarly be respected."*

An additional note to the Plan stated that:

> *"I. - Portugal will be represented at a High Commissioner level as a decolonisation power,*
>
> *"II. - The installation during the transitional period of a Government of National Unity and until general elections can be held, will count on Portugal's representation through its High Commissioner".*

Unfortunately the counter-propaganda from Indonesia presented this peace proposal as a total submission of FRETILIN, thus avoiding yet again the chances for a long lasting and peaceful solution.

PHASE V: AUGUST 1983 - SEPTEMBER 1989: REINFORCEMENT OF THE NATIONAL UNITY AND THE INCREASE OF THE UNDERGROUND STRUGGLE ON THE CITIES

The Indonesian generals decided that, instead of accepting in good faith the Peace Plan, they rather do better using the truce to learn how the resistance forces operated and how to bribe their leaders.

Without any results from its fallacious promises and believing they knew enough about the guerrilla organization to finish with it, the Indonesians through General Benny Murdani threaten:

> *"If the FRETILIN guerrillas do not accept this amnesty offer made by the East Timor Government, a final and decisive attitude will be taken."*
>
> *"This time there will be no mucking around and no mercy,"* added the general, because *"I cannot let the unity of our country be destroyed. Our armed forces will use all means at their disposal on an operation to extinguish all Fretilin rebels."*

The general promised and he kept his word.

On August, 17, during the celebration of the Indonesia's anniversary as a republic, he started a most violent military campaign, involving thousands and thousands of troops, with all the sophisticated military equipment supplied by the UK, USA, France, Netherlands and other civilized nations with strong traditions on the defence of human rights.

In stark contrast with this military bellicosity when Indonesia was deploying all military means and thousands of troops to smash the Resistance, the village of Kraras was totally massacred amidst all sorts of human rights violations, and at the same time, the 1st September 1983, Indonesia's representative at the UN was describing the East Timor situation:

> *"The province is now peaceful. The wounds created by the civil war incited by FRETILIN and the Portuguese are healed. Its entire population is actively involved on the economic, social and cultural development of its province as part of the Indonesian Republic."* [15]

General Benny Murdani considering the extraordinary amount of military means at his disposal predicted that the final breath of the rebellion would be extinguished by October, 5, 1983, promising to bring to Jakarta on that date [when it is celebrated the day of the Indonesian Armed Forces] important war trophies. He was thinking, of course, to exhibit, dead or alive, the commander-in-chief of Falintil, Xanana Gusmão and other major rebel leaders.

That was a promise he could not keep. He was not only unable to capture any rebel leader, as he was forced to delay a few times the lifting of the exceptional security measures for East Timor.

By mid-October 1983, the 'Governor' of East Timor, Mário Carrascalão was a bit more prudent but was still saying that:

> *"I believe that everything will be finished within months. In a few months the situation in East Timor will be totally normal."*

By mid January 1984, Jakarta was still predicting that all operations would be finished within a month. [17]

The years kept ticking by and all big military operations, involving the elite troops of the Indonesian regime, including the forces under colonel Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto, kept repeating themselves without any major success. In some cases like during 1985 the civilians were asked again to serve as human shields to the Indonesian troops.

The guerrilla is once again spreading across most of the territory, with fewer actions to avoid being burnt out and thus to maintain a prolonged action of resistance. Simultaneously the national unity of the Timorese is reinforced, irrespective to political parties to which they belonged not long ago.

Even ex-supporters of the integration movement fight against the occupation, whether in clandestine underground manoeuvres or openly, in armed conflict. The convergency of all nationalist Timorese on its fight against the Indonesian occupation of their motherland and for their self-determination and independence was proclaimed by Fretilin in 1983 and is still strongly lived throughout the territory.

It is according to this unity that in 1984, Xanana Gusmão smuggles to the outside world a taped message for the radio:

> *"Inside East Timor we are well united and we hope that outside all of you will do likewise."*

As a response to this appeal from the resistance leader, the Central Committees of FRETILIN and UDT away from the territory decide to sign on March, 18, 1986 an agreement for mutual co-operation giving substance to the 'East Timor National Convergence. '

Its fundamental objective is for both political parties to *"conjugate their efforts for the indefeasible defence of the East Timorese to self-determination."*

On their joint communiqué it is stated:

> *"Both delegations reiterate the important position of Portugal on its resumption of all of its responsibilities conferred on it by the Portuguese Constitution and by international law."*

During a Press Conference, the Timorese leaders say:

> *"Of all meetings held between FRETILIN and UDT delegations a serious and profound consensus has created the mainframe between the two political organizations for the installation of a westernised democratic regime in East Timor. This is an important and a most essential achievement to which both political parties want the consolidation through the support of all Portuguese political forces. We hope this might enhance a better political positioning of East Timor in the international scene to bring the attention to what is really fundamental: the uphold of international law and of the principles stated on the United Nations' Charter and on the Bill of Human Rights."*

In accordance with these decisions FALINTIL cease to be FRETILIN's armed wing and become the Armed Forces of the National Liberation Movement of East Timor, as declared by its leader on a message dated December, 7, 1987:

> *"Falintil has only a supreme mission to achieve: to defend our motherland, to maintain the internal order, as established in a Constitution where the defence of individual and collective rights can be proclaimed as well as the respect for all citizens from all walks of life in East Timor.*
>
> *"For the glorious Falintil to fulfil such a mission, within a government structure, whatever the political tendencies of the executive may be, it is fundamental to declare now the political neutrality of the Armed Forces of the National Liberation Movement of East Timor."*

Xanana Gusmão, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the National Liberation Movement of East Timor, makes the point of showing no political partisanship, on a letter dated December, 31, 1988 where he resigns from FRETILIN.

October, 5, 1989 again Xanana Gusmão clarifies his position stating:

> *"Falintil has acquired in the past 11 years, the real importance that is bestowed upon them: the defence of the motherland, without any political links to any party whatsoever.*
>
> *"Falintil are not interested in politics, but want to help build a free and democratic nation under the respect of all fundamental freedom of expression and association, of freedom of assembly and thought, under the most strict respect for men's Human Rights.*
>
> *"A multi-party system and a market economy will be the foundations for a free and independent East Timor (that we, guerrilla people are building). A free state, a non-aligned one that however does not renounce its right to apply for ASEAN's membership as a positive contribution to regional stability."*

Simultaneously the fighting in all towns and regions under Indonesian control is becoming more and more organized. Clandestine networks start operating, breaking the news blackout imposed on East Timor, and some public demonstrations start to happen.

Some are merely symbolic ones, like unfurling the Portuguese and/or the Fretilin flags, as it happened on Christmas night in 1987. In other instances there are leaflets clandestinely passed around like on November, 11, 1987 in unthinkable places like the Government House, Military Headquarters and the Provincial Parliament, as well as in other public service offices and parts of Dili.

In those it was written:

> *"Indonesians dogs out-of-Timor. We want the return of the Portuguese for self-determination and independence of our motherland, East Timor."*

Immediately after that some Timorese priests and a Portuguese missionary are interrogated by the Indonesian Secret Services under extreme duress and subject to strong pressures and threats.

The clandestine network starts spreading through the Indonesian heartland, with East Timorese students being sent as bursars to Indonesian universities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta [Java], Denpasar [Bali] and others.

Not even the dob-ins that claimed some prison terms and the 'accidental' death of the newly graduated economist José António Moniz da Silva on December, 15, 1987, can stop the Maubere People's saga becoming known to more and more Indonesian university students.

PHASE VI: 12 OCTOBER 1989 TO PRESENT [SEPTEMBER 1990] THE INDONESIAN-EDUCATED EAST TIMORESE DEMONSTRATES AGAINST THE OCCUPATION AND EVEN THE INDONESIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STAND UP TO JOIN THEIR CAUSE.

When Pope John Paul II visited East Timor for a brief four hours on October, 12, 1989, he became a most significant light on the Maubere people interested in their fight for self-determination and independence.

That was not due to what the Pope said, or omitted on his Tacitolu [Dili suburb] homily. That was not due to what the Pope has done, or not, during his visit, but only for the courage shown by the East Timorese youth when they shouted their desire for independence and their determination to fight.

When they did so, they were fully aware that they risked being jailed, tortured and even murdered or becoming 'disappeared'. But they had the guts to use that rare opportunity of being seen by foreign journalists who were, at that occasion , less controlled than usually in East Timor, so that those youngsters could show their rebellion against the Indonesian occupation.

Francesc Valls of the Madrid daily 'El País' was one of those who were lucky enough to witness the events. We reproduce here a couple of paragraphs from his reporting:

> *"The minutiae zeal taken by the Indonesian Government to prepare this Papal visit to Dili, capital of East Timor, was totally destroyed yesterday during a demonstration against the annexation of this ex-Portuguese colony by Indonesia back in 1975.*
>
> *"People shouting for an independent East Timor echoed in Portuguese and Tétum as soon as the Pope said **'Itae missa est'**, in which was said to be the most polemic part of the Papal visit to the southeastern part of Asia."*

And the Spanish journalist adds:

> *"The shouts for independence of East Timor started growing up and the security forces became more forceful against foreign journalists. They took cameras from two of them and destroyed the films. The demonstrators amidst a cloud of dust were defending themselves throwing rocks and chairs against the security forces."*

For more than ten years Indonesia sought a total Indonesiation of the East Timorese children and youth. That is one of the reasons for the push for education under strict Indonesian control. After 14 years of occupation the result is a demonstration against Indonesia during a ceremony prepared by the authorities to the utmost detail.

Initially the Indonesians had predicted 400,000 people at the Papal mass, but their own repressive measures and the strict control over those East Timorese who could attend it meant that only 80, 000 were able to make it.

Even considering that a huge part of this presence was made up of Indonesians both residing at Dili or from West [Indonesian] Timor and neighbouring islands, and members [uniformed or not] of the armed forces, the unthinkable happened.

The detention and torture of hundreds of Timorese in the months that preceded the visit and the murders perpetrated by the occupying forces of colonel Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto, although aimed through its terror campaign to show that everything happened normally, became indeed inefficient.

After the Pope's departure, dozens of East Timorese were detained and tortured and nobody knew about their whereabouts. The personal statement presented during the 2nd East Timor Seminar by a youth who was at Dili during the Papal visit may help to clarify what happened then.

After that and even with the most severe of all repressive actions, other demonstrations occurred.

In November, 4, 1989, a demonstration against the Bishop of Dili, under instigation by Prabowo and other Indonesian military leaders, creates a counter demonstration in favor of the bishop.

Some confrontations between Indonesian forces and East Timorese caused injuries on an Indonesian major and dozens of Timorese detained or injuried.

On November 15, a large military force puts under siege the S. José Secondary School apparently looking for four students who might have taken refuge there. The students took up defensive action. Soldiers fire shots into the air and after that they invade the college and beat up the students. Similar incidents were repeated during December.

The Far Eastern Economic Review, through its normally pro-Indonesian correspondent in Jakarta, Michael Vatikiotis, prints on December 28, 1989, an article by the same journalist:

> *"The anti-government hostility that until now was reduced to a few remaining pro-independence guerrillas still fighting in the mountains, has now apparently spread to the younger generation on the urban sprawl."*

When the North American Ambassador in Jakarta visited Dili on January, 15, 1990, about 400 hundred Timorese youth used his visit to demonstrate in front of the hotel where he was staying.

On their banners one could read: ***"Independence or Death"***; ***"Integration: No! and Never!" "Indonesians out of our country"*** the Indonesians invade the hotel garden and the confrontation alerts the Ambassador who comes to the door to talk to the demonstrators.

These apologize for the inconvenience and say that they are only trying to convey to him facts confirming the continued violation of Human Rights in East Timor and to appeal for the United Nations to intervene in the territory.

The Ambassador, John Monjo, and the demonstrators dialogue for about an hour. However, as soon as his car left the hotel, the occupying forces charged over the demonstrators. Scores of people were injuried and others made prisoners. Even the Ambassador was shocked by the violent repression of such a pacific demonstration.

After this incident, the Indonesian authorities decide to create *"death squadrons."* During January and February when they start acting, four people were found dead and so mutilated that no identification was possible.

"The National East Timor Resistance Students' News" [Neon Metin] surfaces again during January 1990. Nationalistic but non-partisan, this periodical clandestine publication had first surfaced in 1989, but the Indonesian repression led it to disappear temporarily to come out again fully invigorated in early 1990.

It is worth recalling that on September, 7, 1989, around one hundred Timorese students, attending universities in Indonesia, wrote a letter to the United nations' Secretary General in which they ask for [25, 26, 27]:

- *"The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Indonesian troops, of all bureaucrats and immigrants who have helped the Jakarta Government on its illegal occupation of our territory, the exploration and expropriation of our wealth, and on the extermination of our people;*
- *"An immediate referendum;*
- *"The participation of all legitimate representatives of the people of East Timor, namely the National Convergence [UDT-FRETILIN] in all international fora where solutions for the problem of East Timor are being discussed."*

The students also support:

> *"The position adopted by the Dili Bishop, Mons. Ximenes Belo, on his letter dated February, 6, 1989 to the United Nations' Secretary General"* where it is proposed a referendum, and the students show their *"appreciation to all international organizations, NGO's and government agencies who have shown their solidarity towards the cause of East Timor."*

Their letter ends up with the refusal to accept:

> *"Any form of collusion between the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia for the extermination of the people of East Timor,"* because *"to achieve the interests of the Timorese people there has to be self-determination and total independence."*

On December, 26, 1989, Timorese students at a University in Bali [Indonesia] demonstrate against the repression being exerted over their colleagues in Dili. This is severely repressed and a few days later one of the students, José Carvalho is found dead at the Seliwang Creek, Bogor.

Situations like these helped the Indonesian students to break their usual silence.

Ammarsyah, a student from the Bandung Institute of Technology was on trial on January, 31, 1990 on charges of having, together with five colleagues, organized a pro-democracy demonstration when the Interior Minister Rudini visited the Institute, back in August, 5, 1989.

On trial he decided to use the court case to expose his opinions on the situation on East Timor and Indonesia with the presentation of a document titled: "Indonesia, a story of the bayonet and the steel helmet".

During his intervention and after quoting numerous cases of Human Rights' violations, the student declared in court [18] [22]:

> *"Your Honour, let us focus now on the East Timor extermination,"* and quoting reports from Amnesty International and the International Red Cross, denounces the massacres of entire villages and the death of a third of the East Timor population, the deportation, arbitrary imprisonment without trial and the 'disappearance' of prisoners. *"It is a 'public secret' that the offices of the regional administration and local military posts were used as places of interrogation and torture of the detained."*

The student Ammarsyah ends up by reading in full, the letter written by Mons. Ximenes Belo, Bishop of Dili, to the United Nations' Secretary General and dated February, 6, 1989 where it is *"requested to start in East Timor the most normal and democratic process of decolonisation: a referendum."* The student still adds in court that this letter arises once more the problem of decolonisation in East Timor.

A similar example can be quoted from a report produced by the Research Department on Rural and Regional Development, of the prestigious University Gajah Mada of Yogyakarta [Java]. This report, 130 pages long, was done after a lengthy study in the early months of 1990.

Its conclusions were supposed to be the focal point of a seminar to take place in Dili on April, 10, 1990, sponsored by Indonesia's Central Bank and the Office for Planning and Development of East Timor.

However, due to its contents and conclusions, the seminar was abruptly cancelled by the Indonesian Defence Minister for 'technical reasons. '

According to such report, [18, 19, 20, 21] *"although the Indonesian Government believes that the integration of East Timor solved the decolonisation problem, the Timorese think otherwise [p.7]"* and further on:

> *"The apathy and indifference of the population towards any programs show not only, that there is no reciprocal adaptation between Timorese and Indonesians, but as well, that the rejection to our presence grows and develops itself naturally."*

The research team on East Timor during the first months of 1990 was conducted by Professor Mobyarto, who had already been in East Timor in 1981 and in 1989. It was easy for him to make comparisons and analyse the situation.

These university researchers also reported that *"the East Timorese society is traumatized by the prolonged war situation and that 'even within the Timorese elites there are feelings of hatred' [towards the Indonesian Armed Forces]."* The reports recommend that *"a stop must be put to the war situation."*

Another recommendation is:

> *"Taking into consideration the strong links of the East Timorese to their place of origin and its mores, it is recommended that the relocation of families be stopped. The people in strategic villages should be allowed to return to their places of origin, to grow their crops and live according to their traditions [p.129]."*

On the East Timorese Church the Indonesian's university report that:

> *"The major problem is the competition between the Indonesian government and the Catholic Church. As a patron, the Church has got the numbers but lacks financial resources, the government has got huge resources and coercive means but lacks the support of the population [p.9]."*

In stark contrast to this report, and following a strong-worded speech by the Defence Minister on February, 3, 1990, tens of thousands of troops arrive on East Timor.

Once more the objective is to capture the leader of the Maubere Resistance, Xanana Gusmão. The massacres are repeated in villages of shires like Ainaro [Lour] and Bobonaro. Once more the prisons are overflowing. More prisoners are tortured and more women raped.

For some time a curfew is imposed in Dili and in other cities. People continue to disappear. The resistance defends and counter-attacks.

By July, 17, 1990, the students of Colmera and Bécora [in Dili] and in other places unfurl the FRETILIN flag. it was the anniversary of the Indonesian "integration." Indonesian troops intervene but the students will only furl their flags after the same is done to the Indonesian flags.

Perhaps, most surprising is the role that the young Timorese students start playing during the last few months.

Addressing military personnel on the streets or knocking at the door of people transmigrated from other islands they ask before running away: ***"Kapan pulang?"***, which translated means ***"When are you going back home?"***

In September, 1990, the supreme leader of the Resistance, Xanana Gusmão could state with total confidence, during an interview with an Australian journalist:

> *"If three or four years ago we were worrying about "what is going to happen after the extermination of Falintil," today its extermination is only seen as a price to pay for the motherland. It is not only with much pleasure but also with an enormous pride that Falintil realizes that all its efforts were able to keep and consolidate the basis for a true national and indestructible resistance.*
>
> *"The internal situation is as never before and we cannot disguise how happy we are when declaring it. Our hopes when we began this phase became a jubilant reality built upon all the corpses of those who fell for motherland.*
>
> *"The trust we had on the total abnegation of our people became a certainty, and the faith that always guided us became the leading light guiding us on our duty to achieve victory.*

"The time is on our side, not on Jakarta's as far as war is concerned. From a military point of view, Falintil's members are conscious that they have achieved their goal.

"We are politically, psychologically and morally prepared to accept even our extermination because we know that will not mean the end of the war. The Maubere people will keep on fighting and will never give up the fight, no matter what the winds of fate and History reserve for us."

11 - PORTUGAL STILL UPHOLDS THE RIGHT OF THE EAST TIMORESE POPULATIONS TO ITS SELF-DETERMINATION, EVEN WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF ITS MAIN ALLIES AND OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

As explained before, the Portuguese Revolution of April, 25, 1975 by the Armed Forces Movement, ousted the Salazar and Caetano regime and affirmed the right to self-determination of all Portuguese ex-colonies.

Because Timor was so isolated, in a partially Indonesian island, since the beginning of the decolonisation the Portuguese revolutionary authorities stressed that *"The Governor shall act in accordance with the principles of the Armed Forces Movement Programme, taking into consideration local conditions and avoiding deterioration of relations with Indonesia."* [28]

Based upon this determination the *"Committee for Self-determination"* is inaugurated in Dili on May, 13, 1974, and simultaneously the Timorese political associations were formed.

On July, 27, 1974 the Law 7/74 affirms very clearly *"the right to self-determination"* including *"the acceptance of the independence of the Overseas Territories and the abrogation of article 1 of the Portuguese Constitution of 1933"* that considered the Overseas Territories as an indefeasible part of the Portuguese territory.

For more than twelve years Portugal had to sustain the condemnation and criticism of the United Nations, because it did not respect the right to self-determination of the territories under Portuguese administration. A memorandum dated August, 3, 1974 is presented to the Secretary General whereas Portugal states it is ready to fully co-operate with the United Nations in accordance with the Declaration of the right of colonial territories becoming independent.

This position is further reiterated by the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Minister for Inter-territorial co-ordination in official speeches to the UN General Assembly. [4, 29]

General Ali Murtopo, President Suharto's Special Adviser for Security Matters met in Portugal with the President of the Portuguese Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Frans Seda, Indonesian Ambassador to the European Economic Community, organized with the Indonesian Ambassador to Paris all the contacts needed, and accompanied Murtopo during his visit to Portugal.

No official communiqué of those meetings was ever published, but in 1985 Frans Seda presented a fully detailed report of those and other contacts that took place between the representatives of both countries. That presentation was made to the Papal Committee for Justice and Peace [of which the Indonesian Ambassador was a member] that took place between 7-12 November at Nemi.

Notwithstanding the Indonesian bias and some distorted facts favourable to Indonesia, through the entire report even the Indonesian Ambassador admits that the Portuguese authorities always stressed that any solution had to be the *"result of the free will of the population"*. [30]

It was considered as acceptable the possibility of Indonesia promoting the integration through the East Timorese. Shortly after the UDT and FRETILIN coalition is established, in early 1975, a delegation of the Government of Timor came to Lisbon to contacts with the Portuguese Central Government, proposing to internationalize the problem as a form of convincing Indonesia not to interfere in East Timor.

Portugal was more worried with the situation in Angola, wich it was trying to help solving directly. The Minister for Inter-Territorial co-ordination decided that any step to internationalize the problem of East Timor should only be taken as a last resort.

As an alternative he proposed to float the idea of independence supported by Indonesia and Australia, with Portugal staying in East Timor for a few more years. He just showed how little he knew of the Indonesian regime.

A Portuguese ministerial delegation met with its Indonesian counterparts, led by General Ali Murtopo, in London on March, 3, 1975. The Indonesian pressed them to intervene directly on the East Timor decolonisation process, but the Portuguese delegation refused, reminding them that it must be *"the people of East Timor to decide its destiny."*

The possibility of Indonesia making some pro-integration campaigns is once more mentioned, as well as is the chance of Portugal taking the issue to a higher international forum, if Indonesia interferes forcefully in the process, [31] although Portugal did not stress it enough to dissuade the Indonesian government from intervening.

As we have mentioned before, since Indonesia was not allowed to take part in the decolonisation process, opted instead for destabilizing the territory, in order to invade it later. Portugal then broke diplomatic relations with Indonesia and formally complained to the United Nations. Thus, the problem became internationalized.

The Indonesian blackmail over the fate of the 23 Portuguese military held hostages lasted for almost a year, until Indonesia had finished its process of *"integration"* of East Timor.

The weekly "Expresso" editorializes on July, 3, 1976 reads:

> *"Some of them are in a very serious danger, if the problematic conflict between Portugal and UDT is not solved until August, 17 when Indonesia celebrates its national day and the integration of the ex-colony on Indonesia."*
>
> *"We have the feeling that at least four of all 23 hostages, are risking their lives, if Portugal does not start negotiations or if these do not lead to a satisfactory result for the new Timorese authorities."*

The "Jornal de Notícias" published on July, 13, 1976:

> *"The conditions imposed by Indonesia to free its 23 Portuguese military hostages are the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Jakarta, the official recognition of the Provisional Government and the withdrawal of the Portuguese complaint from the United Nations."*

Portugal decides not to satisfy any of the conditions imposed by Indonesia, but does not initiate any important international activity to avoid the integration, even under the threats over the fate of the Portuguese military staff kept hostage in Indonesia.

On July, 28 the hostages finally arrive in Lisbon, but the decree institutionalizing the integration of East Timor with Indonesia had been signed 11 days earlier by President Suharto on July, 17, 1976.

The hostages had played the role the Indonesians wanted them to: avoiding a large Portuguese and international reaction to the farcical integration. Ever since that day the Portuguese position has been the same: the respect for the right of East Timor to attain self-determination.

The Portuguese Constitution approved on April, 2, 1976 and its amendments of 1982 and 1989 still upholds such a right. The Portuguese Parliament on various occasions has reiterated this right to self-determination, protesting against the Indonesian occupation and against its multi-violations of basic human rights.

Other legislative and executive organizations of the Portuguese Republic have taken up similar positions within their sphere of influence and action. Successive Portuguese governments have had to contend with the supreme power of Indonesia and its powerful allies, especially USA and Australia, thus being impotent to take on more efficient actions to finally end with such unfair and unjust situation in East Timor.

Wavering between the firm denunciation and periods of silence and compromise the Portuguese have resisted the temptation of negotiating the right to self-determination that only belongs to the people of East Timor, or of abdicating of its duty, which is, as an Administering Country to try and create conditions for such right to be exercised.

It is not easy to try to remind the world that it should fight for the right of an oppressed people, whose territory was invaded, occupied and annexed, without having the chance of choosing its own destiny.

One of the reasons lies on the fact that until now, at least, the most powerful prefer to opt for their interests instead of defending principles and the law. It may happen that the grave crisis affecting the Middle East, today will change the international attitude and the need to refuse any form of forceful annexation

As small and fragile as they are, the East Timorese keep on resisting and surviving under such adverse circunstances, which is not only remarkable after fifteen years of fighting but also represents some form of victory.

All that is left to be done, is to think on their suffering, their fighting and courage to give us the strength to end with the humiliations and torture and other offences to achieve Peace in Justice and Dignity in Liberaty. We hope that the East Timorese children don't have to go on asking the occupiers: ***"Kapan pulang?" "When are you going back home?"***

September, 1990, University of Oporto

A. Barbedo de Magalhães,
Coordinator of the 2nd Seminar on East Timor

PART-II

2nd SEMINAR ON EAST TIMOR, OPORTO UNIVERSITY

"EAST-TIMOR, LAND OF HOPE"

I - EAST TIMOR, THE MEDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

I.1 - To avoid letting the world know about their crimes the Indonesians did not hesitate to murder five Australian journalists.(*)

Back in October 1975 two Australian television teams were filming the fall of Balibó, Portuguese East Timor, to Indonesian troops supported by Timorese refugees. Those images would wipe any doubts on the participation of the Indonesian regular army in the attack, and would deny Indonesia's propaganda that only Timorese refugees grouped under "MAC {Anti-Communist Movement}" and Indonesian volunteers were trying to regain control of Timor.

At Maliana, few kilometres before Balibó, a Portuguese television crew from RTP led by journalist Adelino Gomes witnesses the attack where heavy artillery, fire bombs and automatic machine guns were used, trying to film the landing of an helicopter moments after the combat.

The day before Adelino Gomes had talked to his Australian counterparts from Melbourne's Channel 7 and Sydney's Channel 9. On the yellow walls of the house where they were staying the word Australia was written and the Australian flag drawn. One of them, Greg Shackleton had told him: *"This is for the Indonesians: if they come to Balibó they will know that there are some foreigners and they won't kill us. It's our embassy."*

Less than 24 hours later, by the dawn of 16 October 1975, the Indonesians started attacking Balibó with the support from some Timorese members of MAC. Both Indonesian and Australian authorities knew the journalists were there. Just a few days before, some TV programs had broadcast their messages saying they were on the way to Balibó because it was an area predicted to be attacked by the Indonesians, trying to oust it from FRETILIN's control. One of the journalists before being killed managed to say that he was Australian, but Indonesia's objective was to eliminate any inconvenient witnesses, so all five TV crew members were consciously and coldly murdered. Besides journalist Greg Shackleton, the others were Tony Stewart [sound engineer], Jan Cunningham and Brian Peters [cameramen] and another journalist, Malcolm Peters.

The Indonesian generals responsible for this operation [Col. Dading Kalbuardi and Major Yunus Yusuf] were promoted soon thereafter. The official photographer of this operation was quickly decorated by General Suharto.

(*) Introduction to theme I written by the coordinator of this Seminar.

Although the Australian government was embarrassed with the impact of the event on public opinion, it conducted a questionable and inconclusive public enquiry.

Meanwhile in East Timor, other Australian journalists, including Roger East, got statements that leave no doubts on the intervention of the Indonesian Armed Forces in this crime.

Indonesia was unable to gain any substantial territorial control after their border skirmishes and about a month and half later, by early December, an invasion is imminent, thus forcing the Australian authorities to advise all Australian citizens to abandon the territory.

Most members from humanitarian organizations and journalists left Timor, but Roger East decided to stay even after the International Red Cross decided to evacuate to Ataúro Island on December 6, 1975.

On December 7, roughly one hour after the invasion, Roger East was still able to send via the Telecommunications Centre of Radio Marconi, in Dili, a message to Australian Associated Press [AAP] and Reuters in Australia. Shortly thereafter he was captured by Indonesian troops, who forcefully took him to the Dili harbour area where he was killed as were hundreds of Timorese. The collusion between the Australian government and the Indonesians was such that not even a protest was raised on the murder of this Australian journalist and Australian citizen.

For 13 years [December 1975 - December 1988] the Indonesians impose an almost total news blackout to East Timor. Very few foreign journalists are allowed into East Timor. Whenever authorized their visits are closely monitored and their freedom of movements is minimal. Independent journalists report on the generalized fear in a decimated population, traumatized by war and famine and all other atrocities committed by the occupying forces.

The only exception to this rule comes from compromised journalists who decided beforehand to make favourable reports to the Indonesian occupiers. Even in such cases all they are allowed to see are towns, new hospitals and schools, new roads and other façade improvements that the Indonesian try to show as if to make forget the genocide of the East Timorese people. Contacts with the population and the bush are very limited or impossible to make. The International Red Cross was allowed a temporary visit to the territory in March, 24, 1979 under harsh restrictions and limitations. For more than three years their presence had been forbidden.

In one of its first reports, back in 1979, the Red Cross states that the humanitarian situation in East Timor is worse than in Biafra during the secession war, and asks for a mercy campaign of medical and food support to avoid the death of tens of thousand of Timorese.

When East Timor was "opened" in January 1989, as widely announced by the Indonesians, many independent journalists and humanitarian organizations were still denied a visa to enter the territory. Some other journalists admit how well received their requests were, of being invited for dinner by diplomatic members who were willing to give them all their support if their reports would be seen as favourable to Indonesia, but who were later refused their visas when they did not intend to play the Indonesian game.

I.2 - Presentation by Journalist *Antonio José da Silva* from RTP [Portuguese Television Network] (*)

"What was proposed for us to debate today creates a question that although not new is today more up-to-date than ever. Concisely we can formulate it in a question: 'Are the big problems that attract the media or is it the media that make the problems big?' 'Is the media serving democracy or are we living in 'mediacracy' where we decide what is or isn't important?'.

"Almost simultaneously, in France some books concerning this matter are published what indicates the growing concern in this area. The title of one of those books, by a well-known political commentator states ironically: <<We are here because the media wants us to," and that is symptomatic". Such is a theme that could keep us here for hours, but that is not the reason for us to be assembled here today, although it is always a matter to be brought up whenever we discuss East Timor>>. East Timor by itself is not an important issue for the media. When in a few years' time the Palestinians will finally get their independent homeland they neither have to thank it to the four wars between Arab countries and Israel, nor to the bloody actions of some terrorist groups or to some oil boycotts to the West. They will have to thank it to the stone throwing war started about two years ago by the Palestinian youth against the powerful Israeli occupying forces. Intifadeh would not have existed without the TV coverage. What started as a spontaneous reaction, became a fully planned strategy for television, and a devastating one, I might add. It devastated the international public opinion, the Israeli public opinion and the chancellories of the western world. Thanks to television those stones became a powerful political instrument and threaten to achieve what neither the stones nor the most sophisticated terrorism could ever achieve.

"This is one of the multiple and recent examples of what we could call 'mediacracy'. This does not diminish the ethical, political and strategic importance of the Palestinian problem, but that, the TV coverage gave it another dimension, transforming dramatically its development both emotionally and affectionately. There are plenty of similar ethical and political cases worldwide, but since strategically they are not as much important they are obviously forgotten by the mass media. East Timor is such an example. Let us be frank, the problem of the East Timorese attracts less international coverage than the Sikh, Tamil, Erithrean, Hindu, Kashmir or even the animist or semi-Christian ignored people of South Sudan. Today East Timor in terms of mass media means very little.

"The Papal visit, notwithstanding the risks herein mentioned, might have served then to project the problem into some notoriety, but the vertiginous flow of political events rapidly created other points of interests, leaving Timor back into the forgotten world. We all know how much such media oblivion means in political terms.

"Maybe this portrait of the situation sounds a bit pessimistic, but personally I do not foresee in the near future any radical change between the problem of East Timor and the international mass media.

"I have to admit that in the past two years we have witnessed a dramatic explosion of cultural resurgence, that represents an expression of nationalism. Internationally the mood is favourable to causes like the self-determination of the Maubere people.

(*) Almost a total reproduction of António José da Silva's presentation.

"This multiplying factor of nationalist movements, especially in Europe can cause a threat, in terms of media coverage, for East Timor. Based upon geographical, political, historical and other reasons the media will have to make prioritary decisions that do not necessarily include East Timor.

"In the next few months the international media will have plenty of nationalistic coverage to do in Europe, Middle East and Hindustan, which are closer and more profitable in terms of audience. To include East Timor in the priority list of international media, the one that can shake the western world chancellories, to include East Timor in such a priority list seems a challenge parallel to diplomatic efforts for all that have an interest in the future of the people of East Timor.

"I have to admit it is a very difficult challenge on the previously described grounds, and on another one: Jakarta is fully aware of the consequences of opening East Timor to the international media and will avoid it at all costs.

"It is in this context that this Seminar is held, and the presence of illustrious international representatives might make the difference. It might be able to create some openings in this wall of silence that has been erected around East Timor.

"I apologize for my pessimism in this presentation, but being pessimistic is an emotional state, not a rational one. Rationally we have to keep on having faith and fighting to deserve it."

I.3 - Presentation of the Journalist *José Carlos Vieira* of the Portuguese Official News Agency Lusa. (*)

"The Indonesians wanted to use the Pope's visit to East Timor on October, 12, 1989 as a contribution to legitimize the annexation, showing how normal the territory was, but in the end it became the biggest international condemnation of the territory's situation over more than a decade. And this was thanks to what?

"Firstly because a handful of young East Timorese had the guts to show their protest in front of the Pope. Secondly, because even John Paul II - contrary to much of what was mentioned in Portugal and other countries, as I will explain later - did not accept the theory that everything was normal and denounced the situation of the East Timorese people. Thirdly, because the presence in Dili of a few tens of journalists from the most prestigious media from all over the world, gave an unprecedented coverage to East Timor.

"I have to declare that in my personal opinion, Indonesia has made a mistake on the possible consequences of the presence of Portuguese journalists on the Pope's plane. Jakarta had refused visas to all Portuguese journalist who had asked for it. It was only after the Holy Sea and Indonesia had talks that it was agreed that two Portuguese journalists were allowed visas to go on the Pope's plane: Henrique Mota of Radio Renascença and myself representing the LUSA newsagency.

"During the trip and the days before our arrival in Dili, we talked with other colleagues on the situation of the territory now occupied by Indonesia. First they did not trust us, listening reservedly to us, but progressively they became more interested.

(*) Almost the completed transcription of this presentation J.C.Vieira was one of the two Portuguese Journalists who followed the Pope during his visit to East Timor on 12 October 1989.

"After Dili and all that happened there, as you all know, our conversations became totally different. On our way from Dili to Jakarta, some of them came to us and apologized for the incredulity that they had previously shown.

"In my particular case I remember a colleague coming to me and saying: <<Look this rosary was given to me by a Timorese seminarian, but I believe you are the one who should keep it and take it to Portugal>>.

"During the homily the Pope mentioned the long suffering of the East Timorese people, the dead, the lack of freedom and stability, their legitimate expectations and the responsibility of those who have a say in their future.

"The piles of press clippings from the international press since then obtained, with some important articles in prestigious international mass media, show that the Indonesian propaganda, including a brochure on East Timor left in our hotel room, achieved nothing.

"While in Timor I had the chance to talk to some people, and most would only say <<I do not know>> or, <<I am afraid of talking>>. One of the members of the clergy I spoke to, said openly: <<We live here like in a concentration camp>>.

"I became emotional and let it transpire in some texts and reports I have written. It is, thus, very difficult to control a situation where independent and credible journalists can freely report what they have witnessed.

"The world media will have trouble in reporting about East Timor because Indonesia is aware of the risk involved. The Portuguese journalists will have additional difficulties. My proposal is for the Portuguese and international media to be more attentive and responsible towards this case."

I.4 - Presentation by Journalist *Manuel Acacio* of TSF - Radio Journal (*)

"The international community's attitude towards East Timor can be summed up in a word: hypocrisy. PALOP's have defended the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence in various international meetings, including the Non-Aligned Movement to which Indonesia belongs. The EEC has repeatedly condemned human rights violations in Timor. East Timor has not much weight on international relations, except the EEC and PALOP's [AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF OFFICIAL PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE] positions.

"One other reference to the approved United Nations Resolutions that had the effect of reminding the public opinion of the East Timor drama.

"In my opinion, the media has become decisive on the fight of the Maubere people for its independence.

"Many strategic, international security reasons and diplomatic compromises have been used to justify the silence over the dramatic situation under which East Timor lives. Take for instance, the Australian example to whom the treaty for oil exploration was enough to sedate its conscience and consider East Timor as the 27th. province of Indonesia.

(*) An almost total transcription of Manuel Acácio's presentation text.

"Take for instance the USA example of tacitly giving the green light for the invasion and recognizing the annexation of the territory. Indonesia plays its major trump cards on the diplomatic field, it is a military power of ASEAN, an important country within the Non-Aligned Movement and a still flourishing economic power in the region.

"However the Indonesians play with 'hot' cards and even all their trumps are not enough to avoid having East Timor as an "Achilles' heel" on their foreign affairs.

"Since the world opinion can live with more than 200, 000 people dead and almost 15 years of constant violations of human rights, it is bestowed upon us, the media, to exercise our counter punch to mobilize public opinion.

"The worst for the Timorese would be to see their fight forgotten. Therefore it is the media who has to act as a very indiscreet window looking over East Timor and the world capitals where the future of its people is being decided.

"As far as the Portuguese media is concerned, after a few years of silence and even misinformation spread by Jakarta, the situation is now reversed. The Pope's visit to East Timor, the Timor Gap Treaty between Indonesia and Australia and the negotiations for a Portuguese delegation to visit East Timor have alerted our media.

"The media assumes an enormous role with the possible visit of a Portuguese delegation to the territory. It is logical to anticipate that the Indonesians will stage-set the visit. A set for Portuguese to see, with a dual objective: hide the protests, protesters and popular discontent, exaggerating the huge investments of the past fifteen years. Fifteen years of genocide and bloody military occupation.

"It will be up to the journalists who will accompany the parliamentarians to unveil the stage setting and to avoid being naive when assessing the situation. Such naivety can be fatal for the fight of the East Timorese.

"In my opinion the Portuguese Parliamentarians should not abdicate of having a meeting with the guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmão and with other resistance fighters.

"It is important to listen and to broadcast the voice of the East Timorese. We should not forget these statements, respectively by Mons. Martinho da Costa Lopes and Moisés do Amaral:

"Timor might even be more developed but the Timorese don't want to live in a golden cage [Mons. Martinho Lopes, late Apostolic Administrator of the Dili Diocese, deceased the 27th February 1991.].

"Timor is a prison from where you only get out when dead [Dr. Moisés do Amaral, ex-President of UDT Political Committee, deceased on February, 22, 1989.]"

II. - EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION: PROSPECTS FOR EVOLUTION

II.1 - It is possible that demonstrations similar to those which toppled the authoritarian regimes of the Philippines in 1986, and South Korea in 1988, might occur in Indonesia. (*)

II.1.1 - Recent events in Asia, Eastern Europe and in the world are a clear manifestation of the supremacy of human rights and the rights of people.

If we try to look albeit distantly to the political evolution in Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa and in the rest of the world we realize mankind has taken steps towards the supremacy of Human Rights and the Rights of People.

All this happened despite all the natural hesitations in any historical process, despite the retreats which followed each advancement, the conflicts which raised up or reinvigorate while others faded away. All this despite famine still affects millions of children every year, despite political prisions, tortures and wars human madness persists in supporting.

All this despite the smashing in blood of some political springs, despite foreign occupations and many nations and peoples without statehood, cut by artificial borders or forcefully integrated in nations that are neither theirs nor their own choice.

Let us remember some dates celebrating those eventful points:

February, 25, 1986 [Philippines] Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship is ousted. Having come to power in 1965, the same year as Indonesia's General Suharto, imposed the Martial Law in 1972 and did not hesitate to have his main opposer, Benigno Aquino, killed on August, 21, 1983. Forced to conduct presidential elections in 1986, tried to manipulate the vote counting but a popular insurgency forced him into exile.

June, 29, 1987 [South Korea] The Chun Doo Hwan's dictatorship is ousted, after public demonstrations severely repressed by the police.

April, 14, 1988 [Afghanistan/USSR] Signature of an agreement for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The withdrawal starts on May, 15, 1988 and is completed by February, 14, 1989, thus ending ten years of military occupation. The USSR finally enforces, eight years later, a United Nations' Resolution from January, 14, 1980 that "demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet and other foreign troops from Afghanistan."

August, 17, 1988 [Pakistan] General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, President of Pakistan dies, opening the way for presidential elections.

(*) Introduction to theme II written by the Coordinator of this Seminar.

October, 5, 1988 [Chile]	In a referendum, the majority of people said "NO" to President Pinochet's request for a new presidential mandate, thus raising the hopes for democracy. Presidential and general elections are held in December, 14, 1989 and by March, 11, 1990, General Pinochet hands over the presidency to his elected successor, but remains on as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
December, 1, 1988 [USSR]	The Constitution of the USSR is changed and a new electoral act allows candidates who oppose the regime to participate. During elections held in March, 26, 1989, many opposition candidates are voted in, including Boris Yeltsin who takes the seat of Moscow, and later in May, 29, 1990 will be elected President of the Russian Federation (the most populous of the Soviet republics.)
January, 11, 1989 [Hungary]	The Hungarian Parliament allows the creation of independent political parties. A month later, on February, 11, the Hungarian Communist Party renounces to its leading role and accepts the formation of other political parties. By March, 11, it takes place the 1st. Congress of the Democratic Forum. By April, 26 Soviet troops start leaving the country and a week later, start the dismantling of the barbed wire border barriers, known as "The Iron Curtain." On September, 19 the government agrees with the opposition on a democratic transition period. In April, 1990 the first free general elections are held.
January, 17, 1989 [Poland]	The Polish Communist Party accepts syndical pluralism. On February, 6, the government has conversations with Church and Solidarity leaders, reaching an agreement for the establishment of a multiparty democratic regime. the "Solidarity Movement" was legalized on February, 17.
February, 1989 [Algeria]	After huge popular demonstrations and mutiny attempts that cause in October, 1988 more than five hundred deaths, Algeria approves a new Constitution that ends the FLN [National Liberation Front] monopoly power. On June, 12, 1990 the first, since independence, [in 1962] free municipal elections are held and the winner is FIS [The National Salvation Islamic Front.]
February, 1989 [Paraguay]	A coup d'état led by General Andrés Rodrigues ends the oldest south-american dictatorship. General Alfredo Stroessner who had despotically run the country since 1954 is ousted.
May, 11, 1989 [GDR]	Soviet troops start leaving the German Democratic Republic.
June, 4, 1989 [Poland]	The Solidarity Movement has a resounding victory in the first partially free elections held since the start of democratic reform in Eastern European countries. Solidarity is invited to form a coalition government with the Polish Communist Party.
September 21, 1989 [Cambodia/Vietnam]	Vietnam starts withdrawing its last 26000 troops from Cambodia.
November, 9, 1989 [GDR]	Fall of the Berlin Wall. Erected in August, 13, 1961 during the height of the 'Cold War', it was not only a symbol of the division of the two Germanies, but also of Europe and the world into two antagonistic blocks.

November, 18, 1989 [GDR] After many popular demonstrations in East Germany, namely on September, 25 at Leipzig, Hans Modrow is nominated to become the new Primer Minister and opens his government to non-communists. The democratic process then started will lead to the first free election in the GDR on March, 18, 1990.

November, 29, 1989 [Czechoslovakia] The Czech National Assembly deletes Constitutional articles giving the Communist Party its leading role, thus ending 41 years of totalitarian regime. This follows numerous demonstrations in Prague claiming for a democratic regime. By December, 10, some members of the opposition will take part in a new government. On December, 28, Alexander Dubcek, leader of the 1968 Prague's political spring [smashed by troops of the Warsaw Pact] is elected President of the Federal Assembly. The following day, the ex-dissident, ex-political prisoner and leader of the Civic Forum [founded on November, 19], Vaclav Havel becomes interim President of the Republic. Free elections will take place on June, 8, 1990 and Vaclav Havel will become the first freely elected President in more than 50 years.

December, 1, 1989 [USSR/Vatican] Pope John Paul II receives in the Vatican the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, making a gesture that witnesses the new opening in the Eastern European countries to religious freedom.

December, 4, 1989 [WARSAW PACT] The Warsaw Pact, a military alliance of all Eastern European countries, led by the USSR, admits that the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was a mistake.

December, 12, 1989 [Bulgaria] The Bulgarian government announces the end to the monopoly of power by the Communist Party and announces free elections to take place in May, 1990.

December, 20, 1989 [S. Tomé & Príncipe] S.Tomé & Príncipe's President Pinto da Costa, announces his wish of abandoning the one party system and install a plural democracy, during the Congress of PALOP's [African Countries of Official Portuguese Language]. Confirming his intentions he sends on March, 15 a proposal to the National Assembly. A referendum on August, 22, approves by a large majority the new Constitution, thus converting S. Tomé and Príncipe in the first Portuguese ex-colony from Africa to adopt a democratic multi-party regime.

December, 22, 1989 [Romania] The forces of the Romanian Secret Police "Securitas" surrender in Bucharest, after violent confrontations and street combats that followed demonstrations against one of the most closed Eastern European dictatorships. Both, President Ceausescu and his wife are detained. On May, 20, 1990 the first elections after the fall of the Romanian dictator take place.

February, 6, 1990 [USSR] The Communist Party in the USSR renounces its monopoly of power, opening way to a multi-party system. The Supreme Soviet approves on February, 16 a law authorizing private property, extensive to productive resources. The People's Congress of Deputies on its March, 6, session approves the replacement of article 6 of the Constitution. Such article, 72 years old defined that the USSR's Communist Party "was the leading force that manages and guides the soviet society." The new article accepts the existence of pluralism in terms of political parties.

February, 11, 1990 [South Africa] Nelson Mandela, the South African black leader, champion of the fight against apartheid, and leader of the ANC [African National Congress] is released from jail after 27 years in detention. This represents a major step towards the elimination of racial discrimination in South Africa. By June, 1, 1990 the government announces that will end on October its apartheid laws for swimming pools, restaurants and other public places, with similar measures following shortly.

February, 24, 1990
[Lithuania]
The pro-independence Lithuanians get a large majority in the local elections.

February, 25, 1990
[Nicaragua]
Free elections in Nicaragua bring to power President Violeta Chamorro. Daniel Ortega, the previous President embraces the newly elected President, thus marking with that gesture the national reconciliation after eight years of civil war.

February, 1990
[Somalia, Chad, Benim]
Benin, next to Nigeria starts its march towards a multiparty democracy. Soon after Somalia, Chad and other African countries start their long route to democracy.

March, 3, 1990
[Lithuania]
The Supreme Soviet of Lithuania [Parliament] approves a declaration of independence. Moscow threatens it with economic sanctions, but avoids an invasion and the immediate smashing of the nationalist movement. Soon after, Estonia and Latvia approve similar declarations. These three Baltic states were integrated into the Soviet Union in August, 1940, as part of an agreement between Stalin and Hitler, without any popular consultation. Now, they reacquire their rights to self-determination and independence after half a century of occupation.

March, 18, 1990
[Latvia/Estonia]
The pro-independence movements of Latvia and Estonia get a large majority of the vote in the Parliamentary elections.

March, 21, 1990
[Namibia]
Namibia becomes independent. A German ex-colony, the territory of South West Africa was under a 1920 Society of Nations' mandate administered by South Africa. In 1946 South Africa refuses to accept United Nations' Resolutions regarding an international regime for the territory. On August, 26, 1966, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization] starts an armed insurrection trying to achieve independence. On October, 27, that same year the United Nations officially end South Africa's mandate to administer the territory and in 1968 declares the South African occupation of the territory as illegal. December, 1978, South Africa creates an autonomous government after "elections" with a view towards "independence" that would keep racial separation laws. These elections without the participation of the UN and SWAPO has no credibility and the armed insurrection continues. August, 8, 1988, after 22 years of fighting, the governments of Pretoria, Havana and Luanda, under the aegis of the United States agree on an immediate ceasefire. On December, 22, a treaty is signed predicting the independence of Namibia, together with the withdrawal of 50, 000 Cuban soldiers from Angola to be completed by June 1991. March, 10, 1989 witnesses the arrival of the first UN "Blue Berets" to oversee the transition. Between 7 and 11 November, 1989 elections are held for the Constituent Assembly, with a clear SWAPO victory. On February, 16, SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma is elected President. After Namibia's independence, the United Nations only have 18 non-autonomous territories, of which the most important in terms of area and population are Western Saara and East Timor.

March, 23, 1990
[Mongolia]
Mongolia's Parliament deletes an article on its Constitution that gave all leading powers to the Communist Party.

March, 13, 1990
(Cape Verde)
The National Committee of PAICV [Cape Verde's Independence African Party] opens way to democracy, when it decides that the Presidential elections will be held by direct vote of the people and that other political parties can candidate to the Legislative elections. The Congress of PAICV held between 24 and 28 July, 1990 confirms these resolutions and transforms Cape Verde

in a pluralist society.

April, 24, 1990
[Zaíre]
Zaíre's President, Mobutu Sese Seko, announces his retirement as Head of Government and as leader of the MPR [Popular Revolutionary Movement]. He also announces the end of the one-party regime and authorizes the formation of two opposition parties.

May, 11, 1990
[Nepal]
Nepal's King Bhirendra announces the setting up of a Constitutional Committee, to create a democratic, multiparty regime in this monarchy state. Just a month before, on April, 8, the King had legalized political parties that had been banned for more than thirty years, after big pro-democracy popular demonstrations that were severely repressed by the government. The government has meanwhile been replaced.

June, 1990
[Ivory Coast]
After thirty years of one party rule, President Félix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast allows the formation of 14 political parties.

June, 29, 1990
[Europe]
All 33 European nations, USSR included and Albania excluded, met in Copenhagen in a Conference on Human Dimension. By consensus a document was approved that compromises all signatories the adoption of multi-party systems, free elections, the separation between Church and State and an independent judiciary. This document also approves some cultural rights for minorities, forbids torture and all other inhuman, cruel and degrading forms of punishment. Both the United States of America and Canada were signatories to that important historic, moral and political declaration.

July, 11, 1990
[Africa]
The final declaration of the OAU's Summit [Organisation of African Unity] states that *"democracy and development have to thread side by side and offer mutual support."* During the final Press Conference, the newly elected President of OAU says that: *"Democracy must exist because a modern State cannot be governed without it."*

July, 31, 1990
[Mozambique]
The Political Bureau of FRELIMO approves unanimously a multi-party system. On August, 15, its Central Committee approves important changes in the Constitution to allow that, as well as it also approves the new electoral law, the political parties reform law, and an ethics' code for the highest ranking leaders of State. Mozambique ceases to be a Popular Republic to become simply the Republic of Mozambique.

August, 2, 1990
[Iraq, Kuwait]
Iraq invades Kuwait, but the international community reacts with a strength never seen before. The USA, UK, Australia and other states who had supported Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, become the great defenders of international laws and the protectors of the small states against territorial ambitions of their neighbours. The United Nations' Security Council condemns the invasion and demands the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces. On August, 8, Iraq proclaims the integration of Kuwait as its 19th. province. The UN declares void and nul such annexation. The Security Council approves a commercial embargo to Iraq and admits the possibility of using force to re-establish international law.

August, 15, 1990
[Indonesia]
A group of 51 well-known Indonesians, including ex-ministers, retired generals, religious leaders, human rights' activists and other important personalities, publish a petition where they ask President Suharto for his resignation to allow the democratization of the country. The document states that *"Decrees, laws and actions against democratic principles have to change to allow for democracy, as it is promised in the Constitution."*

II.1.2 - The succession crisis casts doubts on the survival of the Indonesian regime.

The shining star of President Suharto has been diminishing ever since August, 1984, when a document started circulating in Indonesia, under the title *"To save Democracy."*

Among the subscribers of such an important document, there were leaders of all major three Indonesian political and social entities, such as:

- Mohammade Sanusi Hardjadinata, ex-leader of the Indonesian Nationalist Party [PNI] that was the most voted political party during the last free elections held in Indonesia, back in 1955, and President until 1980 of PDI [Indonesian Democratic Party], a result of the imposed fusion, ordered by the government of the Nationalist Party and the Christian Party.
- Mohammade Natsir, ex-leader of the Modern Islamic Party *"Masyumy,"* the second most voted party in the 1955 elections.
- General Nasution [Ret.], who was Minister quite a few times, ex-Prime Minister, ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and one of those responsible for the massacre of PKI members [Indonesia's Communist Party] after the 1965 coup that brought Suharto into power.

In their manifesto they complain against the "Law of Association" and other four laws, that once approved close all doors to any democratic evolution of the regime.

Leaders of the Council of Five Legal Religions (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu) also show their apprehension over the new laws.

Some Muslim prayers complain against the "Law of Association," and graffiti has been splashed on to mosques, together with leaflets against the government and defending democracy.

In early September, 1984, the Indonesian Army detains some Muslims near the Rawa Badak Mosque in the capital. A few days later, on September, 12, 1984 a crowd of people who demanded their liberation is brutally massacred and at least 60 people are killed in Tanjung Priok [Jakarta.] More than 60 dead and hundreds of injured, is the balance of that tragic incident.

Amir Biki, a leading Muslim leader was one of the first to be killed by the forces of General Benny Murdani. Known as having commanded the university students battalion in 1965 to help General Suharto to establish the "New Order," Amir Baki had served in other occasions as a mediator between Muslim people and the authorities. This time, however, the troops did not want any negotiation or dialogue, preferring to act brutally and killing an important interlocutor as Amir Baki.

Four days after the Tanjug Priok massacre, a group of 50 politicians and retired generals demands for an enquiry on the events of Tanjung Priok. Simultaneously they raise the popular attention for a growing sense of revolt because of the Government's inability to respect the 1945 Constitution, namely when imposing Pancasila as the only principle to all political, religious and social organizations.

The most important part of this document is the names of the people who subscribe to it: Three ex-ministers, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara [ex-Finance minister], Burhanuddin

Harapan [ex-Prime Minister], H.M.Sanusi, ex-Minister for Industry in the first Suharto Cabinet between 1966 - 1968, many retired generals, amongst who we name Ali Sadikin [Navy, ex-Governor of Jakarta], Hugeng [Police Chief until 1972], General Azis Saleh, General Suyitno Sukitno and General H.R. Dharsono ex-Secretary General of ASEAN [Association of the South East Asian Nations] until he was dismissed for having subscribed to the "Petition of the 50."

After the September 1984 massacre all sermons in mosques were banned, unless there was a special permit for those.

More than 130 Muslim 'predicators' were detained at the same time as General Murdani met with others throughout Java, advising them not to criticize the government and threatening them to abide by it.

The rebellious sentiments have not stopped ever since. On its November, 6, 1989 the weekly "NEWSWEEK" reports a growing opposition to the Suharto regime. That edition referred that there were university students' demonstrations at Jogyakarta an in other Indonesian cities throughout 1989, asking for democracy, respect for Muslim values, and the freedom of other imprisoned students.

This time and contrary to what had happened before, the military refused to violently repress the students' demonstrations. Apparently there are some solidarity links between students, poor peasants [broken and discontent] and some military.

The Indonesian lawyer, Mulya Lubis says that *"something is happening that is not being reported on the papers, but the next couple of years can become explosive."* Suharto, on the other hand, definitely aghast answers to a journalist's question: *"If they want to replace me without respect for the Constitution I will smash them, be they military or politicians."*

A few years' back Suharto would not threaten or get aggravated like this and he would be laughing of such an impossibility. Today he feels the ground running away from his own feet and he loses composure.

Unable to prepare his succession - in part thanks to the East Timor problem, what makes it impossible for the regime to think of democracy without raptures in the regime, Suharto has no way out.

His Defence Minister, General Benny Murdani even admits that looking for a successor for Suharto is like walking in the dark without knowing what to expect. Murdani is the first to admit that it is possible that demonstrations similar to the popular uprisings who ousted the Philippines, [1986], South Korea [1989] regimes may happen in Indonesia. The petition dated August, 15, 1990 is a sign of that.

II.2 - A recent visit to East Timor
by Mons. Paul Moore, Bishop of New York [Ret.]

II.2.1 - Bibliographical Notes on Rev. Paul Moore, Junior.

The Right Reverend Paul Moore, Jr., was installed as the thirteenth Bishop of New York of the Protestant Episcopal Church (Anglican) on September 23, 1972, in the nineth year of his episcopate. Having been elected Suffragan Bishop of Washington in 1963 he served in that capacity untl his elections as Bishop Coadjuvator of New York in december 1969.

Born in Morristown, New Jersey on Nov. 15, 1919, he was graduated from Yale University in 1941 with a B.A. degree; he received a S.T.B. degree from General Theological Seminary in 1949. In 1960 he was awarded an honorary S.T.D. from that seminary and in 1964 was honored with a D.D. by Virginia Theological Seminary. Berkeley Divinity School also honored him with a D.D. in 1971.

He currently belongs to the Chancellory of various Seminaries and University Schools. Between 1941 - 1945 he was in the US Navy. Having been severely wounded in an operation of the First Navy Corps at Tulagi-Guadalcanal where he was a platoon commander, he was later to serve as an Operational Commander at Guan. He left the Navy as a Captain and he received the 'Naval Cross', the 'Silver Star' and 'Purple Heart. '

One of his major interests is the link between the church magister and psychiatry. He is well known by his interest on the survival of all miserable people in the cities and he is a member of the AIDS Council. During Summer 1970 he led a Peace Mission to Vietnam. He was also a member of a delegation that went to Moscow in 1982 to discuss with Soviet leaders problems of nuclear disarmament, and he has recently visited Nicaragua.

He is married to Brenda Hughes and father of nine children.

II.2.2 - Statement by the Most Reverend *Paul Moore*, Bishop [Ret.] of New York (*)

(...) "Last December, my wife Brenda and I visited East Timor under the auspices of Asia Watch, a human rights committee located in New York. We wished to show our support for those who are struggling for their rights there and to gather as much first-hand information as our time there allowed.

"We first went to Jakarta to learn a little bit about East Timor from people there who could inform us. We met with Mr. P. Princen, who I am sure is known to some of you, he runs a human rights group in Jakarta, Mr. Slumer Bratanata, a professor who is an authority on History there, Mr. Jopie Lasut who chairs a Prison Fellowship committee and many of the exiles from East Timor work with him and he worked with prisoners from Timor who are imprisoned in Jakarta.

"We met with our Ambassador and even with a person from the C.S.I.S. which is (...) a large security think tank in Jakarta. We also met several refugees from East Timor, men who had been either part of FRETILIN or who had for one reason or another to escape from Timor to Indonesia. When we arrived in East Timor we went to Hotel Turismo. Accompanying us on the aeroplane was a very important gentleman connected with the Indonesian intelligence. He roomed right next to us in the hotel.

"He had five or six security people with him. As soon as we came to the hotel we had a feeling of apprehension, we had a feeling that the security people next door were watching us, as well as guarding this high official. There was a strange atmosphere indeed. We learned later that all telephone calls were tapped, and all mail is censored, going in and out of East Timor. I am sure you were aware of this. One amusing story: a friend of ours we met was speaking overseas in Portuguese to another person. The monitor on the telephone interrupted them and said:"Please talk in Indonesian. I cannot understand Portuguese." And this happens again and again. They are rather clumsy about their censorship but very thorough.

(*) Almost the complete transcription of Bishop Moore's presentation, taken by Fernanda Jorge and José Paulo Oliveira from recorded cassettes.

"The military presence there is very oppressive. Every street has a soldier walking up and down and with his weapon. When we drove up to Baucau, which you know is three or four hours by car up the coast we were stopped six times by the military police. We had to get out of our car and go to the security booth and have our passport looked at, our guide was questioned and we were reluctantly allowed to go on our way. Half an hour later we were stopped again. Six times! And four or five hours of driving.

"When we were there speaking of military presence, General Benny Murdani had visited Timor. He came for the occasion of the dedication of the cathedral. He too stayed at the Hotel Turismo. He too had five or six security guards. The hotel asked us to move our rooms so Mr. Benny Murdani's security guards could be next to him. They gave us a free night's lodging so that we could make room for Benny Murdani which was really rather funny.

"We had great difficulty finding a taxi who would take us up to Baucau. We asked at several automobile rental places and they had none. They said:"Where are you going?" "Baucau? I am sorry, no cars." Finally a young woman who was our interpreter had a friend who had been a prisoner for five years and had been released several years ago, but apparently was a rather courageous fellow. So he agreed to drive us up to Baucau, but it took a long while to find him because the government really wants nobody to go up there. Why? Because there the military presence is the heaviest. We went by scores of army tanks, gone past us on the road were truckload after truckload of soldiers and they full battle dressed: helmets, machine guns, the whole thing. We went by scores of barracks which had been built rather permanent barracks, not only for the soldiers but for their families as well. It looks to us as if the Indonesian army intends to stay.

"There are 24,000 troops presently in East Timor for a population of 500,000 and very few of the FRETILIN are left off in the jungle. I assume they are afraid of it. This presence is illogical, oppressive, irrational. I understand one of the reasons they stay there is not because they are afraid of FRETILIN, but in order that the army can be trained and have places to manoeuvre. I understand also that many of the higher officers have economic reasons to stay there. We were told they would go and harass peasants in their houses until the peasants, the rural people would leave in fear. Then they come in, take over the farms and exploit the farms, and sell the crops and take the money. There is a great deal of military corruption in East Timor, we were told, and so they want to stay there and profit by the presence of the military in East Timor.

"We were told that even food from the catholic relief services was confiscated and had to be bought, purchased by the very people to whom it was supposed to be given freely. There were just story after story after story of oppression and of corruption.

"We were very impressed by the schools we saw there run by the church and very impressed by the spirit of the young people in those schools. There is a school out at a place called Fatumaca, which is not far from Baucau away up in the mountais. It is near where the presence of the FRETILIN apparently is most numerous, and therefore there are great many army people there and the army people keep a very close watch over this wonderful school which is run by the Salesian Fathers of the Church.

"In any case we had a beautiful visit there and we were told by the priest about some of their young people who went to the demonstration at the time of the Pope's visit. They were there watching, they were not leading, they were not demonstrating they were just watching and listening to the Holy Father. However, because one of them was asked by a photographer to hold up a sign they were arrested by the military police, they were imprisoned, they were tortured, and they were totally innocent and they were kids, 15, 16 years old. There was objectios made and finally the young men were released and the military were so embarassed by this mistake. They are not usually embarassed but they

were by this one that they came out to the school and the general said: "Please, think of me as of your loving father. I have brought basket-balls, base-balls, base-balls gloves, sporting equipment, all for you". And here is the thing that was wonderfull. The young people said: "We do not want your basket-balls, we do not want your sporting equipment, you are not our father, the priest is our father, all we want is for you to free the other young people who are now in prison". So, the general was embarassed, went back, freed the young people, made another trip and gave them the basket-balls. That is the kind of thing one runs into.

"I understand that most of the Timorese people have to bring identity cards with them and are stopped from time to time and have to show their cards like the people in South Africa.

"I understand that some of the young people who are imprisoned, both the ones I mentioned and others were told that they would be allowed to go free as long as they did not participate in any political activity. When the young people said: "We will not promise that", then they were kept in jail. Many of them were still in jail without trial when we were there.

"I would like to say a word or two about the church, the Roman Catholic Church in East Timor because theirs is the most important presence there. Bishop Belo is a very courageous young person (in my way of thinking, he is in his early forties) and I think he is threatened he is beleaguered, he is harassed. He stands almost alone there as one who will speak out against the abuses of human rights, which are so prevalent. We had two or three very good sessions with him and he said to us, and it is said in other reports that he really feels in physical danger because of the stand he has taken. He opens his house as a sanctuary for young people who are about to be arrested. We spoke with some of these young people, teenagers, 15, 16 years old again, lovely spirited young people that were afraid to go home, they were afraid to go to shcool, for fear they be arrested and tortured. We met with them, we talked with them in the presence of the bishop, and it takes great courage on his part to allow those young people to stay in his house, in order to escape the oppression of the police.

"He and many others we spoke to feel there is a deliberate policy of genocide, on the part of the Indonesian government against the people of East Timor: Cultural genocide as well as the terrible massacres of physical death that have already occurred. There is full intentions, so it seems, to obliterate the East Timor culture, which is so different from the Indonesian culture. And so, it is so important, so important, that bishop Belo and some others, and you here, myself and all of as, hold up, at least, the hope of independence because even now it seems impossible, even now many of us are pessimist about hope of self-determination, given the power of Indonesia, none the less it is most important that the light of hope and freedom be held up against whatever arms, and this is the reason why bishop Belo and others speak out for self-determination whatever the price might be.

"My wife and I, we said them: "Isn't it wrong to get people's hopes up when the situation is so bad?". And they said: "Well, this is the only thing in which the young people can have spirit, this is the only way to make the young people proud of themselves". And so I feel it is important for the light of hope and freedom to be held up in East Timor and in the world.

"We were very fortunate in being present at the dedication of the Cathedral. The Pope had already blessed it but this was another dedication. It happened at 7 a.m. in the morning, we went to the cathedral and the whole courtyard was full of thousands and thousands of people. The East Timorese are very devout Roman Catholic people. We were standing in the crowd away in the background, trying to look inconspicuous, (...). And then an acolyte from the bishop came over and got us by the hand and lead us over and we walked

in procession with the bishop, up the aisle and we sat in the front row next to Benny Murdani, which was rather ironic.

"But we were proud to be there and it was a great privilege to be present at this beautiful service. One thing that is off the subject but for someone from my country it was very impressive at the time of the offertory procession, which is when the bread and wine is bought up the aisle as an offering to God, and often money as a collection is brought up as an offering to God. At this event, they brought up chickens, they brought up pigs, they brought up native costumes, they brought musical instruments, it was just beautiful, and all the people were dressed in their native costumes and again they gave us a feeling of the pride of the culture of that place, and how the Church is an institution that can preserve any licit of that culture.

"I would like to conclude by making a few remarks. We were deeply, deeply moved by the courage of the people. I have been around the world in many different places over the years, as my wife was, in Africa, Japan, Nicaragua and so forth, Russia, but I have never seen a people who impressed me more than the Timorese with their courage, their sprit, their compassion, their gentleness and the way in which they welcomed us.

"It seemed to me that several things are most important. First of all, until such a time as East Timor can be free, it is most important for all of us to do what we can to help in the education of the people there, to support the schools, especially the schools run by the Catholic Church, which I just mentioned, by the Salesians, where there is great need for resources, where the government does not allow new priests to come in from the outside to teach, they are short-handed, they need all the help they could get, because that future generation must be educated now, so that when freedom comes they will be able to govern their country, and even freedom is long in coming, it is most important for the Timorese young people to be educated, so that when Indonesia develops Timor, which may mean hotels, industry, better agriculture, whatever that development may be, that the Timorese people are educated enough to be involved in it and, receive the benefits from it, rather than having people from outside come in and exploit Timor and bring the money away.

"And unless the people are educated there and this is what is going to happen, and the people of East Timor will be servants to the people from the outside who will be developing the industry or the tourism or whatever. SO, I THINK EDUCATION IS ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT.

"The second thing that is important is to repeat what I said before, it is to alert the international community in every way possible, in conferences like this, hearings in front of the United Nations, hearings in Portugal, hearings in the United States, hearings in Australia, for all of us and all over the world to say again and again and again , that East Timor is small but is desperately important to the humanity and all the civilized world.

"I am very ashamed, and I say this frankly, I am very ashamed of the role of the United States of America has had over the last several years. I understand that we condoned the invasion of East Timor by the Indonesians, I understand that Henry Kissinger was present in Jakarta just a few days before this took place, he must have condoned it. I understand from my reading that much of the military equipment that was used was United States´guns and so forth. We still object officially to the human rights problems there, our ambassador did recently on a visit, however we have not taken any sanctions against Indonesian because of their treatment of East Timor, and I believe that the United States should bring pressure of whatever kind, so that Indonesia would change its policy and I think we have a right to do that and I don´t think that the fact that its oil and military importance should keep us from that policy for human rights and this would be true also, and even more true perhaps of Australia.

"Thank you for these few minutes to tell you about our recent visit and I am most honoured to have been here and Brenda and I am here to learn as much as we can about East Timor, so that when we go home we can talk to senators and congressmen and the State Department to see whether or not the United States can do its part in changing the policy of Indonesia."

II.3 -The co-operation treaty between Australia and Indonesia for the exploration of oil on the Timor Sea.

This is a synopsis of the presentation made by *Sasha Stepan,* assistant of the Political Department of Monash University [Australia] and author of the thesis *"The Timor Gap agreement and its international implications."*

"Introduction"

"The Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty between Australia and Inonesia was signed in a mid-air ceremony during a flight over the Timor Gap in December 11, 1989 by the the respective Australian and Indonesian Foreign Ministers, Senator Gareth Evans and Mr. Ali Alatas. It has been hailed by both countries as a creative and peaceful alternative to a protracted delimitation dispute, <<... establishing a long-term stable environment for petroleum exploration and exploitation...>> which <<... would not prejudice the claims of either country to sovereign rights over the continental shelf...>> and would not <<... preclude continuing efforts to reach final agreement on permanent seabed boundary delimitation.>>

"It has also been claimed to have successfully removed a <<potential source of bilateral and regional friction>>. Yet this latter statement may well be misguided, for amidst the self congratulatory statements echoing around Jakarta and Canberra, one fundamental aspect is being ignored: the plundering of the rights of the East Timor people. The only hope for the East Timorese in respect of this matter is for Portugal to take decisive action on their behalf as the U.N. recognized administering authority".

"History of Timor Gap Negotiations"

"The region known as the Timor Gap arose as a result of international boundary agreements struck between Australia and Indonesia in 1971-1972 that left a gap in the boundary opposite what was then Portuguese Timor. In 1974 - 1975 discussion between Australian and Portuguese authorities concerning a closing of the boundary gap took place, but these talks stalled and were still unresolved in December 1975 at the time of annexation. It was feared that if Camberra opposed Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor at the U.N., Indonesia could retaliate by freezing the boundary talks.

After having quoted the telegram of August 1975 from the Australian ambassador in Indonesia Dick Woolcott calling the attention of his government for the advantages it could have if it negotiates the "Timor Gap" with Indonesia instead with Portugal or an independent Timor (see page 7), Sasha Stepan continues:

"Although nine rounds of negotiations have occurred since 1979, Australia and Indonesia have been unable to agree with regard to permanent delimitation of the seabed because each country takes differing views as to the principles of international law Australia's and Indonesia's seabed rights extend from their coastline throughout the natural prolongation of their continental shelves which end in the deepest part of the Timor Trough.

"Indonesia's position has been that there is one shared continental shelf between Australia and Indonesia and accordingly a boundary equidistant between the two coastlines (the median line) would be appropriate. Indonesia also argues that new Exclusive Economic Zone concept with seabed rights out to 200 nautical miles, supports the median as the appropriate principle.

"Due to the difficulty of reconciling the two countries'competing claims, both countries began exploring the possibility of a provisional "joint development zone" to operate pending final delimitation. Detailed discussions on this proposal were held in mid 1985 when Senator Gareth Evans visited Indonesia as the then Minister for Resources and Energy. In October 1988, on his first visit to Indonesia as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, he and Indonesia Foreign Minister Ali Alatas announced an interim agreement on the Zone of Cooperation proposal. On December 11, 1989, the Treaty was formally signed.


EAST TIMOR
INDONESIA
Simplified Line of Bathymetric Axis
Seabed
Boundary
Area C
Simplified Line of 1500m Isobath
Simplified Equidistant Line
Area A
Agreed
Median
Line
Simplified Equidistant Line
Area B
200 naut miles from Indonesia
Darwin
AUSTRALIA
Western Australia
Northern Territory

"The Treaty"

"Part I of the Treaty establishes the Zone of Cooperation in an area between the Indonesian province of East Timor and Northern Australia, which comprises Areas A, B and C, a total of approximately 61,000 square kilometres.

"Area A is to be jointly controlled by both states with equal sharing of the benefits of exploitation. Area A contains the highly prized but geologically unknown "kelp" structure, which has been estimated to hold potentially several billion barrels of oil.

"Area B is to be administered by Australia, with 10% of gross resource Rent Tax given to Indonesia.

"Area C is to be administered by Indonesia, with 10% of Contractor's Income Tax *given to Australia.*

"The Northern extent of the Zone of Cooperation is delineated by the maximum Australian continental shelf claim. The southern extent of the zone is delineated by the 200 nautical miles line measured from the Indonesian baselines (i.e. the maximum Indonesian EEZ claim). The eastern and western sides are delineated by "equidistance lines".

"The Treaty does not purport to finalise the seabed boundary, under article 2 Clause 3 of the Treaty each party reserves its respective sovereign rights claimed in the Timor Gap".

Continuing to describe the treaty, Sasha Stepan explains that the responsible authorities for the area are a Ministerial Council (with an equal number of ministers for each of the governments) and a Joint Authority.

This Joint Authority will have, among others, *"the responsibility for environmental protection, safety, search and rescue, and any action required "in the event of terrorist threat to vessels and structures engaged in petroleum operations in Area A."*

After describing the clauses on the way of acquiring property rights over the oil, the applicable legislation, the ways of judging possible conflicts and of implementing the treaty, Sasha Stepan describes how the Australian government faces the criticisms which have been made to its policies.

"Australia's response to Portuguese criticism of the Timor Gap Treaty"

"The signing of the Timor Gap Treaty can be held to be a violation of international law in respect of the denial of the East Timorese peoples right to self determination and their sovereign right to their resources. In signing the Treaty and preparing to divide up the spoils of the Gap between themselves, Austrlia and Indonesia are conveniently ignoring the fact that Indonesia's military annexation of East Timor, which gives it sovereignty to negotiate the treaty, was illegal and that the continuing occupation of East Timor is illegal. Thus any treaty, depending on Indonesia's illegal sovereignty can thus be argued to be void at international law, violating the right of the East Timorese to self-determination, a peremptory norm in international law.

"Yet Australia rejects claims that its actions are inconsistent with established international law and Senator Gareth Evans has stated publicly that should Portugal seek to initiate any action in any forum, Australia would defend its position <<with vigour and determination>>.

"Australia's rejection of Portuguese criticism is a follows:

"Firstly, Australia maintains that there is no binding legal obligation not to recognize the acquisition of territory acquired by force.

"Secondly, conclusion of the Timor Gap Treaty does not signify Australia's approval of Indonesia's original acquisition of the territory of East Timor.

"Thirdly, Australia claims that in international law, the legality of the original acquisition of territory has to be distinguished in subsequent dealings between the state acquiring that new territory and other states.

"Fourthly, Australia has never conceded prior to 1975, any Portuguese interest in the area of the seabed forming part of the Zone of Cooperation. Consequently, Australia does not accept the assertion that the East Timorese have any permanent sovereign rights over seabed resources in the Gap.

"Finally, Australia maintains (with an interesting twist of logic) that the "East Timor issue" is a matter quite separated from the Timor Gap Treaty, which concerns maritime boundaries between neighbours. Australia asserts that its conclusion of the Treaty in no way impedes its efforts in continuing to support discussions between Portugal and Indonesia at the U.N. to resolve the East Timor issue.

"All of these points are clearly debatable and would no doubt be subject to vigorous scrutiny at the International Court of Justice. The Australian Government's view reflects an interpretation of international law that acts of aggression can be ignored and that violators of international law can obtain good title to territory which they seize. It condones violations of the U.N. Charter and many U.N. resolutions dealing with both political and economic self-determination.

"In short, it is a view unlikely to gain approval from the International Court of Justice".

II.4 -East Timor: possible scenarios for the 90's

This is a synopsis of the presentation made by *John G. Taylor*, writer and teacher of London's South Bank Polytechnic.

The author starts with five hypothetical scenarios, under the presumption that the Indonesian regime survives, to describe in the end a scenario that implies a change in the regime.

"Firstly, there is the possibility of an Indonesian military victory over Fretilin. (...) Publicising this defeat internationally, Indonesian diplomats insist that the East Timor issue be brought back to the United Nations General Assembly, in which an even weaker resolution than the one carried narrowly in 1982 is defeated.

In the international field the question fades away.

"Church opposition is neutralised by the Vatican agreeing to the transfer of Bishop Belo and the removal of priests who have acted as mediators between the Indonesian army and Fretilin groups".

John Taylor regards the first scenario most unlikely, not only due to the capacity of Fretilin to continue the fight skillfully, but also due to the interest of many Indonesian military for a protracted war, with a similar low intensity like the last years, in order to have a training field for its troops and possibilities to earn money and fast promotions by virtue of Timor military campaigns.

"Similarly - turning to a second scenario - it is unlikely that Fretilin forces will be able to defeat Indonesia militarily. Estimates of Fretilin's current strength vary considerably, but a reasonable figure seems to be around 2,000 active troops, located mostrly in the eastern and southern zones, armed with weapons captured from the Indonesians.

"The only developments which might enable Fretilin to make a breakthrough militarily would be either a significant upsurge by separatist movements in areas of Eastern Indonesia, such as West Irian, or a prolonged conflict between military factions in Java itself, related a succession crisis to Suharto's Presidency. Neither of these seem likely in the immediate future.

"A Third possible scenario is that of the Indonesian Government organising a referendum in East Timor, whose carefully orchestrated outcome would be a vote for integration.

"Such an outcome in East Timor could be used to legitimise integration internationally, particularly if the military could secure limited U.N. involvement or, even better, a Portuguese presence during the referendum. To a certain extent, Indonesia has already floated this suggestion, both in 1982 and in 1987, when it was argued by government officials that the results of the elections for East Timor's Provincial Assembly gave some guide to the level of support for integration.

(...) "Several factors currently mediate against it. Most seriouly, perhaps, is the point that Shuarto and his immediate entourage seem to be oppose to it, arguing that it would entail a greater opening up of East Timor, and enable opposition - and particularly the catholic church - to give full vent to its criticism of the occupation. They cite events surrounding the Pop's visit in October 1989 as a small scale example of what could happen. Furthermore, since the international community is by now well aware of the methods used by the military to secure the West Irian result, many governments would be unhappy accepting the outcome of a referendum, whilst others would re-open the West Irian case as a means of criticising Indonesia."(...)

"A fourth scenario might be a variation of what the Indonesian officers involved in negotiating the 1983 ceasefire termed the "Sulawesi Solution". This would begin with a negotiated ceasefire.(...)

"Under present circunstances, such developments seem rather remote. There is little sign of any lessing of Indonesian brutality, or of any serious intention to involve East Timorese in the running of the political system or the organisation of the economy".

A fifh scenario presented by the author relates to the changes in the international community and in Portugal, in the direction of a general acceptance of the fait accompli provided that the human rights, religious freedoms and the preservation of the Timorese cultural identity were guaranteed.

"Currently, this outcome seems far less likely than it did in the early eighties, since the Portuguese Government has repeatedly stated the necessity for an act of self-determination. (...) For the moment, however, Portuguese policy probably constitutes the most effective thorn in the side of Indonesian diplomacy.(...)

*"In drawing up these scenarios, we have assumed that the present regime remains in place in Jakarta. Clearly, if this were to change, it could have a profound effect on the conflict. Scenarios which we have assessed as unlikely - notably the referendum and the **<<Sulawesi Solution>>** - might well".*

After referring to the problems of succession of President Suharto which is a crucial problem in Indonesia due to the role he played in the destruction of the political parties and due to his skillfull manouvers in turning one military faction against the other,John Taylor quotes from the Asian Wall Street Journal on the First family:

"In recent years the Suharto sons (of which there are three) have put together a maze of businesses giving them a stake in almost every important commodity or service in the country. In most cases these businesses originates from and thrive on state contracts, government decrees or licences giving concerns tied to the Suharto sons and their associates special rights to handle the import, manufacture or distribution of such goods or services".

According to the estimates quoted by several magazines and several newspapers (Far Eastern Economic Review, Sydney Morning Herald, Asian Wall Street Journal) in the eighties the wealth of the Suharto family and its associates would mount between two and three billion dollars.

Due to the authoritarian oldfashioned character of the regime, The Economist, in its annual analysis of the economic perspectives of developing countries considered (20/12/86) Indonesia as high-risk country for investments. Therefore John Taylor concludes that:

"If Indonesia is to change such perceptions, then a number of crucial issues need to be dealt with urgently in the nineties, and in many of these it would seem that Suharto Government forms part of the problem rather than the solution."

John Taylor analises afterwards some of the main economic problems of Indonesia, concluding:

(...) "We are witnessing a growing conflict between the increasing needs of the Indonesian economy for modernisation based upon deregulation and diversification, and the entrenched interests of monopolies supported and sponsored by companies aligned with the Suharto family.(...)

"Indonesia similarly faces serious environmental problems, whose impact will intensify during the next ten years". These problems, related to deforestation*(...)"cannot be discussed without also mentioning the related issue of transmigration. Policy in this area aim to move millions of landless poor from the central island of Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok to the less densely populated island mostly in the east" (...).*

*"Transmigration has involved widespread human rights abuses, including forced resettlement, as has been rigorously documented by many commentators. The government has made it clear that an additional aim is to undermine non-Javanese societies and cultures. Hosting a meeting on transmigration in Jakarta, Minister of Transmigration, General Martono, promised that, **<<by way of transmigration, we will try to realise what has been pledged, to integrate all ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesian nation. The different ethnic groups will in he long run disappear because of integration, and there will be one kind of man>>.** Current estimates for the period covering the present Five-Year Plan put the loss of tropical rain forest resulting from the clearing of transmigration sites at 3,3 million hectares. In addition, many transmigration sites have proved totally unsuitable for*

farming, and their settlers have abandoned them for surrounding areas thereby causing further deforestation.

"The Indonesian Government's gandling of the environment, its transmigration policies, and its treatment of its minority peoples have all led in recent years to growing opposition, both domestically and internationally.

After referring the growing role of Indonesian NGO's (since political parties are controlled by the government) and the appearance, among the armed forces, of factions that wish to demilitarize the regime and let the exercise of politics mainly to civilians, John Taylor concludes:

"Consequently, the president should either retire or step down, to be replaced by a more civilian-influenced regime, if Indonesia is to modernise in line with other AESAN states.(...)

"A post-Suharto regime may adopt a less brutal and exploitative policy towards East Timor. The limited degree of autonomy allowed by such a regime might then enable the independence movement to pursue its aims in a situation which is no longer dominated by the dreadful brutality and carnage that has been imposed on the East Timorese people for the last fifteen years".

II.5 -Indonesia: Winds of change (*)

Synopsis of the presentation made by *Liem Soei Liong*, indonesian political refugee, Chemical Engineer, author of the book "War Against East Timor" (1984), co-author of the books "Muslims on trial" (1986), "West Papua, the obliteration of a people" (1988), "Die Molukken" (1989), co-editor of "Tapol Bulletin" (The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign) and the montly "Indonesia Feiten en Menigen".

Characterization of the Suharto's regime

(...) "The Suharto government has over the years survived many crises, has changed policies and general strategy and in the end has remained as one of the oldest dictatorships on the globe today. In this quarter of century, 1965 to 1990 Suharto has proved himself to be a very skilful and cunning operator, wiling to change policies if needed while at the same time sticking to certain principles".

After referring to the scheming way how Suharto maintained his predeccesor Sukarno as a figurehead President during three years, while eliminating about one million alleged members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), of trade unions and of other organisations, Liem Soei Liong affirms:

"The purge of anybody with leftist inclinations or ideas and the constant vigilance (in general: the security approach) has become the first and most constant factor of Suharto's government. Another constant factor in Suharto's rule is the gradual centralisation of power into his hands; starting with a loose coalition with military fractions, the regime gradually transformed into a Suharto dictatorship. Over the years the structure of the Suharto rule has increasingly become a vertical top down structure. The third consistent factor is the depoliticisation of the Indonesian society.

(*) Synopsis and translation of the quotations and the last part - which is almost completly transcribed - by the coordinator of this Seminar.

"Next to the constant factors, the Suharto rule can be describe through features of change. One important factor of constant change is the relationship between Suharto and the ABRI , the Indonesian armed forces. Another important factor of change is the gradual emergence and growth of Indonesia as a corporatist state. And last but definitely not least is the swift and drastic changes in the economy. (...)

"Until 1974 Suharto could still rely on the support of the majority of ABRI, starting the mid seventies a period of uncertainty emerged as several important opposition groups within ABRI started to challenge his leardership. Since 1983, Suharto's fourth presidential term, his rule became increasingly personalised. It could well be argued that Suharto in this period reached the peak of his power, at the same time recent history has taught that accumulation of power contains a grave danger, being at the top of the pinnacle can only mean descendence or a abrupt fall".

(...) "The use of provocation methods may be the most consistent feature in Indonesian politics. Practically all the major political conflicts in Indonesia are immersed with a strong element of provocation. Suharto's closest aides up to 1987 have been intelligence officers and it is a public secret that many allegedly subversive plots were deeply infiltrated by intelligence agents and subsquently provocated to perform unlawful acts. It could be argued that the Indonesian armed forces has a pitiful record as a pure military strike force but as an intelligence outfit is doing a very effective job. The territorial concept of the Indonesian army possesses a strong security component. Leaked documents from East Timor (the military manual) is a prof of population control".

After describing in detail the permanent characteristics of the regime and reminding that even today 1.4 million of ex political prisoners (ex-tapol) are obliged to use identity cards with the initials ET and are object of discrimination, Liem Soei Liong presented finally the prospects of change.

"The prospects of change"

"Although the presidential elections are still more than two years away, it was President Suharto himself who started the discussion of succession. In his highly controversial autobiography, published in 1989, Suharto indicated that this fifth term (1988-1993) will be his last one. In the meantime the discussion of Suharto leaving office or more general the fate of the New Order government, has escalated into a national issue. Strange enough, in contrast with other Asian countries where succession is prepared for a long time, Indonesia's preparation for succession seems to be totally absent. Suharto has not disclosed any viable candidate or concept about the transfer of leardership. (...) Many leading politicians have tried by launching trial balloons about the succession but so far the President has kept his lips sealed.

"A few possible scenarios of change have been discussed in Jakarta none of them overall convincing, not in the last place due to lack of proper democratic structures and outlets. (...) As political forecasting has great risks and uncertainties, scenarios based on deep knowledge regarding the power structures can also fail, proved in 1965 when the politically relatively low profile officer called Suharto emerged as the undisputed leader.

"The most possible scenario is a relatively smooth takeover from Suharto by a group of generals. The most powerful group of officers are assembled around a triumvirate of General Benny Murdani, General Rudini and General Edi Sudrajat. In particular Murdani and Sudrajat enjoy a lot of support within the army, Murdani paved the way for the present generation to lead ABRI while Edi Sudrajat the present army chief-of-staff is seen as the representative and spokersperson of the present generation of officers. This group are very much contesting Suharto's leadership but their views on the succession are widely known. While they take it for granted that Suharto will step down in 1993, Murdani has reiterated on many occasions that the succession will be performed in a

constitutional way. Chief of Staff General Sudradjat has backed Murdani's words by announcing the preparation of 422 military companies during this election period to keep the security and order. Murdani's constitutional concept is an implicit warning to Suharto to step down in a orderly way, albeit more forceful methods will be used.

"This scenario is better known in political circles in Jakarta as the "Kopassus scenario", the red berets scenario. Kopassus is the notorious red berets commando that have played an instrumental role in 1965 during the red drive and in 1975 during the invasion of East Timor. All the three generals are former red berets and of bear the same grudges against the excess wealth and fortune of the Suharto family. Although in objective terms the Murdani group possesses enough muscle and fireworks, it is still to be seen whether they can mobilise enough support outside the armed forces. With the decline of the political fortunes of ABRI, their access to special funds also declined. Many of the military corporations have been closed down due to mismanagement, corruption and incompetence while their connections with the large business groups is still far from satisfactory.

"There are strong indications that a group of young officers is getting restless and want to step up the pace and create a showdown situation already prior to 1993. Murdani has been criticised strongly of not showing enough criticism and defiance towards Suharto. The option of showdown has been strongly rejected by Murdani, who wants a smooth succession along constitutional lines. As a long time Suharto loyalist, Murdani has shown enough caution and like nobody else recognises the cunningness and ruthlessness of Suharto. regarding style of leadership, views or political culture Murdani shows many resemblances with Suharto. This is much less the case with Rudini and Edi Sudrajat who don't have a long enduring relationship with the President.

"Many political observers will argue that Suharto will not resign voluntarily. Even if the three generals give the solemn guarantee that the vast wealth and property of the Suharto family will not be confiscated, experiences with the Marcos of the Philippines and Chun Do Hwan of South Korea, will make Suharto very cagey.

"The relatively good prospects of the economy will be beneficial for Suharto, if a kind of succession scenario is being implemented by the trio of generals. Although nearing his seventies, Suharto looks to be in good health and many observers are convinced that he will opt for at least another term. If this is going to happen it is expected that Suharto will make some manoeuvres to boost and regain his influence within ABRI. The most likely efforts will be to neutralise his opponents by appointing loyalists in the ABRI general staff. So far Suharto did not manage to interfere in the appointments at the top, but promising lucrative offers to ABRI generals could easily jeopardise the plans of the three generals.

"In both options, the smooth succession or a sixth term for Suharto, the position of the civilians, in particular the technocrats and the Muslim mainstream groupings, will gain importance. In the "battle of wits", both Suharto and the other side will give generous offers to these two important social groupings to get them on their side. Again, the president has the advantage to be able to offer more, either finantial gains or positions in the administration.

"The weak spots of Suharto"

"As explained earlier, Suharto's strength lies in the fact that he is able, if needed, to change policies. It does not mean that he doesn't have weak spots.

"On the domestic front, land conflicts have been very sluggish and have created instability on nationale scale. Although the handling of land affairs has now been transferred from the Department of Agriculture directly into the authority of the president's office, the conflict has only grown in quantity and intensity. Several ABRI

generals have shown open sympathies with the pledge of the peasants or demonstrating students. The presidency does not have an answer how to decrease the tensions. If exploited by the military, it can create an explosive situation. The other problem mentioned earlier is the equitable distribution of wealth. The fast pace of economic boom has not benefitted large sections of the urban poor. The problems of employment remain endemic while at the same time Suharto has to repay huge amounts of external debts.

"Criticism inside and outside Indonesia concerning violation of human rights, the aggression over East Timor and West Papua and environmental degradation, are consistententtly growing and parrying criticism has become a major share for the Indonesia diplomats.

"The globalisation of the world and the increasing interdependency of nations cannot but affect Indonesia.

"A new generation of human rights and environmental activists has emerged on the Indonesian political scene, rejecting all the scenarios described above. They demand the uphold of human rights and the establishment of a democratic system. At the end this is the only viable alternative".

II.6 -The international position of East Timor (*)

This is a synopsis of the presentation done by Professor *Adriano Moreira*, President of the Oriental Studies Centre of the Lisbon's Society of Geography, and Parliamentarian of CDS, Centro Democrático e Social, Christian Democrat [Centre Social Democratic Party.]

"The Timor issue is simultaneously a problem for the Portuguese national conscience and an embarrassment for the lack of such a conscience, as far as the interests of the big powers are concerned. Those interests are still hiding behind the so often invoked communist danger".(...)

"Indonesia's regime as the aggression power (...) is one of the rare examples of a State of National Security: the army is in power and the enemy is identified as communist. It had an history of failed and inconsequent liberalization attempts, assuming a need for security against aggression that is perceived as potentially coming from external sanctuaries."

When trying to take over the Western Papua New Guinea (...)*"Indonesia proclaimed to submit to the rule of colonial self-determination"*(...) publicly rejecting any potential claims over the then Portuguese Timor, in order to consolidate its claims over New Guinea [Irian Jaya.]. *"Having won its prize, does not hesitate to make incursions into Papua New Guinea, independent since 1975, in hot pursuit of Irian insurgents."(...)*

"It also invoked the usual enemy of the State of national security at the time of the revolutionary Portuguese decolonisation for East Timor, pointing to the danger of becoming a sanctuary or a focal point, according to the modal form the guerrilla might assume. Everything could be considered to be a normal police activity, without any support of international law but solely based upon security interests. Even an abusive police case does not imply territorial gains, as it was the case of the occupation [of Timor.]"

(*) This synopsis, as all the others, was dom by the coordinator of this Seminar, based on the presentation and trying to use as many quotations as possible.

Professor Adriano Moreira reminds us that the United Nations had considered ever since 1961, all Portuguese overseas territories (including Timor) as non-autonomous regions. Even the Portuguese Republic, after the 1974 Revolution assumed its statute of administering power, under the international regime of Trust Territory. Although a fully detailed agreement has not been celebrated *"it is obvious and unrefutable that the relations between the United Nations, the Portuguese Republic and Timor are being developed under a typical relation of Trust Territory with Portugal acting under mandate from the international community."*

"Of the many functions and powers entrusted to the United Nations' General Assembly and to its Custodial Council (article 87) is "to enable periodic visits to Trust Territories on the dates agreed with the administering power. Nothing on its [UN] Charter allows for one of its members to totally boycott the full implementation of the decolonisation programme. Quite the contrary, any act against such objective violates the [United Nations'] Charter and gives authority to the Security Council to act upon it. It seems very hard to prove that a genocide is not a generalized aggression, because it clearly is a crime against humanity.

"This brief explanation purports only to recommend a total repudiation of the current international process that wants to consider the question of Timor as merely a problem between Indonesia and Portugal, trying to bring an end to the dispute between the old colonial power and the invader.

"Portugal can only (...) exercise its limited powers as administering nation, acting on behalf of the world interests vested upon the action of the United Nations. UN has the sole and direct responsibility for decolonisation, for the repudiation of the aggression, for the fight against genocide and other crimes against humanity.

"We cannot allow it to alienate its intervention and responsibility into a totally unjustifiable form of mediation between Portugal and Indonesia. The UN is not a mediator, it's the direct holder of an interest: self-determination; of an international responsibility: peace; and is forced to try to restore the independence of subjugated people and to reject military conquest.

"It is illegitimate to consider this to be a question between Portugal and Indonesia. It is a question between Indonesia and the international community represented on behalf of the UN, by an administering power whose incapacity is not its own but of the community on whose behalf is acting upon.

"The people of Timor counts on Portugal to fulfil all its administering obligations, but cannot acquit the international community here represented by UN of its fundamental responsabilities".

II. 7 - Timor and the international law

A synopsis of the presentation by Eng. *Rui Silva*, Parliamentarian of the PRD, Partido Renovador Democrático [Party for Democratic Renewal]

(...) "Timor is still one of the territories listed as having no self-government. As such it is possible to demand that the Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), which determined the implementation of the right to independence and self-determination of the people of East Timor, should be respected.

"For approximately fifteen years the occupation of East Timor by Indonesian troops has been a very grave violation of the fundamental rights and of International Law, and the continuation of this situation is clearly and condemnably an offence to the United Nations Charter, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.

"Portugal also recognises on its internal laws, by Law 7/74 and by its constitutional law the indefeasible right of the East Timorese people to freely choose its politic, economic and cultural future."

The Hon. M.P. Rui Silva quotes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (approved in Algiers on July, 1976) and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Penal or Degrading Treatment of Prisoners, *"two documents whose contents are permanently violated in the East Timor territory,"* adding that *"the right to life apart from its individual dimension also has necessarily a collective dimension.(...)*

"The cultural genocide on the territory of East Timor adds such collective dimension. The United Nations' General Assembly on its Resolution (14) approved on December, 18, 1982 states its conviction that all people, without exception, have a right to life, and to safeguard such right is an essential condition for the fruition of social, cultural, civil and political rights.

"The UN Human Rights Commission on two Resolutions in 1982 and 1983, repeated and ratified "ipsis verbis" that point. It is, thus proved the logical connection and the common ground between the right to life and the right to culture. The death of almost a third of the Timorese population causes a grave rupture on the logical and natural evolution of the Timorese culture acquired throughout the centuries. It is our responsibility, and the responsibility of the entire world to preserve this goal of the Timorese. We all owe this to them because of their martyr History. This is the reason behind generalized world repudiation, condemnation of the unjust and inhumane military occupation, and this is also the single major reason behind our presence here today on this Solidarity Forum to the people of Timor."(...)

"The world has to demand, that the exercise of the right of the Timorese to self-determination and the upkeep of its History and Culture be granted through popular consultation, under UN supervision to guarantee its authenticity. Until such solution is not met the Timorese will continue gagged and international law violated. It is our duty as free citizens conscious of this reality to share all efforts to find such solution."

II.8 -Timor, a national and international problem.

Synopsis of the presentation by Dr. *Raúl Castro*, Lawyer and Parliamentarian of Intervenção Democrática [Democratic Intervention]

(...) "Apart from bringing democracy and development, the Revolution of the Carnations had as another objective the decolonisation. In the recent celebration of the 16th. anniversary of April, 25, it was a military from the April Revolution now an M.P., Major Marques Júnior, who had the wisdom to say that 'if decolonisation was an objective, the April, 25 Revolution won't be completed until the people of East Timor can achieve its freedom and independence'."

Quoting the long and difficult fight of the Portuguese people against the regime that so much oppressed it all over fifty years, Raúl Castro, M.P. uses that analogy to say to the

Maubere people: *"No oppression lasts forever and some time the victory day will come."*

Quoting an article in the Portuguese Constitution that mentions the obligations of Portugal in regards to self-determination and independence of East Timor, that M.P. reminds the need of the Portuguese to go to the International Court of Justice to denounce the Treaty signed on December, 11, 1989 between Australia and Indonesia for the exploration of oil in the Timor Sea.

(...) "The self-determination and independence of East Timor are part of an intricate web of international interests, namely the fact that Indonesia is a big and powerful nation under the ferocious dictatorship of Suharto, on one hand, and on the other, since the very beginning, the complicity of the United States. These are fundamental links with other nations' interests. It may be important to draw your attention to the relevance of an intervention of the Pope on this international context, on behalf of the self-determination and independence of East Timor."(...)

"It is not as if revendicating for the East Timorese an exceptional attitude by the Pope, but the same He has adopted for other nations. The same as He, Himself expressed:

> **"To talk about peace on earth and not intervening on behalf of all world citizens who are mistreated, defending truth and justice, is an hypocrisy that only serves to weaken the unity and the moral authority of the Church."**

"These are words spoken by the Pope, John Paul II at the St. Guy Cathedral, in Prague this month [April, 21, 1990.] I will finish and I was not able to better express my solidarity with the heroic fight of the Timorese people against its occupiers, in order to get their self-determination and independence, than choosing these beautiful words from the Timorese poet Fernando Sylvan:

"TO FIGHT IS TO DISCOVER A PEOPLE THAT DOES NOT DIE!
TO LIVE IS TO SEE THE FREEDOM OF A PEOPLE THAT DOES NOT DIE!
TO BE INDEPENDENT IS THE WILL OF A PEOPLE THAT DOES NOT DIE!"

II.9 -The European Parliament supports the fight for Human Rights and the right of the East Timorese to achieve self-determination and independence.

Synopsis of the presentation of the Hon. *José Barros Moura*, Member of the European Parliament on behalf of PCP [The Portuguese Communist Party] and Member of the Parity Assembly ACP-EEC (comprising the countries of the European Economic Community, and African, Caribbean and the Pacific nations of the Lomé Convention.)

During his presentation MP Barros Moura gives detailed information on multiple and important initiatives and resolutions adopted by the European Parliament regarding East Timor, namely the Resolution dated July, 10, 1986, with reports from the socialist MP Van Den Heuvel regarding Human Rights in Indonesia [Doc A2-0283/87] and on East Timor [Doc A2-149/88] as well as the Resolution based upon this, and another Resolution on the situation on East Timor approved after the Papal visit to the territory [Doc B3-0473/89, as referred to in the first part of this booklet on page 25.]

His presentation goes through important resolutions adopted by the Parity Assembly ACP-EEC, the first of which was unanimously approved on October, 1, 1987 [see pages

24/25 of this document], followed by a "Resolution on the East Timor situation" approved in January 1989 in Barbados.

Summarising the history behind some of those resolutions, Barros Moura, MP, presented his conclusions. They are condensed as follows:

(...) "The joint action of the Portuguese Parliamentarians was capable of influencing political groups, and it was essential to balance a situation, previously favourable to Indonesia's position."

(...) "The Portuguese intervention at the European Parliament favoured its action within the framework of The European Political Co-operation. Initially, Portugal had to resign and be represented by the UK at the EEC-ASEAN meeting in Jakarta in 1986. The East Timor matter did not even raise some reservations from other EEC countries. On the contrary, after the Van den Heuvel Report, the European Political Co-operation was able to present a common stand to be adopted at the UN General Assembly."

The Parliamentarian, Barros Moura, goes even further, after reminding the *"potential for increased intervention, because the vote of Portugal is essential for the most sensitive EEC decisions,"* and he mentions various ways to *"create the intervention of the European Parliament (...). Other EEC institutions (Council and Committee) and the European Political Co-operation have not yet put to practice some fundamental areas of the resolutions already approved. Insisting on its implementation, asking for clarification on results already obtained or difficulties encountered we may initiate new Parliamentarian initiatives."*

The following are the most important areas yet to be implemented from the Van den Heuvel report: (*) (...)

12. *"We request the Ministers' Council take initiatives in order to obtain a cease-fire and the implementation of a referendum, after a transition period to be defined by the interested parties. Such referendum has to allow the population to exercise its free choice for the future of East Timor.*

14. *"We insist that the Foreign Affairs Ministers, develop a united diplomatic action, under its European Political Co-ordination, in order to give the people of East Timor the right to self-determination. We appeal to those ministers to establish contact with all parties involved in the conflict, including representatives of the East Timorese, and to inform the Parliament of the progress obtained through such initiatives.*

15. *"We request all EEC organizations to take into consideration the colonial situation on East Timor and this resolution within the framework of relations between EEC and ASEAN.*

16. *"We request the Committee to take into consideration the East Timor situation on all his contacts with Indonesian authorities.*

17. *"We request that in co-operation with the Portuguese authorities and with the relevant international humanitarian organizations, the Committee grant adequate and direct aid to East Timor, to refugee camps in Portugal and in Australia".*

(*) Translated from portuguese version of the report.

II.10 - East Timor from utopia to reality

Synopsis of the presentation by Dr. *Francisco Xavier de Menezes*, ex-administrator of the Shires of Viqueque, Baucau and Ermera [1958- 1965] and ex-Mayor of Dili [1968-1971] in East Timor.

"Lost in the outskirts of the Far East (...), Timor has shown throughout its history to be part of great cross roads."

Dr. Francisco Xavier de Menezes reminds us of the 'Afonso de Albuquerque' plan to *"throw a vital cut in the Islamic societies, ensuring at the same time the survival of the spices' route."*

He also mentions the attacks of King Toló from Makassar to Timor *"where he smashed all opposition until the locals decided to pay him a tribute. The Timorese refused the conversion to Islam because forbade them to eat pork, ceremoniously important in trade and in their tribal and ceremonial system.*

"It is then that the East Timorese opt for Catholicism, being proud until recently of being conquered by missionaries, by the cross and the holy water, instead of arms.

"With a quick jump on time it is important to stress that from 20% Catholic people during the Portuguese occupation in 1974 now we have 80% under an hostile majority of Islamic occupation".

We can talk about the Netherlands and the Portuguese strategy that conditions the situation of East Timor, forcing a move of the capital from Lifau to Dili Bay.

Between 1942 - 1945 Timor is under a Japanese occupation in yet another crossroads of its History.

(...) "If there wasn't the loyalty, the support and the sacrifices of the East Timorese, the allied forces, especially the Australians, would have not been able to use their tactics of a devastating war against 40,000 Japanese with only 500 hundred men. This tactic of denying the Japs the right to invade Australia was essential, and the Japanese were stalled and worn out for most of the time.

"After prolonged and successive defeats by the North Americans (...), East Timor is part of a new strategy much more complex than previously with the help of Indonesian expansionism and a general contention policy by the USA. (...)

"It is pragmatic and makes elementary common sense that one tries to change world attitudes [towards Timor] and even, why not enlist the support of the US and UK who are the major arms suppliers to Indonesia?. This should be done in conjunction with all other political lobbies, and apart from the 'platonic' support of EEC countries and the inoperative UN resolutions".

Congratulating the reconciliation between FRETILIN and UDT that created the National Convergence, Dr. Menezes applauds FRETILIN statements that *"it accepts a Parliamentary multi-party system, and it is important to divulge this new image in the world and in the international arena."*

Dr. Menezes ends up saying that (...) *"it makes good sense in an atmosphere dominated by political pragmatism, that the two major Timorese parties have shown their willingness to a possible future link with ASEAN, leaving Indonesia without the argument that an independent East Timor might become a nuisance of a neighbour."*

II.11 - Indonesia bets on the new generation

Synopsis of the presentation by *Licínia Ramos Horta*, East Timorese.

"I spent two years in a Bali University [Indonesia] studying English literature. There are more than two hundred East Timorese studying in Bali." The students have to sit for an admission test, and once they passed it, they will be screened and have to be approved by KOPSKAM (Indonesia's Secret Service and National Security body.)

"KOPSKAM has the final word. Once approved, and when attending Indonesian universities, the students join the Timorese Student Associations, all of which are controlled by the Indonesia military. Take Bali, for instance, all students have to join the East Timor University and High School Alliance - IMPETTU (in Bahasa Indonesia.)

(...) "The Indonesian authorities have decided to nominate a military commander for the leadership of IMPETTU. All initiatives taken by this organization come from the military in co-operation with civil authorities and under the directives of the Jakarta government.

(...) "The Indonesian authorities not only control the organization's activities, they also organize spy networks within the students' community, within schools, universities and in the students' residences. They pay and instruct other Timorese to spy on their compatriots with whom they share desks or lodging. Other Indonesian students also provide this 'service'. Teachers act also as spies working closely with the Indonesian secret service.

(...) "At school, the East Timorese avoid mingling with the Indonesians and are always grouped together. This behaviour enforces the climate of lack of confidence.(...) Since the East Timorese are not interested in learning Indonesian, language is another factor that only increases the hostilities.(...)

"The vast majority of almost two hundred East Timorese studying in Bali prefer to study Economics, Medicine or Law, and only two attend Indonesian Literature courses. At school what we learn most concerns Indonesia, and "Pancasila" - the five philosophical principles of the Indonesian State - is the most important subject in all areas of study.

"Marks on this subject sometimes determines who passes or fails at exam. East Timor is not mentioned, there are no broad discussions or debates between the East Timorese students on any international political issue, on democracy in other countries or on their economic development.

"As the teachers and the military told me: <<that is not a subject for the Timorese.>> Indonesia is all that matters like if it was the only country on earth. Indonesia has liberated the Timorese from Portuguese colonialism, the Timorese are considered underdeveloped.

"According to Indonesia, the only way to improve their lot is to learn and assimilate everything that is Javanese or from cultures of other Indonesian provinces, like Bali.

"When a student goes to Bali to continue his/her studies has to present him/herself to the Bali Military Command. During this meeting with the military authorities, students are told to socialize with everybody, local and others and not only with the Timorese. At this stage they are also told to spy on others. (...)

"Although, as I mentioned before there are no broadly-based or deep debating on international matters, sometimes they surface during classes. The teachers and the most distinguished students, always try as hard as they can to avoid any negative or vulnerable mention to Indonesia. If someone mentions a similarity to East Timor, the subject cannot be mentioned, otherwise one is punished and the smallest punishment is a fail mark.

"That is exactly what happened to a colleague of mine who dared mention the rights of people to self-determination, during a "Pancasila" class. Although she was a brilliant and distinguished student, she was the only one to fail the exams."

Licínia Horta then explained the Indonesian efforts to transform the East Timorese mentality into an Indonesian one, with all sorts of control, including censorship to family letters, etc. and adds:

"The East Timorese students do not identify themselves as Indonesian. The armed resistance on the mountains and on the occupied areas, are a powerful stimulant for the nationalist feelings and hostilize the Indonesians even further.

"Indonesia bets that this new generation will get a Javanese/Indonesian and integrationist mentality. But this is also the generation that survived all massacres since day one of invasion, December, 7, 1975, and all the massacres of 1978, 1979, 1980, etc., during the Indonesian occupation.

"These students belong to a generation that asks when someone passes away: <<Was it from disease, accident or the tentaras [Indonesian soldiers]? >>".

Licínia Horta ends saying:

"So far, only General Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, seems to be the only one to admit that the bet on the new generation was a failure. When his soldiers from Battalion 328 were biting the dust on the battlefield, frustrating his military strategy, he said <<There is only one way to end the Timor war: exterminate them all.>>"

II.12 - Helping to analyse the political problem of East Timor

A synopsis of the presentation by *CDPM* (Committee for the Rights of the Maubere People).

The problem of East Timor and its international positioning has changed substantially with the dismantling of political and military blocks and with the generalized turning back of one-party regimes.

Taking this into consideration we can present some major conceptions:

*"**a)** New regional powers are about to emerge thanks to the turning back of the two superpowers regarding the spheres of intervention and influence. Japan is expected to become the new 'boss' of South East Asia.*

"(...) The transformation of regional alliances, like the current warming up of relations (even in the military field) between Australia and Indonesia, might be an indicator of unexpected changes, like the new role for Japan in that region.

"With his decisive regional role in the future, Japan (as well as the Japanese public opinion) ought to become a most privileged diplomatic target.

"b) *(...) The reduction of global conflicts weakens the position and the support of the big powers to their 'regional cops'. Dictatorships, of which Indonesia is a big scale example, who were located in strategically important regions, supported directly or indirectly by those two superpowers are losing their relevance. These countries who have had a history of repeated human rights' abuses and other over their people are being left out in the cold.*

"On a long-term basis it is well documented that the relationship between states is better guaranteed by those where some form of popular plebiscite and support has created national consensus. This is one of the reasons why the superpowers, USSR and USA as of lately have tried to build up alternative power alliances in such allied countries.

"c) *(...) With the dismantling of political blocks, the non-alignment movement loses its 'raison d'être'. East meets West and the confrontation between the developed North and the underdeveloped South is aggravated.*

"d) *(...) With the re-emergence of nationalist movements and the depoliticization of conflicts, cases like the East Timorese one will be withdrawn within itself instead of falling into oblivion. This is because it is based upon deep roots ranging from ethnical, linguistic, religious or otherwise nationalistic factors, instead of political or ideological influences from the major powers.*

The presentation from CDPM goes on to consider that: *"notwithstanding the political stability, the causes for crisis remain unabated,"* and are even on the brink of deterioration because *"the central power is delegated to an old and aging man (...), the President (71 years old), supported by the military and his replacement can open a Pandora box between political factions.*

"In the meantime the internal restructuring of the economy will intensify the pressures (...). The Indonesian economy is highly conditioned by its monopolies and concession grants, depending upon a close union between the military in power and the private and public sectors (...)

"Apart from internal reasons, and mainly because of external pressures from foreign credit organizations, namely Japan, Indonesia is witnessing and will proceed with a market deregulation and the lifting of trade barriers. Major consequences of this process will be a bigger foreign investment with its implicit access to decision-making areas, the weakening of economic, thus political, importance of the military elite structure in power, with all potential risks of internal confrontation and an uprising of an urban technocracy mixed with private financiers."

Apart from this the pro-democracy movements, the human rights campaigners and the ecologists who sponsor the changes are rapidly becoming more and more influential in Indonesia.

CDPM draws its attention to the incoherence of the administering power based upon its dependency on the external affairs interests' and pressures' from its natural and traditional allies.

To end this presentation CDPM suggests a strategy of negotiable diplomacy, mass media and a firm " *support, financially and politically to the nationalist movements, in order to exercise the right of the East Timorese to self determination and to implement it in what is expected to be a long term decision (five years plus.)*".

III - CULTURAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL NOTES, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF THE TIMORESE NATION (*)

III.1 - The Timorese, predator or ecologist?

Synopsis of the presentation by Dr. *Francisco Xavier de Menezes*

"Following a critical and analytical process of the oral traditions I have tried, during my participatory stay of more than 16 years [1955 - 1971] in Timor, to learn and understand the ancestral system of soil protection, environment as well as of people and wealth.

"Apart from the community based human resources as vigilantes, militias, patrolmen, whose utilization seems to be more recent than the Portuguese administration, it has been noticed that people often relied upon magical-religious protective norms of noticeable practical efficiency (...).

"LULIK is a major nucleus, working simultaneously as a motivator and inhibitor of those protective practices (...).

"The Timorese believe in a force or vital principle, whose identity is often mistaken by the soul of live people or spirits, be it the predecessors or the nature. This vital force can take on superlative aspects, becoming a mysterious and occult power, that needs to be captivated or dominated since it presides over its bodily destiny.

"An obvious and clear distinction surfaces from that power. For the Timorese such distinction wavers between the beneficial, protective or even disciplining power and the maleficent and destructive side of it. The first considers the occult as venerable, almost sacred when the word 'lulik' is mentioned (...)"

The latter essentially maleficent, destructive and disintegrating is called 'buank' or 'suank'.

"One of the typical propriety protection by magic-religious means is through "Hórok" or objects like cutlasses, tree branches, ropes, etc., after they were hung on a fence or a tree, after some rituals to capture 'lulik' so that it would become the chosen object, thus protecting such land against robbers and intruders, afraid that the cutlass would chop them off or their souls, or that the tree branches would castigate them, or that the rope would tie them up.(...)

"Certain rites would guarantee protection against soil and forest erosion and the land control that was attained by considering some bush zones as "lulik." (...)

"This conceptualizing of "lulik" is a disciplinary force that in the past helped regulate the distribution of foodstuffs, helped against promiscuity during parties and rituals and the defence of property (...).

(*) Drs. Maria Olimpia Lameiras and henry Campagnolo did most a interesting presentation about "Peoples of Timor, people of Timor: divergences, convergence (the anthropological knowledge as a basis for a strategy)."
As they couldn't give its synopsis on time, as they wished, it can't be included in this brochure.

"There is no doubt, once we appreciate the traditional East Timorese agricultural methods, that there were in place self-controlling mechanisms able to keep the socioeconomic standards and the balance between man and soil resources. The Timorese, contrary to some rushed analysis and writings imply, was not a predator, and apart from some excesses was an authentic ecologist.

"Time does not stop. The lack of agricultural treatment, the vigilance methods using forest rangers and surveillance have progressively replaced traditional methods, with the subsequent reduction of importance of the 'lulik' concept as a socioeconomic disciplinarian, has brought disastrous results in forest and soil protection (...).

"The socioeconomic balance and the soil degradation in East Timor are aggravating through this war of usage and devastation, as followed by the guerrillas, opposing an invader and occupier who does not mind looting, and indiscriminately burning with napalm bombs and fire throwers all areas.

"The indiscriminate exploitation of soil riches by rubber, coffee and clover plantations, together with the introduction of the so called 'cash-crops' as cinnamon, pepper and tea. The sandal exploitation and export of sandalwood, forbidden by the Portuguese since the last century and even more strictly after the 20's has reached 560 tonnes in 1982, which is in excess of any output during the last two centuries". This of course came to an abrupt halt shortly after.

III.2 - Bunak's People [East Timor] Social and Political Organization

Synopsis of the presentation by *Father Apolinário Guterres*, Timorese and religious assistant to East Timorese refugees, and by *Dr. João dos Santos*, anthropologist.

Both authors started by doing an ethnographic description of the *"social and political organization of TAZ [village] of the ethno-linguistic group of the Bunak,"* who are located in the hilly central regions of Timor island. The research was based on studies done in the field between 1968 and 1975, and completed in Portugal within the Bunak East Timorese community in Lisbon. Their conclusions are as follows:

"Within the Taz [village] in a Bunak society we can find an organized "mini-state," structured under a lineage system, with complex components such as family, education, political, judiciary, religious, military and economic.

"All distribution of powers in a Taz is done by consensus. Since its foundation powers are set and distributed. It is this strict and effective exercise of all institutional functions that coupled with the interaction of all social agents, that generate harmony and a global well being, following traditional mores.

"There is in Taz, an Assembly of the Council of Chiefs [datomil/matazmil] who acts as a controlling body following community decisions.

"Bunak society and life are filled by the sacred "pho", that regulates the cyclical sacred rites. These are celebrated at length by the entire community, in a show of festive demonstrations where all social agents take part.

"Taz" goes on and on, identically, single and multiple throughout generations, strengthened and enriched by its ramifications, growing naturally with the time, even if

made up of different lineages.

"The traditional culture and the continued hand over of the culture of its ancestors is guaranteed by the Lal Gomo (the lords of the word, the guardians and holders of the history and traditions of its ancestors.

"Although the contact with the Portuguese has introduced some "innovations," the basic Bunak culture has not lost its fundamental traits."

III.4 - Culture and social structure

Synopsis of the presentation by *Luís Costa*, East Timorese, ex-priest, and brother of the Timorese poet Borja da Costa, murdered by the Indonesian troops on December 1975, Secretary of the Australasian Foundation Borja da Costa

"All Timorese - parties, population and the local Catholic Church - must strive for the establishment in East Timor of a democratic government that can lead the Timorese Nation to the consolidation of freedom, democracy and development. The government and even the opposition must work towards a better standard of living and of the Maubere welfare. The people and its will are the ones who have to decide the path to follow, and the only way to chose is through free elections. In order for the United Nations to establish favourable conditions for free elections in the territory, with the current political status, it is imperative that all Timorese are united under a nationalist block, with ideological divergencies but within the framework of the National Convergence. Without these nothing can be done on behalf of the people of East Timor.

"The reality of the Timorese social and political structure is based upon a democratic system, where the elected chief has his powers limited by the general consensus of the elders - 'Katuas' -, normally without any chances of hereditary succession. The East Timorese political organization, before the European influence, was based upon a feudalistic primitive system led by the monarch or Liurai.

"Heads of Souk and villages, the liurais, are freely chosen between the noble, and they represent a powerful and rich class who exercise all authority and justice. They are chosen in an election by a meeting of their equals - Datos -, descending from royal families from either their maternal or paternal side.

"All questions and disputes between people under their jurisdiction that become entangled and not solved are to be decided by the Liurai. Family problems are solved by the eldest - Katuas - belonging to the Knua. Katuas are the guardians of traditions and good mores of a Knua or Souk. They are the ones who keep up the well being and harmony between all inhabitants.

"Therefore in an initial phase of the new nation, it is important that "datos" and "katuas," especially the most influent and idoneous, are members of the consultative committees of Kingdoms and Knuas.

"The administrative division should respect the traditional borders of the kingdoms, and ethno-linguistic barriers, but the Shires can be reduced and the villages can become an enlarged Knua (not only related to a family group.)"

As far as family and *"barlaque"* [marriage] are concerned, Luís Costa sustains the principle that marriage should be monogamous and that the population be *"sensitive towards the equality between men and women,"* simultaneously respecting the traditional spirit of dowry.(...)

"In religious terms, the East Timorese is divided between two opposite worlds: 'his world', Cosmos, the territory where he lives, and the unknown and undetermined space that surrounds him, Chaos, populated by a thousand demons and an unknown number of dead souls.

"Their religion is basically animist, a religion of people who identify their lives with every surrounding matter. Each important happening is normally accompanied in the Timorese world by sacrifices, rituals and offerings.

"There is a sacred triad: Maromak, god by excellence, Rai, the land of the alive; and Lalehan, heavens, where all the Nature gods and ancestors live.

"All relics belonging to the Knua community or to the kingdom are kept in 'Uma Lulik', a sacred house under the responsibility of Dato Lulik, a traditional priest.

"It is under this atmosphere of mysticism and imaginary that the first Portuguese, missionaries, land in 1515 on the land of the crocodile, East Timor. For a century and a half, missionaries preached the word of Christ, teaching the first things about Portuguese culture. Nowadays the spirit of the Roman Catholic Gospel belongs to all Timorese - Christian or Pagan - and the local Catholic Church through its priests has demonstrated in the last few years as an unconditional supporter of the will of the East Timorese people.

"Whatever type of government is established in East Timor it has to respect the Catholic Church. Whatever educational system is put to place it must aim at an intellectual, human and spiritual formation, guaranteeing religious freedom in a way that everybody can fight for the cultural, social, economical and political self determination of East Timor.

"The national language used will be Portuguese, but teaching of Tétum should be implemented as a national language, capable of developing the legendary, imaginary and narrative of its people (...).

"The population should be made to accept traditional medicine practices as a complement, not as an alternative of medical science. Matandoks have to be sensitized to promote research and development of plant medicine, divulging what they know on the subject.

"A wide and efficient policy of health has to be pursued, so that people know how to become healthy, and if unable to achieve it, they know they can take appropriate measures with qualified members of the community."

III.4 - Tomorrow's East Timor

Synopsis of the presentation by *Fátima Guterres*, Timorese, refugee in Portugal, after having been detained and having accompanied her husband during the resistance until his death.

"When East Timor and its people become free and independent from the aggression, slavery and the criminal Indonesian military occupation that has been imposed upon the Maubere people for more than 14 years, notwithstanding its fighting and resistance to reach its objective <<the right to be free>>, we should be able to unite all Timorese to take part in the restructuring and reorganization of our motherland, and destroying all systems

imposed by Indonesia.

"East Timor will become a democratic republic, and its government will be democratically elected by the Maubere people. It will become a non-aligned country without any foreign military bases. It will pursue good diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries under a government of national unity.

"Politically it will be a multiparty regime. As all other countries in the world it will have its own language, religion, traditions, mores. It will return to the practices of its culture, celebrating traditional dates on its sacred houses ("Uma lulik"), marriages ("estilus"), and mourning ("Kore metan"), after all these years under the Indonesian silencing of its culture and of attempts to replace it with an Indonesian culture.(...)

"As a national language the people will speak Tétum, widely spoken throughout the territory, and the official language will be the Portuguese. All languages and dialects will be tolerated under our democratic principles.

After referring religious points of views, land ownership, land burnt out policy and health care, Fátima Guterres ends up saying:

"The Maubere people intends to live free and independent and create a democracy for all, defending their freedom and live under a fair justice system."

IV - CHURCHES AND EAST TIMOR

IV.1 - The Church in East Timor

Synopsis of the presentation by *Ana Nunes* of the group "Peace is Possible in East Timor"

*"**<<The Church has nothing to be threatened by the integration of East Timor in Indonesia>>,** such were the promises of the Indonesian bishops and the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, to the Portuguese Bishop of Dili, back in 1975, even before the Indonesian invasion.(...)*

"Some priests went with the people and hide in the bush. Others stayed behind, in the occupied villages and settlements. All of them lived through the horrors of a foreign military occupation, whose brutality exterminated a third of the entire population of East Timor.

"And all, or most of them, in the clergy have fortified throughout their suffering the links they had with the East Timorese, sharing their aspirations to freedom.

"For the Timorese the Church became a rare haven for their identity, and they responded accordingly in massive numbers. If the Roman Catholic only represented 30% of the population, after five centuries of Portuguese colonial domination, they soon became 80% after a few years of Indonesian occupation. To be declared as Christian is also a way of affirming oneself as distinct from the sociologically Muslim occupier.

"Monsignor da Costa Lopes, was nominated Apostolic Administrator of the Dili Diocese in 1977, after the Portuguese Bishop leaves Dili. He then assumes a clear position on behalf of his people, denouncing the genocide practised by Indonesia. His words do not please and in May 1983, he is invited to resign by the Holy See, even against the will and the protests of the local clergy and the population.

"A young Salesian priest is nominated to replace him, Carlos Ximenes Belo, who had recently returned to Timor after his formative years in Europe during the invasion and following years. (...)

*"His nomination was feared as it might facilitate the integration. Less stern than his predecessor, Mons. Belo could not be alien to the suffering of his people and he defends the rights of his people, denouncing in 1983 and 1984 the clamorous situation lived in East Timor." **<< We live under oppression. East Timor resembles a prison camp. Indonesia is colonizing East Timor and its citizens will become second class citizens in their own land. The solution for this conflict lies in the respect for the right of the people for self determination (...)>>.***

(...) "In April, 1986, after a request from the Vatican, Mons. Belo secretly meets Xanana Gusmão, the armed resistance leader to whom he proposes a surrender formula, offering in exchange guarantees of safeguard of the lives of all guerrillas and the possibility of exile to all those who preferred it (...).

"Mons. Belo, in July, 1988 is nominated Bishop, but continues as Apostolic Administrator of the Dili Diocese (Dependent from Rome). A few months later [November] he is host to the Indonesian President, Suharto, who went there to inaugurate the new Dili Cathedral built with offers from the Government and the Indonesian Armed Forces. The East

Timorese, never saw it straight calling it 'The Rupee Cathedral.'

"President Suharto's visit was preceded and followed by a wave of detentions and torture, estimated around 3, 000 people. Mons. Ximenes Belo, after playing host to the President denounced <<the tortures that became standard in Timor>>. Soon, thereafter the Bishop's residence was under military surveillance and all visitor were been pre-screened.

"Finally freed from his long lasting silence, Mons. Belo writes in February 1989 to the United Nations' Secretary General asking for a referendum because <<until now the people of East Timor has not been consulted, and others talk on their behalf>>.

"A few days later he writes to the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, explaining his position. ***<<Every year we witness the same abuse. We have discussed them with the authorities, but in the end the result is still the same. The people suffer. Thus, it is urgent to do a referendum and ask the people of Timor if they accept integration>> (...).***

"As soon as the contents of the letter to the UN Secretary General are known, the pressures on the Bishop of Dili intensify. Ministers and military commanders criticize and threaten the Bishop. Mons. Canalini, the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta supports them stating that ***<<Mons Belo wrote this letter on a personal basis, as a Timorese citizen. That is his responsibility and it does not link in any way the Catholic Church with it.>> (...)***

"Ignoring the pressures and critiques Mons. Belo writes to the Bishop of Setúbal about the pressure he is under ***<<Here the critical comments of Indonesian ministers have been strong and humiliating, the Timorese 'parliamentarians' were forced under the threat of a pistol to sign a statement where they say that 'integration and the decolonisation process have already been done' >>.***

"Local priests repudiate the Nuncio's statement ***<<The clergy of Dili rejects opinions and biased suggestions stated by some ecclesiastic personalities.>>*** *The priests support Mons. Belo stating* ***<<The Bishop is theologically, juridically and ecclesiastically the representative of the local Church when he speaks on such quality, on behalf of the Church and the feelings of the clergy and the people>>".***

Ana Nunes refers to the wide publicity given by "Osservatore Romano" to a pastoral letter signed by Mons. Ximenes Belo, but written by an Indonesian priest in contrast with numerous letters written by the Bishop himself, but refused any publicity by the Vatican newspaper.

Ana Nunes also mentions the support received from personalities, organizations, movements and Christian communities on behalf of the Timorese.

IV.2 - The Church and East Timor

Synopsis of the presentation by *Father José Lopes Baptista* of the movement "Peace and Justice for East Timor"

The presentation from this solidarity group from Oporto focus on the acts, omissions and hopes of the Catholic Church in relation to East Timor, stressing its admiration towards the *"courageous and clairvoyant work of Mons. Martinho Lopes as Apostolic Administrator of Dili."*

Father José L. Baptista refers various Portuguese Christian solidarity groups in relation to East Timor, and the position assumed in 1984 by the Permanent Council of the Portuguese Synod (remembered in 1989, just before the Papal visit to East Timor). Some extracts:

(...) <<It is an illusion to think, that notwithstanding other events, what has been happening in East Timor is nothing but a national conscience strongly felt, refusing to be suppressed or annihilated. Timor aspires to fully express its own individuality. To forbid it to express itself leads not only to a physical but also to a 'cultural' genocide, even more grave because it affects not only those who die as those who survive, not only present generations but all the future ones>>.

The presenter then goes on mentioning a document from his solidarity group where the February, 6 letter by Bishop Belo [Apostolic Administrator of the Dili Diocese] to the UN Secretary General is quoted:

<<I take the liberty of writing to Your Excellency, Secretary General to let you know that the decolonisation process of Portuguese Timor has not yet been resolved by the United Nations. *It is important not to let it go into oblivion, so that us, the people of Timor, can be consulted over the fate of our land (...).*

<<Being in charge of the Catholic Church and as a Timorese citizen I ask you, Secretary General to initiate in East Timor the most normal and democratic decolonisation process: a REFERENDUM. *The people of East Timor has to be consulted through a plesbicite regarding his future. So far the people has not been consulted. Others talk on their behalf. It is Indonesia who says that the Timorese have adopted integration. The people of Timor never said it. Portugal thinks that time will solve the problem, but as people and as nation we are dying>>.*

The presenter then quotes a letter from Xanana Gusmão, dated October, 5 that year:

<<We totally support the proposal from our Bishop of Dili, Mons. Ximenes Belo. We want to put a stop to any doubts that might still arise that in case of the Maubere people, under international supervision, <<will reaffirm>> their wish of integration with Indonesia, we as Falintil guerrillas will immediately abandon our fight and will lay down our guns >>.

"A group of around 100 Timorese students, in September, 7, 1989, risking persecution, torture, "accidental death," or "disappearance," dare write to the UN Secretary General showing their solidarity with the Bishop, Mons. Ximenes Belo.

"They reiterate their support <<to the position taken by the Bishop of Dili, Mons.

Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, on his letter dated February, 6, 1989 as a political and religious official expression on behalf of the people of East Timor for the immediate realization of a <<referendum>> as a viable form for a peaceful solution for the case of East Timor.>>

The presentation of the group "Peace and Justice for East Timor" reminds us of other positions taken by various Bishops in support of a referendum:

(...) "The Japanese Bishop, Aloysius Soma, President of the Japanese Committee for Peace and Justice, sent a letter to the UN Secretary General, with the signatures of 114 Asian and Pacific Bishops, more than 1,000 priests, various religious members and laity of Churches in the region, where they show their solidarity in relation to the position adopted by Bishop Belo and for his referendum proposal."

It is mentioned that it is regrettable that after a Christian movement and a group who collected solidarity letters for the East Timor Church, *"when trying to deliver them on March, 13, 1990, to the Portuguese Apostolic Nuncio, Mons. Luciano Angeloni, to get them, via diplomatic bag to the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, the representative of the Holy See in Lisbon, did refuse to take but one of the 1,024 letters, alleging that sending them to Timor could be misconstrued as a political attitude.*

"What is the real position of the Church?" asks the solidarity group. *"There are some signs for quite some time that very influential forces have been moving to take the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia as a natural, irreversible "fait accompli."*

"His Sanctity has stated in Jakarta in front of the Indonesian Government that:

<<Sometimes some nations are tempted into underscore the basic and fundamental human rights, in a desperate attempt of a political unity based only upon a military or economic power. Such unity can easily be dismembered.>>

"Unfortunately as it seems the Indonesian Government has not grasped how deep and meaningful are these words."

Father José L. Baptista also stated that it *"is the mission of all believers to build free societies"* and concludes his presentation with some work proposals.

IV.3 - Church and Christian responsibility for peace and self determination

A synopsis of the presentation by *Father Bernardino Queirós Alves*

Father Bernardino Alves starts by defining the Church's mission as a defender of Life and Peace, quoting Papal documents that show *"two characteristics of what is commonly called* ***<<sin structures>>*** *that lead to modern forms of imperialism: the thirst for profit and for power."*

He then goes on reminding us of a duty for solidarity:

"We cannot forget the importance and the impact of the statements made by the Bishop of Coimbra during the Fátima celebrations of October, 13, 1989. Those who were dominated by indifference, misinformation or suspicion were certainly taken aback by his words: ***<<One of the biggest crimes of our era is the situation of humiliation, oppression and lack of respect beguiling the Maubere people.>>*** *And he went on*

stressing the position adopted by the Bishop of Dili on the need and demand of a referendum for the Maubere people to freely choose its destiny."

He also quoted Bishop Simones, President of the Episcopal Dutch Congress who expressed his solidarity to the Bishop of Dili:

<<(...) I am deeply convinced that your frank and courageous appeal for a referendum can only be born out of lengthy meditation and painful experience of the sad situation and long lasting suffering of your well loved people.(...)

<< As a fraternal tribute to show evangelical love and hope I want to profess to you the active sympathy and the strong support of the Dutch Catholic Community towards your courageous fight >>.

Father Bernardino says that:

> *"It is reassuring, but also challenging for the Christians to know of the letter written by the resistance leader Xanana Gusmão to the Pope: **<<The Maubere people always trusted the sacrificed East Timorese clergy, who have never left them down and always raised their eyes, their thoughts and their suffering to the Holy See>>"***

Father Bernardino suggests some solidarity actions as:

"Personal contacts of responsible lay people with their bishop in each Diocese. Contacts between Parish Priests, Religious Orders and other Church organizations where someone is able to inform and sensitize other people. Contacts with Papal Committees linked to this cause (Pax Christii, Justice and Peace, etc.,) and with the Catholic Media.(...)"

IV.4 - John Paul II visits East Timor

Synopsis of the presentation by refugee *Ana Margarida Sales Luís*, Timorese student in Portugal

"For the East Timorese the Papal visit started long before it took place. Indonesia was quick to transform it into a political question, so that it could be seen by the world as a political acknowledgment by the Vatican of the Indonesian integration of East Timor.

"During May there was rampant speculation over the Mass and the language chosen by the Pope to celebrate it. Persecution soon took place and the agreement for East Timorese to departure through the International Red Cross was cancelled. some youngsters were detained and beaten (...) They were released to be imprisoned again (...) in October."

"Persecution intensified as the time of the visit was getting nearer. Many youngsters were taken to be interrogated by INTEL [secret police] and police enquiries turned violent (...). During July my passport was confiscated. I was summoned by KOPSKAM [secret military police] to give detailed information on José Madeira, the leader of the youth resistance. As they could not get information from me they tried to get me on contradictory statements." (...)

"When October came, plenty of Indonesian people were sent to East Timor, not only troops but well armed civilian dressed people so that they could be seen as Timorese by the international media. On October, 12 the Pope finally arrived and everybody expecting the

Mass to be celebrated in Latin, were very happy when the Pope did it in Tétum." (...)

"By the time the Mass was coming to a close, a group (...) showed up cloth banners where it was written in English and Portuguese "Long Live FRETILIN," "LONG LIVE THE LAND OF THE HOLY CROSS," "LONG LIVE INDEPENDENCE," "TRAITORS OUT," "WE WANT FREEDOM AND PEACE FOR EAST TIMOR."

"There were a few others that we could not read, because in the meantime Indonesian troops attacked and confiscated the banners from students' hands. That is when the confrontation started, with Indonesian people throwing stones and chairs to the students before these reacted.(...)

"Students from the S. José External Secondary School dressed up as boy scouts during the Papal visit on October, 12, were persecuted. Some of them were detained. Others took refuge inside the Bishop's quarters or inside the Red Cross headquarters. Even the Bishop's residence was not respected. Members of KOPSKAM [secret military police] took students away from the Bishop's residence.

"They alleged that it was for a quick interrogation and that they would be brought back quickly. They were savagely spanked and barbaric ill treated and they were rescued by the Bishop himself. Not all of them were released, because they alleged that the interrogation has not finished yet. In the meantime the spanking kept on going.

"On November, 15 by 9.30 am the S. José External Secondary School (the only Portuguese school in the territory) was conducting business as usual on its classes (Year 1 to 6). Suddenly six trucks loaded with troops pulled over together with East Timorese working for the Indonesians. They surrounded the school. Because the school keeps its doors shut during class time, the troops escalated walls of SMAK [Indonesian Secondary School.]

"The children taken by the surprise attack of the Indonesian troops, tried to evade being shot at, but they were spanked, caught and attacked, handcuffed and stepped on, with lots of them having to be taken to the Hospital. The troops were more than the students and inflicted great damage, until they were able to carry the students to where they could be savagely attacked and interrogated without witnesses. Three seminarians students, almost priests, were also savagely attacked.

"The youths lacking arms and other ammunition asked only <<Where is your justice?>>

"And they went on beating as savage beasts. Unable to do much more under the hands of the Indonesians the students said: <<You do not respect Pancasila, you keep on killing and torturing without any respect for human rights.>>

In the meantime the Bishop had been warned and went on to the College. The Indonesians feeling defeat said only:

"<<This must be your lucky day because your leader [the Bishop] arrived so fast, otherwise we would have left a bomb to finish with you all.">>

IV.5 - Statement on East Timor

Synopsis of a document prepared by the ***Permanent Committee of the Lusitania Church*** (Anglican).

The Permanent Committee of the Lusitania Church wanted to associate itself with this 2nd. Seminar on East Timor promoted by the University of Oporto and reiterates a document from January, 1988:

"The Permanent Committee of the Lusitania Church [Catholic Apostolic Evangelical] met on January, 16, 1988, appealed to an end of the war in East Timor and approved the following resolution:

1. *"We recognize the indefeasible right of the East Timorese people to self determination and independence in accordance with the UN resolutions;*

2. *"We appeal to all Church parishes to declare a day of prayer and fasting in 1988, to reflect and pray for the end of war in East Timor, through a negotiated and just solution with the participation of the East Timorese population;*

4. *"We will propose other measures as necessary through government entities, imploring on behalf of God for:*

a) *an immediate ceasing of all war actions and violations of the Human Rights Convention;*

b) *the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops, and its replacement by international forces under the UN aegis;*

(...) d) *that under the UN supervision an international conference be called to supervise and help implement the free and democratic will as expressed by the East Timorese people."*

V - STRATEGIES FOR PEACE AND SELF DETERMINATION

V.1 - Western Sahara: is that a model for East Timor?

Synopsis of the presentation by *Pedro Pinto Leite*, lawyer and specialized in International Law by the University of Leiden [Netherlands]

*"The world has finally managed to celebrate Namibia's inclusion in the world community of Nations on March, 21. Not that long ago, supporters of **"realpolitik"** disdained of the efforts of SWAPO and its sympathisers, convinced that South Africa, based upon strategic and economic reasons would never let the territory become independent. After more than 70 years of South African administration, 40 of debate over its future and 23 of armed insurrection, Namibia is today an independent and sovereign state."*

The list of territories who await to see their processes of decolonisation concluded is yet to be exhausted. *"Both East Timor and the Western Sahara, have a lot in common, notwithstanding the distance that separates both and cultural differences. Ever since Namibia became independent, they represent the biggest territories under the aegis of the UN Decolonisation Committee, with Western Sahara being slightly bigger in area but less populated than East Timor.(...)*

"Western Sahara (...) is a territory with 266, 000 sq. km., more than a 1,000 km. of coast and rich in minerals, yet underpopulated and arid. Authors differ on the total population, varying between 74, 000 in 1974 plus 20, 000 European and the 117, 000 estimated by the UN in 1976 [Espiell, 59,] or the 139, 000 estimated in 1977 [Goedvolk, 189,] or even 151, 000 [Times Atlas.]

*"One of the causes for such disparity is the fact that the population is mainly made up of nomadic bedouins (linked by cultural traits and a common language **'hassania'**, derived from the Arabic and the lack of importance that traditionally they have adopted towards the existence of fixed borders (...). Besides, of its population there is also an uncertain number of refugees on other countries, estimated at 50, 000."*

Pedro Pinto Leite depicts then the evolution in Western Sahara:

- the creation of a "Representative Assembly" and the approval by this assembly of a petition to the UN which stated that the territory did not seek political independence.

- the refusal of the UN to recognize the validity of this petition, as that Representative Assembly had not been democratically elected.

- the creation of various political parties, one of which proposed the integration of Sahara in a neighbouring country and other two which defended independence, though in different ways.

Then he tells about foreign interventions, namely those of neighbouring countries, the abandonment of the administring power, the occupation, the armed resistance and the support of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the Sahauri people.

Finally and in sequency of a long and hard negotiation process, sponsered by UN *(...) "on August 30 1988, in Geneva, Morocco and the Polisario Front, gave their agreement to the proposals of UAO and UN regarding the realisation of a referendum, organized and supervised by UN, together with OAU for the self-determination of the Sahauri people.*

They agreed, namely on the constitution of the electoral college and on the question to be asked in the referendum"

As a conclusion, Pedro Pinto Leite reminds that the right of the Sahauri people to self-determination is an inalienable one and therefore *"any action that is against that right is legally null and worthless"*.

V.2 - East Timor: Self determination and independence

Synopsis of the presentation by *Dr. Manuel Tilman*, East Timorese, lawyer, ex-MP, ex-member of the Secretariat of the first Eventual Commission of the Parliament for the Follow-up of the Situation in East Timor.

"Independence is (...) the final goal of the long journey of all oppressed, dominated and colonized people who fight for their freedom and peace."

Reminding us of some historical facts, Manuel Tilman says that:

"The long journey to independence has to be done (...) in four major steps:

"Step One: - Withdrawal of Indonesian troops and administration (...)"

In accordance with international law and especially Chapter XI of the UN Charter:

"All members shall solve their international controversies by peaceful means, that do not threaten the international peace, security and justice.(...)

"In regards to this matter, the peaceful means are direct negotiations under the mediation of the UN Secretary General. The intervening parties being Portugal and Indonesia. The subject to be negotiated is the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and administration from East Timor.(...)"

Mentioning some philosophical details on the negotiations Manuel Tilman goes on:

"Step Two: - Reconstruction of the Portuguese Administration, in order to fulfil Law 7/75 of July, 17.

"The withdrawal of the Indonesian troops and administration implies the reconstruction of the Portuguese administration in East Timor, as per article 73 of the Charter, Resolution 1514 (XV) of December, 14, 1960, and Resolution 3485 (XXX) of December, 12, 1975 of the General Assembly of the UN in order to implement self determination and independence of the territory, as scheduled on article 293 of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic and on Law 7/75 of 17 July of the Revolutionary Council.

"It is anticipated there that:

<<The Portuguese State will give to a representative Popular Assembly of the territory the right of defining the political future of East Timor. Such Assembly shall be elected by direct, secret and universal means with full respect of all principles defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Once elected the Popular Assembly shall define by a single majority, direct and secret vote, the political and administrative status of the territory of Timor. >>

(...) "However taking into consideration the harsh consequences of the coups and contrecoups practised by the Timorese political parties, the long and harsh years of abandonment, invasion and occupation of the territory by Indonesia, that caused so much destruction and death, Portugal on moral and solidarity grounds shall stay for some time if so is the wish of the people of East Timor and Portugal."

"Step Three: - Referendum

"The permanence of Portugal for five to ten years, as stated in Law 7/75 of July, 17 must be subjected to a referendum by the Portuguese and Timorese peoples.

"Step Four: - Independence

"The referendum shall determine when all prerogatives of the Portuguese sovereignty and administration shall cease."

"Conclusion:

"The solemn act that will end with the Portuguese sovereignty over East Timor will be signed in Dili by the President of the Portuguese Republic and the President of the Popular Assembly.

"That day will witness a new, free, open, democratic, pluralist and Asian State that will take on the name of:

Democratic Republic of East Timor."

V.3 - A global peace plan needed (*)

Synopsis of the presentation by *Raúl de Brito*, Parliamentarian of Socialist Party and member of the Eventual Commission of the Parliament for the Follow-up of the Situation in East Timor [CEARST].

Raúl de Brito starts by mentioning the importance of the political evolution in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Pacific as justifying the hope for *"a just, and internationally acceptable solution for the problem of East Timor.*

"Some of the events that occurred in East Timor and Indonesia in the last few months help build our confidence. Particularly the students' demonstrations at Tacitolu and Dili during the visits to East Timor by Pope John Paul II and the North American ambassador to Jakarta. Those confrontations had a double impact: they destroyed the image that the Indonesian were trying to sell to the outside world of a military opposition without the support of the population; they also showed the world that the new generations of students reject the Indonesian occupation and are in solidarity with the Maubere people for freedom and independence.

"There are also less positive developments, like the granting by UN of the Population Award to the dictator Suharto and the Treaty for the exploitation of the wealth of the Timor Sea between Australia and Indonesia. These are two paradigmatic examples that show the contradiction between a new spirit that seems to be presiding over relations between states and the international and concrete actions of organizations and some States."

(*) This title was given by the coordinator of this Seminar.

Raúl de Brito mentions the Portuguese Government whose omissions do not impede anyone to believe that it *"is acting under the true spirit of defence of the right for self determination and independence of East Timor."*

Referring to the current round of negotiations *"between Portugal and Indonesia under the auspices of the UN Secretary General"* and to a future parliamentary visit of a Portuguese delegation, Raúl de Brito ends saying:

"The proposal for a referendum as presented by the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, Mons. Ximenes Belo, dated February, 6, 1989 and the Peace Plan presented by the leader of the Timorese resistance, Xanana Gusmão on October, 5, 1989 are a good working platform for the Portuguese, since both respect the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter and Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), with the ample support of all that defend a just solution for the East Timorese problem."

V.4 - Strategies for peace

Synopsis of the presentation by *Dr. Teresa Cunha*, National President of the Christian Movement for Peace.

Teresa Cunha starts by reminding us that *"Peace has to be translated into the realization of all genuine and deep feelings of the people, both in political, cultural and humane level.(...)*

"No peace but that of the cemeteries' will be possible without the liberty, dignity and justice for the motherland. This radical approach is the only that we feel can achieve peace for East Timor and its people. I learned this from refugees from Timor, Sahara, Palestine and Namibia (...).

"They all made me understand that everything is negotiable but these three life conditions:

"LIBERTY, DIGNITY AND JUSTICE."

To reach a true peace there are some conditions:

"The first is fairly clear to all of us, Portugal has to fully assume without any ambiguity its history of more than 400 years in East Timor and the international recognition as an administering power of that territory.

"Just because we think so, the last Congress of the Portuguese MCP approved a resolution where the Portuguese government is asked to nominate a Commissioner for East Timor."

Teresa Cunha proposes also an embargo *"on the sale of arms to Indonesia together with an economic embargo, as needed and opportune.*

"A second condition for reaching peace in East Timor is the acknowledgement that the people of East Timor has to take part in all negotiations, because Portugal and Indonesia are only two of the three interested parties.

"The legitimate representatives of the people of East Timor have to be listened to and have to take an active part on the decisions being made. This, of course will represent a reinforcement of the interventional capacity of the Timorese, both at national and international level. They will require means in order to achieve that goal.

"Since 1975 East Timor is synonymous of death and terror on a daily basis, defiling that country with the more than 200, 000 dead who are a cry of Humanity offended and smashed.

"In our opinion without a major political change in Indonesia, its policy of annexation and extermination, supported by the USA, Australia and other western powers will not lead to a peaceful solution.

"The end of violation of human rights, the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and its administration, the return of all transmigrated civilians, the end of the treaty for the exploitation of the riches of the Timor Sea, coupled with the effective action of Portugal, UN and the Timorese will repose the legality and allow for a true act of self determination and decolonisation.(...)"

The President of the Portuguese Christian Movement for Peace reminds us that:

"Peace in East Timor has a plan and a strategy of the utmost historical and political value. We refer of course to the peace plan of Xanana Gusmão. We think it can become a starting point for achieving all the objectives we have been fighting for and so many Timorese died for.

"The occupation, the war and the humiliation of East Timor are linked to blood and suffering. We cannot postpone, not even for a moment, any gesture that can liberate all men and women of East Timor."

V.5 - Strategy to reach peace

Synopsis of the presentation by *António Assunção Rosa*, Timorese living in Portugal since 1987.

(...) "The war in East Timor is not a mere revindication of more or less autonomy within the Indonesian nation. The war in East Timor is not a civil war within a state where some people try to impose by the force of arms some demands of sectors of the population.

"We have nothing, repeat nothing, to do with the kind of government Indonesia has not even with other political, economic, religious, cultural or ethnic aspects of the big Indonesian nation.

"The war in East Timor is a conflict between the aggression of Indonesian troops and the continued resistance of the Maubere people against its continued and barbaric occupation.

"The guerrilla will never change its strategy of keeping to the mountains, and the Maubere will never conform with the Indonesian occupation. In this Indonesian context the transfer of the guerrilla war from the hills to the cities is a significant progress for the East Timor question. This shows the moral strength of a national and patriotic conscience of all sons of East Timor.(...)

"A consultation of the people under Indonesian supervision will only benefit their own interests. The Timorese people would never accept any consultation done the occupying power, based on the sad case of Irian Jaya [Western Papuasia], today the 26th. province of Indonesia. That was a sad example for the Timorese (...) to repudiate all consultations organized by the Indonesians towards East Timor self determination.

"It is imperative that during the transitional period, all "transmigrasi" [transmigrated], (indonesian) priests and troops leave the territory, in order to avoid pressures in a stage of politicizing and mentalization of the people towards its vote. Such interim period should count on the Portuguese presence under the auspices of the UN. With Portuguese and Timorese - members of the Nationalist Convergence - who always showed their inclination for self determination.

"Portugal as administering power of East Timor must take a more energetic and coherent action on behalf of the defence of the interests of the East Timorese. (...)

"The Vatican should keep an open and coherent position, condemning all violent and barbaric acts practised by Indonesia, instead of giving instructions to its Nuncio in Jakarta to help bring the guerrillas to surrender."

V.6 - The resistance war: the mainstay for self determination and independence

Synopsis of the presentation by *José Guterres*, Timorese, ex-fighter of Falintil

After being captured in 1979 during the siege and annihilation campaigns, he took part in the attack to the TV Broadcasting tower on Dili, June, 10, 1980 {National Day of Portugal}. He was detained, and tortured again by the Indonesian troops. He was a member of the first group of Timorese prisoners sent to the concentration camp of Ataúro where he stayed for four years without being charged.

Thanks to the intervention of the International Red Cross he was able to leave Timor in February 1987. He is 27 years of age and currently works at the Press Information Centre of Fretilin.

"Notwithstanding the numeric and bellicose difference between FRETILIN and the Indonesian army, since the very beginning, FRETILIN has always maintained a war of resistance as the most important means to achieve peace. (...)

"FRETILIN not only took care of the military side of operations but also of the civilian side of it. Between 1975 - 1978 80% of the population were in areas controlled by FRETILIN.

"Health and sanity services were organized then, together with schools and a dedicated agricultural effort. FALINTIL's motto was "Fight, Learn and Create." FRETILIN was prepared for a war of attrition counting only on itself. (...)

"During 1978 - 1979 the enemy starts a campaign of siege and annihilation with huge number of troops, supported by heavy artillery, navy, air force and chemical weapons against FRETILIN and the population under its control. The leadership of FRETILIN is decimated up to 80%. The same happens to FALINTIL. FRETILIN definitely loses its support base.

"Most of the population that supported it was victim of the heavy enemy bombardments, or famine, or sickness. The remainder was taken by the enemy to the occupied areas.

"When doing this, the enemy was unconsciously transfering the support bases of FRETILIN to its own midst. A year after the population of the occupied zones were clandestinely organized to keep on with the resistance war, as a means of achieving peace.

"On June, 10, 1980, in the East Timor capital, Dili the clandestine resistance led by the unknown Pedro Fátima Manek, develops its first military operation from within the occupied areas. Pedro Manek was the FRETILIN commander of the Centre North Sector, captured during 1978 - 1979 and after being subjected to interrogation and torture was taken with other 30 FRETILIN combatants to be executed at Taci Tolu.

"During the trip he managed to escape away from the truck that was taking them. Hidden in the mountains he was able to establish contact with some FRETILIN guerrillas under the leadership of Commander Alex, and all survivors of the siege and annihilation campaign.

"In the meantime, Commander Xanana was going through the territory in small columns to reorganize all survivors under a new resistance restructure. The guerrillas under commander Alex were already under a revised organization by Pedro F. Manek, although they ignored the new strategy by commander Xanana. Pedro went back to Dili disguised as a street seller of fruit and coal, and was able to contact FRETILIN sympathisers and militants. Quickly a vast clandestine network was organized in Dili.

"The lack of experience in clandestine operations, since most have been working in the areas dominated by FRETILIN, forced the leadership to transfer its experience from armed insurgency to clandestine operations.

"The same strategies of the armed fighting were transposed to the clandestine fight: armed robberies, and other violent actions. We never thought of peaceful demonstrations. Any peaceful demo in those days would automatically be flattened by the enemy forces. This was the time when executions and people disappearing were very common. (...)

"What we witness today in Dili, with the youth demonstrating are but a continuation of the resistance that always existed in the occupied areas, especially after 1979, when FRETILIN support bases were transferred into areas occupied by the enemy.(...)

"The atmosphere inside occupied areas became more and more tense, especially after receiving information from the outside world on the political situation being lived in East Timor.

"The clandestine network became the receiving end of all information from all fronts: the armed and diplomatic, and changed into a communicating channel between the two, always well informed of everything that was happening.

"The resistance war aims at the attention of the international community for the strong will of the East Timorese people to become free and independent and for condemning Indonesia of its invasion and occupation of East Timor, as well as for the violation of Human Rights by Indonesian troops, in order to achieve a peaceful solution for the problem.

"The resistance war should be maintained and intensified until all Indonesian enemy troops leave the territory of East Timor. This is fundamental to achieve peace. All advances obtained until now are due to the resistance. The FRETILIN motto has been since the start of the armed conflict:

"Motherland or death
To resist is to win."

V.7 - Strategies for peace and self determination

Synopsis of the presentation by *Luís Costa*, East Timorese

As an ex-Catholic priest he followed the majority of the Timorese population under FRETILIN's protection into the mountains during the first years of occupation. He was detained, ill-treated and threatened. He currently is the Secretary of the Australasian Foundation Borja da Costa (name taken from his brother, the poet who was murdered by the occupiers in December 1975.)

(...) "History teaches us not to follow the same erroneous path that led Irian Jaya (Western Papua New Guinea) to be under Indonesian control. During the transition period, the Jakarta government manoeuvred the UN and placed all his agents in the transitional administration. When time for consultation came, Jakarta manoeuvred the referendum. Suharto will never lead a public consultation unless it serves its own interests.

"It is fundamental that during a transitional period all Indonesians - priests, transmigrated, troops and other members of clergy - leave the territory. Otherwise there will pressure during the phase of politicizing and mentalization for the free exercise of people's vote. The interim administration should be made of Portuguese and Timorese, including members of the National Convergence, who always showed their tendency for self determination.

"Portugal as administering power must be more energetic and coherent on behalf of the defence of the rights of Maubere people. Its occasional speeches should motivate and instruct its ambassadors to become more sensitive to the cause of East Timor, developing an action capable of convincing the national and international world's opinion about the violation of human rights in East Timor by Indonesian troops. The government should support the National Convergence right to be part of the negotiations over the future of East Timor.

"If Portugal is really interested on the self determination of Timor, should guarantee Timorese cadres specialize for the future. I suggest that the government establishes a special educational programme supporting the secondary educational system with material and complementary programmes, and in co-operation with Universities to facilitate the admission of Timorese, without being subjected to the <numerus clausus> restrictions.(...)

"Thinking that the war is over and done with, the Indonesian keep on their brutal activities, disrespect the amnesty promises of Suharto and massacres and generalized murders continue unabated.

"A score of priests from East Timor has taken up courageously positions on behalf of its people against the invader. The occupier exercises its pressure over priests, catechisers, and Christian people in Timor, threatening some, detaining more and murdering others.(...)

"The Catholic Church is subject to pressures by Indonesian civilians and troops, being constantly smeared by the Timorese lackeys, in order to be discredited and to be further isolated.

"The Indonesian Catholic Church cannot support the Timorese Church since it has been deeply compromised with the political regime of Suharto, apart from representing only 2.5% of 170 million inhabitants. It is imperative that all organizations (Catholic and Protestant) appeal to the Holy See on behalf of East Timor, so that its jurisdiction over

Dili can be maintained until a just solution can be found, based upon the right of the Maubere people to self determination."

V.8 - The preservation of the East Timorese identity

Synopsis of the presentation by *Brigadier Mário Lemos Pires*, ex-Governor of Portuguese Timor (1974 - 1975)

Lemos Pires starts by quoting East Timor's problems of which some are herewith mentioned:

(...) <<"They have killed and humiliated the parents but the children rise proud of not being Indonesian, and affront death to proclaim their difference. >>" [Jean Pierre Catry "Diário de Notícias, February, 7, 1990]

<<"General Benny Murdani, the Indonesian Foreign Minister stated by the end of February in Dili to the Timorese that he would not tolerate "more violations of law and order within the territory; "If someone still wants to demonstrate in favour of independence our [Indonesia's] armed forces will annihilate such attempts.>>" [Sydney Morning Herald, Australia quoted by "Diário de Notícias, March, 16, 1990."

<<"Indonesian should have addressed the UN instead of invading the territory, since they repeatedly allege that the decolonisation process was in risk.">> [Ambassador Costa Lobo in the UN Human Rights Committee, as mentioned by Diário de Notícias of February, 7, 1990]

He then goes on to conclude the tenacity of the resistance and the relevant participation of the Church of East Timor *"on its resistance to the Indonesian annexation."*

He also mentions the important position developed by Portugal, notwithstanding the Timorese criticism, that *"Portugal has not done as much as it could and should do but has always maintained its moral and historical obligations towards the people of East Timor.*

"The Indonesian government considers the annexation as irreversible and that the world public opinion, after an initial period of apathy over the situation on East Timor has, of lately, been more supportive of the East Timorese."

The ex-governor reminds us of the danger *"that when a political solution is finally found the identity of East Timor might not be possible because of the lack of existence of the Timorese people,"* as well as the inexistence of the interests and obligations of Portugal in the question.

To conclude he advances some structural proposals:

"The Portuguese government has to organize itself in an efficient manner to manage the East Timor problem. (...)

"The solution to be adopted must take as a priority the relationship between all intervening parties in order to achieve a consensual effort.

"It is essential that the Portuguese political structures and the structural representatives of the East Timorese people can co-operate and understand each other.

"On the other hand this must link flexibly with international organizations as well as with our most privileged foreign partners.(...)

"Two structures are proposed to preserve the Timorese identity and patrimony:

"A Portuguese-Timorese Institute [Foundation], independent from the state but supported by it to maintain and intensify the Lusitanian-Timorese cultural relations. During a transitional period also would help preserve the Timorese cultural identity.

"A General Secretariat for East Timor," directly dependent from the Portuguese Executive, preferably through the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Its action should concentrate on administration of the Timorese patrimony (studies, statistics, documentation, reorganizing in an accessible manner all that exists and updating it with further data) and on Timorese citizens (specifically in relation to other Portuguese citizens, and promoting their professional development and training.)

"Such a body should be directed by a High Commissioner nominated by the Government and should employ several Timorese people. Once freed from the Indonesian administration, for the East Timorese to achieve its functioning representativeness, it is advantageous, and even essential that already have in place a functioning organizational structure. Currently the National Convergence seems to be the ideal structure.(...)

"This proposed system has to be open to all organizations, movements or fields of opinion, either Portuguese, Timorese or foreigner. If they have a genuine interest in finding a solution for the East Timor problem they should, in due time and according to their interest, be heard and contacted."

V.9 - East Timor: the road to the future in perspective.

Synopsis of the presentation by *Dr. José Ramos Horta*, Founder of ASDT/FRETILIN, FRETILIN's permanent representative in the United Nations between 1976 and 1988, with a degree in International Studies by the Antioch College, author of the book "Funu, the unfinished saga of East Timor," currently the Director of an International Diplomacy Training program at the University of New South Wales, Australia.

East Timor in the geopolitical context of 1975

"In the history of East Timor, 1975 was a black year, marked by an aborted decolonisation, civil war, negligence and despise, the collective immaturity of those aspiring to the Timorese political leadership and a bloody invasion. It was also a year of great convulsion in the region and in the world. From the Horn of Africa to Southern Africa and to Indochina all dominoes started crumbling. At the Horn of Africa, Haile Selasie was ousted and the long presence of an American naval base was terminated. The Americans witnessed their position on the Red Sea and on the Indian Ocean seriously compromised whilst the Soviets established their control over the Gulf of Aden and the Berbere naval base.

"The North American defeat in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam(11); the CIA intervention fiasco in Angola, the Cuban intervention and the MPLA victory; FRELIMO's taking power in Mozambique; the threat of installation in Portugal of a regime that was anathema for NATO and American interests; were all events that seemed to confirm Lyndon Bird Johnson's <<domino theory>>.

"The problem of East Timor comes into evidence in such a dramatic change in regional stability. East Timor would not draw the attention of high hierarchies in the Department of State and the National Security Council. They were too much humiliated and traumatized by Vietnam, by their credibility as the world cop.

"During the summer of 1975, the Secretary of State, Henri Kissinger instructed its embassy in Jakarta to reduce the number of reports on East Timor because ***<<the United States have other and bigger preoccupations in other parts of the world. >>*** *This lack of interest and the American non-committal position would translate into "green light" for the Indonesians to solve the problem as they saw fit.*

"The dramatic events of 1975 also caused a big impact on the Indonesian generals, who were extremely worried by the victorious wave of left wing forces on all continents. A Marxist regime in East Timor was absolutely infeasible for them. Their paranoia was always utilized to totally smash every domestic dissident attempt.

"I have always claimed and I still defend that Indonesia's invasion of East Timor has little to do with a communist threat, more imaginary than real, but more with a real and rational preoccupation that an independent East Timor might bring hopes to other separatist groups still barely visible, throughout the archipelago.

"Indonesia has, and has always had, a school of thought that does not hide their dream of recreating Indonesia bigger than the Dutch colonial borders. For that school, the integration of East Timor with Indonesia was but another step in that direction.

"The Soviet "threat theory" in Southeast Asia was denied by Indonesian strategists who saw the USSR and Vietnam as buffers for a possible Chinese expansion into the south. Abiding by that logic, Jakarta never hostilized Moscow and vice versa.

"The Kremlin would not change its Southeast Asia strategy because of its "socialist fraternity" towards an ideologically undefined FRETILIN (where there were Marxists, Social Democrats with a vast majority, and primary anti-communists in bigger number than the Marxists but less influential.) (...).

"It does not come as a surprise that FRETILIN leaders were never invited to Moscow, and even less a surprise that FRETILIN never got a ruble or a Soviet rifle.(..)

"Slightly less than a month after founding ASDT [Timorese Social Democrat Association on May, 20, 1974] I went to Kupang, capital of the Indonesian Timor, where I had talks with Governor El-Tari, and went to Jakarta where I had a series of three meetings with the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and with other military personalities. During such meetings, I stressed the following points:

"An independent East Timor would have preferential relations with Indonesia, other ASEAN country members and with Australia;

"An independent East Timor would opt by integration with ASEAN;

"An independent East Timor would co-ordinate its security and external relations with Indonesia.

"With Adam Malik, I was even able to confer on more concrete and immediate questions, confirming our good will and seriousness like sending to Indonesia young Timorese to start their studies and diplomatic training in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, or sending Timorese army officers also to be trained by Indonesia. (...)"

"East Timor in the context of 1990"

"The regional and international situation in 1990 is substantially different from what it was back in 1975, as I previously described. The paranoia Soviet threat that justified so many excesses from the right is totally discredited. The paranoia of the imperialist threat that justified the excesses of the totalitarian left regimes is equally discredited. Myths of irreversibility like the taboo of the Yalta Treaty, the secret Pact Riebentrop - Molotov, the sacrosanct powers of the States and their domestic jurisdiction gave way to democracy, to self determination and a bigger acceptance of the universal application of legislation defending human rights.(...)

"The winds of change that affect all continents have yet to reach Indonesia. Such a transformation can only improve the people of Indonesia and East Timor, if domestic agents for the change can intervene actively in such a process.(...)

"From a military and tactical point of view, Indonesia has the upper hand and an offensive superiority in East Timor. The resistance still lacks the most basic means to influence a change in the strategic field. The guerrilla action is limited, sporadic and without major impact. However, the war in East Timor is a social and political haemorrhage capable of affecting the Indonesian presence. I do not call it an economic haemorrhage because considering the limited action of the guerrilla to inflict heavy damage can easily be absorbed and included as a training and preparation cost of the armed forces. Indeed East Timor has been an exceptionally good training field for the armed forces to practice with live fire. On the other hand this situation can drag on for many more years with an East Timorese human cost unheard of.

"Politically, Indonesia lost the war. After 14 years of savage occupation even those who were apologists of the integration are alienated and at the same it helped strengthen nationalistic feelings on those who always idealized an independent East Timor.

"The new generation of East Timorese, born or bred after the invasion is at the frontline, fighting for freedom and they are the guarantee that the resistance will continue.(...)

"Without any prospective and substantial political change in Indonesia or in the military balance in East Timor, we are only left with one alternative: Increase the diplomatic and political cost of the war so that Indonesia might have the incentive to search by dialogue a serious solution for the conflict.

"The greater interdependence of countries makes them more vulnerable to external forces." It is thus possible to adopt *"other forms of pressure whose impact may balance the military costs. (...)"*

Following this line of approach, Ramos Horta proposes a diplomatic offensive based upon:

"round table conversations without pre conditions based on Resolution 37/30 (...) of the UN General Assembly.(...)

"This concept of conversations without pre conditions would put Indonesia into the defensive, giving us the lead for a diplomatic offensive, multiplying our actions in various fronts:

"USA, American Congress, Department of State, White House, Pentagon (as all are the major agencies that take part in formulating big American diplomatic initiatives), NGO's, Media, etc."

To achieve that, Ramos Horta suggests: *"to hire an American lobbyist whose work could be supervised by the Embassy."*

In New York the East Timorese resistance does not have:" *a permanent presence because it lacks financial means. It is imperative to find some funding to keep in New York, two dynamic East Timorese with good and sound knowledge of at least two of the five official languages adopted by the UN: English, French or Spanish.(...)"*

The ex-FRETILIN representative at the UN, also advances that: *"the East Timorese resistance should have a more visible presence in Strasbourg, Geneve and Brussels. (...)*

"The resistance also must be well represented in Japan, with a delegate in Tokyo to cover some of the ASEAN countries [Philippines and Thailand] and South Korea.(...)

"All this means an adequate budget, but the cost, will be feasibly covered by a political will from the powers that rule.(...)

"Furthermore, our strategy has to rely on an offensive arms' embargo to Indonesia, if this country does not relax its inflexible position.

"The current regional and international stability are on our side. Indonesia does not face today, nor has it faced ever, any external threat to its national security.

"The Indonesian generals paranoia about the communist threat, no longer have any justification to acquire sophisticated means of defence, thanks to the relaxing of the regional and international tensions.

"In most industrialized arms' manufacturers there is legislation forbidding any arms transfer to conflict areas. This happens in the US, where specific legislation exists to prohibit the use of American military equipment in areas of aggression.

"Based upon such legislation it might be legally feasible to start a legal suit in a State Court, in order to obtain a restrictive order for the sale of weapons to Indonesia. Other countries, such as Canada, UK, and Sweden have similar legislation.

"One must find ways to support the Timorese resistance in the various fronts of fight (...)".

VI - CLOSING SESSION (*)

VI.1 - Speech by *General Ramalho Eanes*, ex-President of the Republic (1976-1981 and 1981-1986) and Member of the Republic's Council (**)

(...)"Timor as a problem for the conscience of the Portuguese Nation"

"Regarding such important problem it is my opinion that everything has already been said. I will stress it however, quoting a recently published piece of poetry by João Sant'iago:

<< There at the other end of world we left them
abandoned in land that used to be ours, but not any more
slaves now because of our fault and risk
(...)
And slowly they die those who were left behind
- every man bears some truth -
when one loses the strength and freedom
one dies slowly day after day >>

"Timor and the international community represented by the UN"

"Timor is unquestionably and rightly so, a problem of the international community. Contrary to what has sometimes been mentioned, Timor is not and has not been a mere contentious dispute between the invader [Indonesia] and Portugal.

"Our country is only the administering power, and as such represents and acts on behalf of the international community, represented by the United Nations. The biggest of all responsibilities is not to be alienated by the United Nations.

"The UN has more and more responsibility, with the internationalization of the problem of East Timor, after the situation created by the invasion, by the genocide of the Javanese occupier and by the continuous violations of human rights.

"More than ever before, Timor represents today an indefeasible political obligation of the UN."

"Timor in the geopolitical world scene"

"As you know World War II ended with a bi polarized world with a balance of forces highly favourable to the maritime power: The USA. Not long thereafter, the continental power, the USSR tries to alter such balance.

"In fact the Soviet -led communist expansionism, shows determinedly its intent of questioning the position of the USA on its own territory. It is the cold war and the direct and indirect attrition with classical conflicts, guerrilla wars and crisis.

(*) In the closing session, besides the following presentations, almost in their complet form, there were also those of the coordinator of this Seminar and of Dr. Rui Quartim santos (First Class Plenipotencionary Minister who, in the Foreign Office, is the most important person directly in charge of the East Timor problem). Due to the cirunstancial character of the first and in the absence of the written text of the second, we have decided to omit both.

(**) Presentation almost in its complete form.

"It is worth remembering as far as the Pacific area is concerned that:

- *"As soon as 1946, the USSR supports and stimulates war on Indochina. When the USA departs in 1954 occupies the Cam-Ran naval base and has access and air and navy facilities to Da-Nang.*

- *"Between 1948 and 1957 the communist guerrilla dilapidated Malaya. From 1949 to 1953 the Philippines are perturbed by guerrilla movements. From 1950 to 1953 the Korea war directly threatens the American control of the seas.*

- *"The USSR transforms itself in a formidable naval power. The Us in a multifaceted response to the strategic Soviet offensive in the Pacific, update and reinforce their traditional expansionist policy, through the archipelagos (as they had done during the XIX century until they got to the Philippines*

- *"The ancestral animosity between the Soviets and the Americans, not diminished by the communist ideology led to changes in the soviet strategy in the Pacific. After some time the USSR:*

i) "Did not question the American strategic domination in that area,

ii) "Decided to try as its major objective the weakening of the Chinese Empire, putting obstacles to its expansion to the south (the Vietnamese-Chinese war, Cambodian invasion, sale of arms to Indonesia), thus forcing the Chinese to considerably increase its military might on the South West border.

"It is under such scenario that the current situation of East Timor has to be seen (unfortunately the big powers - and not only them - follow geopolitical logic without any moral backing.) This scenario led the US to (at least) stimulate the so called States of National Security: Marcos in the Philippines, Lon Nol in Cambodia, Suharto in Indonesia.

"Those states, according to A. Moreira, have "the army in power, the enemy identified as communist, and an assumed need of security against any aggression from foreign sanctuaries.

"It is such logic that led the USA to, objectively "sanction" the invasion of Timor, and to objectively recognize the validity of its "integration" with the Javanese empire.

"The same logic leads the USSR to consider the invasion of Timor as a "minor act" and assumed it as an indirect rebuff to its traditional enemy China. It also used it to attack the USA within the then scenario of the Cold War.

"China was very careful, because of its tactical alliance with the USA and of all its internal and external vulnerableness, limiting itself to moderately support the Portuguese position. The different regional powers had neither economic interest in being hostile to Indonesia, nor political and strategic reasons to oppose the US policy in the area.

"Because of those reasons, Timor could not have received other international response during the Cold War. These reasons were at some stage well endorsed by high ranking Portuguese officials and politicians.

"Today the international scene is vastly different:

a) "The US allowed the fall of Marcos in the Philippines.

b) "The Cold War ended leaving China even more weakened, and no longer posing a threat to the region.

c) "The US and its allies have fortified their position in the Pacific.

d) "The international situation makes it difficult for the American power to "support" the "States of National Security," i.e., Indonesia, in relation to US and international public opinion."

"East Timor as a political problem for Portugal"

"Everything has been said regarding this point. It is an indefeasible responsibility of Portugal:

a) *"To do everything to stop the genocide (including the cultural genocide) imposed by Indonesia on the people of East Timor.*

b) *"To assume totally its position as administering power and take it to the limits.*

c) *"To force the international community, especially through the UN to assume its major responsibility towards East Timor: simultaneously a case of decolonisation from an external aggression, genocide and crimes against mankind.*

d) *"Not to refuse, any action that possibly might lead to a real self determination, accepted by the entire Maubere people.*

e) *"To use the current international situation and Indonesia's vulnerability, to initiate a new offensive on the international public opinion and friendly governments (USA, and especially EEC countries.)*

"Solutions"

"Given the current international situation with all new opportunities that it presents towards a solution of the East Timor problem, it should be considered a careful and urgent study of the situation and options for action.

"I will end with a suggestion for the formation of a group to define a strategy to adopt for East Timor supplementing the government's strategy. Such group should compulsory be made of representatives from the people of East Timor and the Catholic Church.

"Such study should take into consideration results from this conference:

a) *"Current situation of East Timor, both internal and external.*

b) *"Indonesia's current vulnerableness, both internal and external.*

c) *"Non governmental initiatives to be taken.*

d) *"Formation and mobilization of means in order to carry operationally the strategy to be adopted.*

"To avoid that actions or measures advanced by such group could be used against the external initiatives and actions of the Portuguese government, it should operate independently.

"A new and justified ray of hope for freedom, shines for the East Timorese. A well deserved freedom, because of its impressive courage who led to resist all pressures against its assimilation with the Javanese Empire. A freedom deserved by political and moral reasons, through its admirable guerrilla war, in a small insular territory, lacking sanctuaries for recovery.

"To Xanana Gusmão, a symbol of determination and fight of the Timorese people, is due a special homage, that I here want to express."

VI.2 - Presentation by *Dr. Paulo Pires*, Timorese, President of the UDT Political Committee (Timorese Democrat Union) (*)

"It is with great pleasure that we notice the presence of so many high ranking personalities from all areas of the Portuguese Sovereignty. Also present, other personalities from all walks of life within the Portuguese civilian society, foreign representatives, leaders of various solidarity groups for East Timor, and the permanent and dedicated presence of representatives from the media.

"This objectively means that, long are the days when the situation of East Timor was treated as a"taboo." At long last, the representatives of the Portuguese Sovereignty, the civilian groups of our society and other representatives of the Portuguese society, are openly assuming the problem of Timor, that not so long ago was almost forgotten.

"it is now time for Portugal to publicly and strongly assume its historical mission towards the East Timorese, thus honouring the commitment celebrated with the Timorese kingdoms of 500 years ago. During those centuries of coexistence there were strong links between the people of Portugal and East Timor, and they were not only friendly manifestations but also cultural. The global political events that affect History cannot break such links, because they are still alive and strong. Portugal has made us different from our Indonesian neighbours. Our cultural and spiritual identity was achieved century after century, decade after decade, together with Portugal.

"Therefore Portugal is as resposible as we Timorese for keeping our own identity, our own culture, our own religion, our history. We have writings in common. What links us goes far beyon distance and time depletes the formal contents of the principles taht rule the relationship among peoples.

"If by any academic chance, the institutional, legal, national and international scene changes, taking from Portugal its responsability over Timor, our links will make Portugal assume its moral and historical responsability. This is the vinculum that turns Portugal the first responsible for the liberation of the Timorese and for the independence of the island.

"Portugal may only clamour ***<<it has given worlds to the world>>*** *if Timor gets independent as all the other Portuguese ex-colonies. For this historical task that can be compared to the advertures of the Portuguese Discoveries in the XV and XVI centuries, Portugal can count on us, Timorese people and on our representatives.*

"The National Convergence (NC) has already done important thinks in difficult situations of our fight. NC is in a different level of its development. From today on it will have to go further and involve all the live forces of our community and Diaspora, it will

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(*) Almost complete transcription of the presentation.

have to embrace Timorese values that also want the liberation of its people an an independent homeland.

*"Our resistence can not confine to armed fight, because it is conjunctural; it can not confine to political-diplomatic fight, because it is strategical; our resistence will have to embrace all the aspects of our Timorese Society, which are the grounds of the Timorese identity. However a student of mine in 74/75 wrote the following **<<they can kill the body, but they will never kill the mind>>.***

"I can not leave without expressing my gratitude to the Rector of Oporto University and my friendship to Prof. Barbedo de Magalhães, coordinator of this seminar and to the groups that made this possible".

VI.3 - Presentation by Abílio Araújo, Timorese, member of the Central Committee and Head of the FRETILIN delegation outside the territory (DFSE) (*)

(...) "Last year, on April, 26 three Timorese students, Fernão Trindade, 17 years of age, Mário Trindade, 22, and Felisberto Mascarenhas, 23 were detained and tortured by the military police. They were detained and tortured, according to a report we have received today from Australia. I started by mentioning this to stress another point, that during the past few days and even now, there is a people that keeps on fighting a regime whose barbaric acts never stop against an innocent, defenceless people who only wants to be free.

"I am glad that the presence of Your Excellencies shows once more that there is a consensus in Portugal regarding the need to put an end to the genocide and the martyrdom of the East Timorese people..

"<<East Timor, Land of Hope>> was the motto for this Seminar. Timor awaits the strength and determination of Portugal to combine with its own, as it has been shown for the past fifteen years. Notwithstanding the difficulties, problems and crises that occurred within the Resistence, notwithstanding the split that happened with the Civil War, we have had the opportunity of witnessing throughout this Seminar the strong contribution from the Timorese, from leaders of the Nacional Convergence, from leaders of both UDT and FRETILIN, and from independent people who also have shown their willingness to work towards the comon objective, that is: the liberation of East Timor (...).

"For the past fifteen years of suffering we have followed a process of self-criticism, if you will allow me to use the word. The Timorese society and the Timorese kept on fighting, trying to overtake all difficulties or hazards, in order to obtain a deeper involvment in our fight. The example comes from inside the territory, where our people, the armed resistence, the Church and the active elements of the clandestine movement have joined their hands in order to show the world their determination to become independent . They also want to show the Indonesians how difficult they are to be subdued. The strategy, the military plans of the Indonesian generals to take over East Timor in three days is now obsolete. The people of East Timor keeps on fighting and resisting.

"The leaders of the National Convergence are united in order to make it efficient in the pursuit of our fight outside the territory. We believe that the National Convergence is a step, perhaps an historical one, needed to generate other developments. Following this line

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(*) Almost complete transcription of the presentation.

of thought I want to state here that the leaders of the National Convergence will never waste the intellectual and professional wealth and capabilities that the Timorese, either individually or in group have shown for the past fifteen years.

"I want to reiterate what Dr. Paulo Pires stated: "All of us are not enough for the big enterprise that awaits us." We are determined and willing. We expect an answer to this determination of ours from Portugal. We are a small, defenceless and weak people, but we have a huge will to keep on fighting to achieve our liberation and independence.

"For the past few years our people has increased its identity, an identity that in part we owe to Portugal. When we continue our fight in East Timor, we are conscious that we are keeping alive the Portuguese language and presence in the Far East, as we will keep alive the friendship that has always united our people and the Portuguese.

"Ladies and Gentlemen, we are going to leave this meeting, with a strong belief that all the efforts of these past days will be a motivator and a creator of leads for our fight. As Timorese we will do everything we can to help Portugal on its efforts to liberate our country. Together there will be more hope for us and especially for those who still fight inside".

VI.4 - Presentation by the Honourable MP, *António Sousa Lara* from PSD (Social Democrat Party), President of the Eventual Commission of the Assembly of the Republic for the Follow-up of the Situation in East Timor

Sousa Lara, MP has a degree in Social Science, is a Full Professor of the Lusiad University and a Tutor at the International University. He has published various books and publications, including "The Subversion of the State," "Political Science Notes," and he is a Member of various academic institutions in Portugal, Brazil, Spain and Italy. He has been decorated by various honorific institutions: Order of Malta, Saint Sepulchre, Isabella the Catholic, Civil Merit of Spain, Poland Reinstated, etc. (*)

"I heard and read with the utmost interest the invaluable presentations that I believe will constitute a "dossier" of immense actuality and importance on this issue. I believe that the Oporto University intends to publish the minutes of this Seminar, as it has previously done. I consider it to be extremely useful if we could include a summary of each intervention in French and English in order to get broader publicity overseas.

"Instead of an archival document of good intentions we should transform it into a catapult.

"It is clear and just that people consider East Timor as a problem for the politicians. In fact, politicians, civilians and military started it and by inherence of their own positions they were responsible for it.

"But the dramatic suffering linked to the clamorous situation lived by the people of East Timor, and we should never shy off publicising, concerns mankind. Reliable news come to us of political prisoners, sequestered, tortured, mutilated and even murdered between the ages of fifteen and sixteen years.

"The same reports tell us of priest imprisoned and viled, they tell us of compulsory sterilization of youngsters, of forced relocation of the population, of deliberately provoked famine, forced migrations, permanent violations of mail secrecy and a whole lot of total disrespect for the most elementary human rights.

(*) Almost complete transcription of the presentation.

"Do these belong to the exclusive field of politicians or should the civilians and the society rebel on their own?.

"If, as I believe, it is a public duty I question myself over the boycotts to Indonesia?

"Where are the workers' unions forming an international chain of solidarity against such vile dictatorship?

"Where are the Universities and other schools, joining hands and voice with the courageous University of Oporto to promote a joint campaign of debates and congresses over East Timor, showing its political, cultural, historical and religious identity?

"Where are the mass media, both national and international to use their power as the fourth estate to agitate systematically the ill advised, the sleepy and the ignorant masses, or to frighten the complicity of alliances who try to avoid knowing of the on going genocide?

"Where are the churches and all their authority, the same Christian religious groups that have just celebrated Namibia's independence?

"Where are the Eastern European countries who celebrate now their newfound freedom? My God, of them all where is Poland, a victim of persecution and genocide who always became victorious because of its firm intransigence during its fight?

"Where are the United States of America, our friends and champions of democracy and freedom, defenders of all human rights, where are they in this long march to the Calvary?

"Do not tell us to rest calmly, softening our rebellious shouts when we have been left with so little voice.

"If you are after tolerance ask it to the Timorese who are going to die, if you are after patience ask it to those Timorese who are going to be tortured.

"No dictatorship is eternal and Suharto has his days earmarked. Now what is important is the people who suffer. They are all different and we cannot replace them. We can always do something more, and together that will make a difference. All we need is to start saying: <<I want>>.

"Your Excellency, the Rector, ladies and gentlemen, I will end as I started a few days ago with words of gratitude and hope.

"To the University I will say thank you so much, congratulations and keep on with the good work. To all of us that have just learned a little bit more, I will lend a strong and fraternal embrace for the fight. Yes it is a fight we are talking about.

"To all our close salutation."

VI.5 - Synopsis of the presentation by Professor *Alberto Amaral*, Rector of the Oporto University

After thanking the presence of all participants in this Seminar, namely the foreign ones, political personalities, Timorese, and representatives of the National Convergence, as well as all the organizations and solidarity groups who helped the Seminar taking place, the Rector reminded us that:

"There are the indefeasible rights of the people, and amongst those the right to existence, to political self determination and the maintenance of culture. Those rights are also linked to the respect for the Human Rights (...) that Indonesia has systematically violated."

And goes on further:

"We have witnessed throughout the years to a long series of international cumplicity that sometimes take the problem of East Timor into oblivion, and there are always new events in the international scene taking first spot on the stakes for the attention of the public opinion, shadowing even more the drama of this oppressed people.

"The destinies of History are unstoppable and in the last few years we have learned that even dictatorships are not eternal, and that happily the speed of disappearance of those dictators has increased substantially. It should be noted that since Indonesia lives under a dictatorial regime its days have to be numbered.

"We should have hope in the future, not passively but actively. It is imperative that we awake the international community for the problem of East Timor by a constant action on the public opinion and using various other mehtods expressed throughout this Seminar.

"Universities being independent, have a moral weight as a forum for the free discussion of ideas and principles, and as such they can have a relevant role. This explains why the Oporto University has taken once more this sort of intervention.

"As Rector I want to take up the challenge of the Honorable António Sousa Lara, MP, and promise that documents produced in this Seminar will be published, accompanied by summaries in French and English to be sent to other Universities in Europe and the world. We also will ask for the intervention of the:

- *Council of European University Chancellors*
- *International Universities´ Association,*

for them to take up the publicitation of the case of East Timor in international organizations, university comunities of all countries. The same was recently done for a Turkish problem and we believe a similar supportive action will be possible for Portugal and East Timor.

"I conclude thanking you once more your participation, and thanking the organizing committee, with a message for our Timorese brethren: Do not give up because we are with you".

(*) Oporto University is the larget in Portugal both in number of students and of courses.

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Resolution approved by unanimous vote in the
Assembly of the Republic (Parliament)
on May, 3, 1990

"It took place on April, 28, 29 and 30 and on May, 1 the 2nd. Seminar on East Timor, promoted by the Oporto University. Representatives of the Eventual Parliamentary Commission for the Follow-up of the Situation in East Timor, solidarity groups, religious, political and cultural representatives from Portugal and other countries, namely from the United States of America, United Kingdom, and the Australia, the Most Reverend Paul Moore, anglican Bishop (Ret.) of New York, and a member of the Portuguese Foreign Office did participate.

"Throughout the Seminar there was ample debate and reflection on the serious problem of East Timor, and it is worth mentioning the statements on the repeated human right violations of its people by the invading nation.

"The Assembly of the Republic congratulates the organization of this 2nd.Seminar on East Timor, on its success and reiterates all its willingness to develop all the efforts, within its area of responsibility, in order to reach the constitutional objective of self determination and independence of East Timor."

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